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This study is about the ideologies of Zionism and Apartheid, whose
regimes (Israel and South Africa) represent the last bastions of the
colonial settler enterprise. This study is multidimensional, coming under
the fields of both political sociology and comparative politics. It is
a cross-national analysis of ideology and race relations, and is concerned
with exposing the role of ideology in perpetuating and legitimizing
political domination.
The November 10, 1975 U.N. resolution that equated Zionism with
racism and racial discrimination has generated a great deal of controversy
and debate. Supporters of Israel denied the charge, arguing that Zionism
is a progressive national liberation movement which led the fight against
imperialism. The Afrikaners, too, rejected their colonialist origins and
claimed that they led the decolonization movement in Southern Africa.
This inquiry tests the fairness and the validity of the anti-
Zionist thesis (not popular in the West) which sees Israel as a colonial-
settler state, like that of South Africa, and which maintains that Zionism
is a no less racist ideology than South African apartheid. In other
words, the purpose of this inquiry is to find out whether the ideology of
Zionism and the laws of Israel sanction discrimination against non-Jews
in Israel. If so, how are these conditions similar to that of apartheid
in South Africa?
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The evidences reviewed in this study suggest that the course of the
Zionist enterprise was similar in essence to that of European colonialism
in Africa and Asia, and emphasize the settler-colonial character of the
Zionist movement and the state of Israel. The findings do not support the
Zionist thesis of liberation, and see Zionism as a racist ideology whose
ethnic policies lead in the same direction of South African apartheid:
expropriation of the lands of other people, denying the natives'
fundamental human and political rights, and practicing extreme
discrimination based on race superiority and purity using the myth of
fulfilling a divine mission. One can argue about the relative differences
between the two situations, but the essence is the same. In both cases,
the colonial settler either denied the existence of the local native or
wished his disappearance. Both regimes are committed to a practical
policy of apartheid, though Israel does not formally employ the term.
Both regimes follow domestic policies based on race discrimination, which
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Can Israel be classified as a colonial settler state like those of
the former Rhodesia and South Africa? Does a form of apartheid exist in
Israel similar, along general lines, to that of South Africa? Is Zionism*
a liberation movement or a racist ideology? The present study seeks to
answer these questions. I shall start by presenting the Zionist point of
view.
The Israeli writer, Amos Elon, argues that although, in technical
terms, the early Zionist pioneers can be considered as colonists, the
essence and intention of their enterprise differed from other colonial
ventures. He explains:
Technically speaking, they were colonists. Yet by
temperament, motivation, circumstance, and choice they
differed sharply from other emigrants of that period who
colonized Australia, Africa, Canada, or the United States.
They were not in search of fertile land, gold, unlimited
opportunity, or steady employment in a fast-expanding economy.
Nor were they sent by chartered companies or government
anxious to rid themselves of surplus populations, expand the
territories under their control, or make the flag follow the
trade.
This was colonizing without a motherland, an attempt to
establish a state without the backing of state power; it was
also a.dramatic reversal of the then current village-to-city
trend.1
Elsewhere, Elon adds:
By avoiding the typical pattern of colonial settlers
elsewhere, the policy of Avoda Ivrit bred in their hearts a
deeply felt, and totally sincere, sense of moral superiority
over other colonialists. If this be a fallacy, it gained
ground, again, because there was some truth to it.
There was never a sense of "colonial vocation" among the
Zionist settlers. There was a cultural arrogance here as
elsewhere; but individual motivation was sharply different.
Elsewhere, a colonial career frequently meant social and
professional advancement. In Palestine the opposite was true.
Elsewhere, those who failed to attain bourgeois status at home
often found it in the colonies; again, here the opposite
happened. The settlers were not looking for individual
material benefits but aimed at achieving a collective goal.
In a similar vein, John Farley states that this Israeli pattern of
colonialism and conquests differs from that of Rhodesia and South Africa
because "... the impetus for the Jewish settlement came not from the
expansionist desire of colonial power but in large part from the desire
of a persecuted people for a safe homeland."3
Zionism sees itself as a national liberation movement of the Jewish
people. In his criticism to the 1975 United Nations resolution that
equated Zionism with racism, the Israeli delegate, Chaim Hertzog, stated:
"Zionism is one of the most striking and constructive national movements
in human history."4 As to the charge of racism, defenders of Zionism
argue that Zionism cannot be viewed as a racist ideology because it
"define[s] its members in terms not of birth, but of belief." In his U.N.
speech, the then U.S. Ambassador explained:
It was not a movement of persons connected by historic
membership in a genetic pool . . . nor yet of diverse groups
occupying the same territory ... To the contrary, Zionists
defined themselves merely as Jews and declared to be Jewish
anyone born of a Jewish mother or, and this is the absolutely
crucial fact, anyone who converted to Judaism . . With a
consistency in the matter which surely attests to the
importance of this issue to that religious and political
culture, Israeli courts have held that a Jew who converts to
another religion is no longer a Jew.
In the same U.N. debate, the representative of Barbados declared
that the concept of racism is based on color, and thus cannot apply "where
the target of discrimination was not ' black'. "6 In an article in the
Washington Post. William Drummond admitted that "discrimination does take
place" in Israel "for a variety of reasons, but none of them appears to
be racist in origin."7
In regard to the charge of israeli apartheid, the editor of the
Israeli liberal political weekly, Koteret Rashit. said: "We do not have
apartheid in Israel; Jews and Arabs for that matter can live where they
want."6 Likewise, in 1985, the Israeli cabinet announced that it
"unconditionally objects to the policy of apartheid . . . The Jewish
people's state will never agree to any discrimination on the grounds of
race, religion, or color, or any other grounds."9 Another Israeli writer
projected the Zionist colonization as a progressive one. In his book
Conflict and Contradiction. Meron Benvenisti argues that the creation of
a separate Jewish society by early Zionists aimed 'to prevent the rise of
a colonial society in Palestine consisting of Jewish masters and Arab
peons."10 Finally, the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, spoke of
democracy, equality, and justice within Jewish society, stating:
Israel's citizens—Jews, Muslims, Druze and
Christian—are equal before the law. Its judiciary is totally
independent and beyond reproach; its elections, in which 70
to 80 percent of the electorate vote, are exemplary; its
parties, from the extreme left to the extreme right, are all
represented in parliament; and its numerous newspapers, in
Hebrew, Arabic, English and other languages, reflect an
incredible diversity of opinions. The Arab citizens of Israel
are the only Arabs in the Middle East who can vote freely for
a representative democratic government and who enjoy freedom
of speech, assembly and movement.
The foregoing discussion outlines the controversy in Israel and the
world concerning the charge of "Zionist racism" or "Israel's apartheid".
I am fully aware that the comparison between Zionism and South African
apartheid is a very controversial subject, and thus no thesis can satisfy
all parties. While it is not difficult from the Afro-Asian perspective
to view the Zionist state as another manifestation of racial colonialism,
Western public opinion tends to see Zionism and Israel in a different
light. Those Western "liberals" who oppose colonialism and apartheid but
firmly support Israel argue that Israel's ties with South Africa are
exaggerated and that comparison between Zionism and apartheid is
superficial or misleading. Several professors and students with whom I
have discussed my study expressed reservation and disbelief, asking how
a country like Israel, established as a refuge for the persecuted, could
become a persecutor. How could a state founded as a homeland for victims
of racism turn out to be itself guilty of racism?
The Literature Review
It is by no means an exaggeration to say that Zionism is a very
controversial subject which is "adequately understood by only a small
percentage of its critics and by an even smaller percentage of its
supporters."12 The question is also sensitive for its obvious relevance
to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Zionism is frequently depicted by its supporters as a national
liberation movement which seeks to establish a Jewish state in Palestine
where Jews can find a safe haven. Those who oppose Zionism see it as
being part of the colonizing movement of the white man who goes to live
among the non-white for purposes of exploitation. Holders of this view
have frequently emphasized the similarities between the Zionist "settler-
colonialism" in Palestine and the white colonial enterprise in South
Africa. This perception holds that the "racist" nature of Zionism is
similar, although not identical, to that of South African apartheid. The
following discussion clearly indicates the conflict in the literature.
Yigal Allon, one of the early Zionist leaders stated:
Zionism is the national liberation movement of a people
exiled from its historic homeland and dispersed among the
nations of the world. Zionism is the redemption of an ancient
nation from a tragic lot and the redemption of a land
neglected for centuries.
Zionism is, in sum, the constant and unrelenting effort
to realize the national and universal vision of the prophets
of Israel13 (p. 75).
In his book, The Making of Modern Zionism: The Intellectual Origins
of the Jewish State.14 Sholomo Avineri describes Zionism as a revolutionary
response to "anti-semitism" and "emancipation." He credits Zionism with
the creation of Israel and with the unity of the Jewish people all over
the world. The author seems to overlook Zionism's inability to solve "the
Arab problem." Another book from the Zionist perspective is: The Siege:
The Saga of Israel's Zionism.15 by Conor O'Brien. The author believes that
the powerful influence of the Zionist movement cannot be explained except
by Biblical divine power. Although he acknowledges that Israel, as far
as the Arab inhabitants are concerned, is not a true democracy, O'Brien
finds this excusable because the Arabs are non-Jews who live in basically
a Jewish state, and because the Arabs are "reasonably" considered a
security problem. A pro-Zionist author, Yohanan Romati, states that if
the rights of the minorities all over the world are not equal to that of
the majorities, why does anyone demand equal rights for the Palestinians
in the Jewish states. Writing in Midstream.16 Ramati put it this way:
Frenchmen enjoy special rights in France, the Dutch in
Holland, and the Swedes in Sweden. Zionism demands special
rights for Jews in their country—Palestine. It is as
legitimate as any other nationalism, and no more racist. It
has no wish to oppress the Arabs. But it definitely claims
that the rights of the Arab minority in Palestine are not
equal to Jewish rights—just as the rights of the Swedes in
Finland are not equal to the rights of the Finns (p. 25).
[Emphasis in original]
In her book, Human Rights in the Israeli-Occupied Territories.17
Esther Cohen holds that "Israel's security legislation was patterned after
the Fourth Geneva convention and was in conformity with its provisions."
(p. 143); "customary international law is absorbed automatically into
Israeli courts" (p. 156), and the economic condition of the occupied
territories has benefitted from the growth of Israel's economy (p. 286).
Cohen concludes: "... Israel's policy of balancing security measures
with economic, cultural, social, and civil liberties can be taken as a
paradigm for future occupations" (p. 289). In his book, Revolution and
the Transformation of Societies: A Comparative Study of Civilization18.
S. N. Eisenstadt expressed admiration of the "revolutionary" Zionist
experience in Palestine, but made no reference to the Palestinian Society
and its doom at the hands of the Zionists. He writes:
Israeli society shared important features with such non-
imperial immigrant societies as the United States and the
British dominions: (1) a strong emphasis on equality, at
least among the earliest settlers . . . (259)
The revolutionary experience of the Zionist movement as
manifest in the colonialization of Palestine and later the
state of Israel is closest to the experience of the American
colonies . . . (260).
In the same vein, Jacob Tsur, in his book, Zionism, The Saga of a National
Liberation Movement19 defines Zionism as "the Jewish people's movement of
national liberation" which "constitutes an integral part of the wider
historic process of the emancipation of nations" (p. 9). Tsur also adds
that from the beginning, Zionism has been progressive, democratic, and a
"mass movement of the oppressed Jewish people. It developed as an
offshoot of the egalitarian doctrine heralded by the French Revolution"
(p. 11). In defense of Zionism is Amnon Rubenstein's book, The Zionist
Dream Revisited: From Herzl to Gush Emunim and Back.20 Rubenstein
contends that Zionism is a revolutionary liberation movement that "is not
content with returning the Jewish people to its lost sovereignty, never
forgotten homeland; it also seeks to be the midwife who helps the Jewish
people give birth to a new kind of man" (p. 6). What went wrong, like the
Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the author maintains, does not reflect the
Zionist ideal; rather, it reflects the growing influence of religious
nationalists in Israeli society.
On November 10, 1975, the United Nations issued its resolution of
3379 which "determines that Zionism is a form of racism and racial
discrimination."21 The Zionist scholarship responded vigorously by
attacking the resolution as "anti-semitic". In its "editorial,"22
Midstream, a monthly Jewish review, describes the U.N. resolution as a
"cynical drive of the Arab-Communist axis" (p. 3), and holds that Zionism
is a unique national liberation movement inspired by "universalist social
vision" (p. 3) and that "its egalitarian vision continues to shape"
Israel, the only "democratic" country in the Middle East, (p. 5). A month
later, another critical review appeared in Midstream23 in which the author
attacks the resolution and echoes the charge of U.N.'s "anti-semitism."
In defense of Zionism is Robert Goldston's book, Next Year in Jerusalem.
A Short History of Zionism.24 The author pointed out that throughout its
history, the Zionist movement waged a constant struggle against racism.
He added:
Nowhere in Zionist teaching, philosophy, or action can
the faintest taint of racism be found. Racism is
diametrically opposed to all Jewish belief and practice. To
impute to Jews the very evil from which they have suffered so
terribly throughout history is a truly vicious, truly ignorant
slander (p. 224)
Similarly, Seymour Finger and Ziva Flamhaft wrote an article in
Middle East Review25 in which they expressed dissatisfaction with the
"outrageous Zionism-racism resolution" (p. 49). They stated:
It is ironic and tragic that Zionism—which sprang up out of
the need to combat racial discrimination—and the state of
Israel—which was born out of the shadow of the most savage
form of racism—were singled out by the very organization that
proclaims itself to be guided by the principles of freedom and
equality (p. 49).
A Zionist1 advertisement published in the Christian Science Monitor.26
claimed that the Zionism-racism resolution is not valid because Israel is
a multi-racial society where all races are treated equally. Another
advertisement27 repeated the pro-Zionist argument by saying that "the Arabs
in Israel are full-fledged citizens, enjoy every civil right, and have the
same status in law as Jewish Israelis." The Arabs also, the advertisement
continues, "enjoy the highest standard of living and liberty of any Arabs
in the Middle East." As to the question of Israel's connection with South
Africa a pro-Zionist advertisement appearing in The Christian Science
Monitor28 stated: "Israel is a very minor player in trade and military
relations with South Africa, has no nuclear cooperation, and has, at all
times, condemned and denounced apartheid." Further, the Israeli
newspaper, Ha'aretz29 describes the U.N. resolution which equated Zionism
with racism as an "attempt to delegitimitize the state of Israel's right
to exist." The comparison with South Africa is not valid, it continues
to say, because there is a difference between apartheid which is the
ideology of racial superiority and Zionism which is a "national liberation
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movement." In defense of Zionism is an article which appeared in the New
Outlook.30 "Israel and South Africa: Some Preliminary Reflections." The
author of this article contends that the analogy between Israel and South
Africa can be misleading. He said: "The comparison between Israel and
South Africa is often distorted and analytically unhelpful; it is also
perplexing and deeply troubling," (p. 8). He believes that "the Zionist
struggle for national liberation was, and many believe, still is, a
struggle against exactly those principles of racial supremacy on which the
present regime in South Africa is based," (p. 9). The author finds a
"major" difference between the two situations: South Africa is a classic
example of minority rule, while Jews constitute a majority in Israel.
"And while apartheid is an unassailable reality in South Africa, it is
still not policy or practice in Israel," (p. 9). The author concludes his
argument by saying while "Apartheid in South Africa is a system of
domination," in Israel, "despite increasing discrimination of Jews against
Arabs, Israelis are less bent on dominating another people than on
securing their own boundaries. Israel may act as a conqueror and a
colonizer, but it is precisely the colonial analogy rather than the racist
one that is apt." (pp. 9-10).
In the opposite camp, there are many writers and scholars who argue
the case against Zionism. Their charge against Zionism ranges from
"racism" to "colonialism" to "apartheid", that is similar, in general
lines, to that of South Africa.
In his book, A History of the Jews—Ancient and Modern.31 Ilan
Halevi, a leftist anti-Zionist Israeli, argues that Zionism is another
false solution to the Jewish problem. He believes that Zionism was used
by the Great Powers to solve the problem of the fate of the Jews and the
problem of western domination over the east. Halevi also contends that
the Zionist leaders have sought to use the tragedy of the Holocaust for
their own political purposes.
In an essay in Race and Class.32 Eqbal Ahmad wrote that the
establishment of Israel in 1948 was a setback to the decolonialization
process which began with India's independence in 1947. He explained:
Thus, at the dawn of decolonization, we were returned to the
earliest, most intense form of colonial menace—the
exclusivist settler colonialism which had dealt genocidal
blows to the great civilizations and peoples of the Americas.
As if to compel our historical memory, Israel's sectarian,
racialist character was ensured by the expulsion of the native
Palestinians from their homeland. The tragedy occurred as a
counterpoint to contemporary history, a reminder that all was
not well with the era of decolonialization (p. 4).
Elsewhere he added:
Israel obviously shares many similarities with South Africa,
and may in time come to resemble the apartheid state more than
most liberal Zionists suspect. However, structurally and
substantively the Zionist movement and State share significant
similarities with the early form of colonial movements which
transformed the western hemisphere into the 'new world' of the
West.
In their "Introduction," the editors of Israel and the
Palestinians.33 contends that in 20th century Palestine, Zionism is
necessarily discriminatory and racist. They point out:
It seems obvious to us that Zionism as the major political
force in Israel aims at preserving, consolidating, and
expanding Jewish privileged position in Israel. There is no
way this can be carried out without the domination of the
Palestinian Arab people, (p. 9).
In a letter34 to an Arab Ambassador, the Jewish American Rabbi, Elmer
Berger, accused Zionist policies of being "discriminatory" and
"exclusivist". He said: "Israel is a state, therefore, in which if
apartheid is not blatant or as territorially visible as South Africa,
'Jews' are nevertheless 'more equal than others.'" As to the charge of
Zionist1 racism, Rabbi Berger explains" ". . .if racism is a form of
government or a structure of society in which national rights and
responsibilities are officially legislated upon the basis of creed, color,
ethnic derivation, then the Zionist' character of much 'Basic' Israeli law
qualifies." In a book35 published in 1978, Rabbi Berger expressed concern
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that the "racist, discriminatory political sovereignization of Zionism"
possesses dangers to the spiritual message of Judaism (p. 57). In 1944,
a critic of mainstream Zionism, Hannah Arendt,36 an American-Jewish
scholar, suggests that Herzl's (the founder of modern political Zionism)
Zionism was not a mass movement, as it is claimed, but an ideology of
European-Jewish intellectuals and that Herzl had constantly expressed
hostility toward revolutionary movements. She also criticized the Zionist
project in Palestine because it left the Palestinian Arabs with only two
choices: emigration or second class citizenship. Another anti-Zionist
Jew is Roberta Feuerlicht, who, in her book, The Fate of the Jews: A
People Torn Between Israeli Power and Jewish Ethics.37 finds that there is
a conflict between Israeli power and Jewish ethics. The author believes
that the Jews betrayed the ethics of Judaism when they established the
State of Israel, and that the Jews wanted Palestine to "serve as a litter
basket for Jews unwanted elsewhere" (p. 94). She also made it clear that
Israel is "a form of colonialism" (p. 220). Akiva Orr, an anti-Zionist
Israeli writer, advanced a similar thesis by suggesting that Zionism is
in conflict with the spiritual message of Judaism. In his book, The
UnJewish State: The Politics of Jewish Identity in Israel.38 Orr states
that "Zionism was a heresy which overturned every single precept of
religious Judaism" (p. 6). In addition, Moshe Menuhin, in his book, The
Decadence of Judaism in Our Time.39 argues that modern Judaism had become
decadent because of its close identification with Zionism. In an article
in Critical Inquiry.40 entitled "Ideology of Difference," Edward Said
maintains that whatever the nature of the debate, there is a general
agreement that Israel is a Jewish State. "To be a non-Jew in
Palestine/Israel is first of all to be marked negatively" (p. 43), Said
argues. He sees Zionism as an ideology of difference and separation. The
result has been inequalities between Jews and non-Jews, the author holds,
and that such inequalities are sanctioned by Israeli "Basic Laws." In his
book, The Question of Palestine.41 Professor Edward Said suggests that
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Zionist "racism" is manifested in the exclusionary idea of the Jewish
State, in the philosophy of Kibbutzim which indeed practices a system of
apartheid, in the discriminatory land regulation, and in the Law of Return
which guarantees any Jew (but only a Jew) living anywhere the right to
emigrate to Israel and automatically to become a citizen. The author
contends that Israel is a colonial-settler regime, but, unlike South
Africa or former Algeria, the Israeli case sought to exclude rather than
to exploit the natives. Similarly, in an article in MERIP Reports42 Fred
Halliday suggests that the Israeli-colonial type is different from the
South Africa model in that the former has sought to expel the indigenous
population, while the latter has sought to maintain the natives for
exploitation. Also, Uri Davis, an anti-Zionist Israeli scholar, advances
similar ideas regarding a "specific pattern of the Zionist colonial
initiative in Palestine" (p. 8). In his book, Israel: Utopia
Incorporated.43 Davis said:
The Zionist movement did not originally predict its efforts
on colonialization of the native land by way of exploitation,
but rather, systematically followed the pattern of
colonialization by way of dispossession (p. 8).
In TELOS,44 Dan Diner asserts the colonial character of the conflict
in Palestine and suggests that any discrimination against Palestinian
Arabs cannot be removed without a fundamental change in the Zionist
structure of Israel. He explains, "If one, however, wishes to end the
discrimination against Arabs in Israel within the 'Zionist structure',
then the national identity of Israel as a Jewish nation-state comes into
question" (emphasis is in origin) (p. 43). In an article published in
Race & Class.45 Jenny Bourne, a Jewish-feminist activist, emphasizes the
charge against Zionism: a colonial movement, expansionist, exclusivist.
She also finds that the practice of Zionist separation created similar
conditions to that of South African apartheid in terms of "... who can
buy land in Israel, where people can buy homes and where workers may live"
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(p. 7). Henry Cattan, in his book, The Palestine Question.46 indicates the
"colonial" character of Israel and the "racist" essence of Zionist
ideology. Writing from the Palestinian perspective, Sabri Jiryis, wrote
an essay in the Journal of Palestinian Studies47 in which he examined three
areas of Israeli legislation; security legislation, nationality and
citizenship legislation, and the question of land regulations. The author
concludes that discrimination against the Arab minority is sanctioned by
Israeli laws despite the existence of an independent judiciary. In an
article in American-Arab Affairs.48 Roselle Tekiner examined Israeli laws
that "legalize discrimination" against non-Jewish citizens in Israel. She
said: "It is true that Arabs in Israel may become Israeli citizens, but
Israeli citizenship does not give Arabs the same rights as Jews" (p. 84).
Tekiner suggests that three "fundamental laws,"—Israel does not have a
written constitution—legalize discrimination against non-Jews. These
are: The Law of Return, the Law of Citizenship, and the Status Law. He
also contends that, unlike South Africa whose apartheid is stated in its
constitution, Zionist "racism" has been successfully concealed thanks to
the Status Laws. Maxime Rodinson, the French-Jewish scholar, was among
the foremost to emphasize the colonial-settler character of the Zionist
enterprise. In his book, Israel. A Colonial-Settler State?.49 Rodinson
demonstrates that the creation of Israel came as a result of colonial
conquest which was based on racial exclusive ideology that was in line
with the dominant outlook of European chauvinism.
Three political movements, the Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO), the South African Communist Party, and the African National
Congress (ANC) have carried the struggle against Israel and South Africa,
and have accused Zionism of being a "racist", "colonialist", and "fascist"
ideology. The Palestinian National Covenant reads:
Zionism is a political movement originally related to world
imperialism and hostile to all movements of liberation and
progress in the world. It is aggressive, expansionist and
colonialist in its aim; and Fascist and Nazi in its means.
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Israel is the tool of the Zionist movement and a human and
geographical base for world imperialism . . . (p.49).
In a leaflet entitled, "Israel and South Africa—The Present-Day
Nazism" and published in The African Communist.51 the South African
Communist Party states:
It is ironic that a state founded on a wave of emotion against
Nazi persecution and genocide should itself end up employing
the same Hitlerite methods and techniques? ... We say no,
it is not at all ironic! This is actually the logical
consequence of Zionism which is an exclusive, narrow, racist
ideology comparable to Apartheid.
The ANC's position is that Zionism and apartheid:
are based on ideologies that preach a supremeness of one
people over another, and they have translated this ideology
into a constitutional reality in Israel and in South Africa.
Both are based on the uprooting of an indigenous people and
the takeover of the Palestinian and South African peoples'
land . . . (p. 8).52
In its "editorial," the African Communist indicates a striking
similarity between Zionism and apartheid:
Both exist on the basis of the theft of land from the
indigenous peoples, who are in consequence placed in a
position of dependence and inferiority and denied the basic
right of self-determination. Both follow domestic policies
based on race discrimination and oppression in the interest
of the colonizing elite . . . (p. 10)53
The anti-Zionist literature is rife with the question of the
link/analogy between Israeli Zionism and South African apartheid. In an
article entitled, "South Africa: The Israeli Connection,"54 the authors
maintain that Zionism and apartheid are both products of European
nationalism and that both ideologies "are, in essence, the same" (p. 108).
They also refer to apartheid as "the Afrikaner version of Zionism" (p.
108). The authors also find similarities in the myths and policies of
apartheid and Zionism concerning the question of land. They pointed out:
Both Israel and South Africa propagate the myth that the land
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of Palestine and South Africa was "empty" a 'desert waiting
to bloom, ' the same myth under the slogan, 'manifest destiny, '
used by the United States to displace its large indigenous
population (p. 108).
In a booklet, entitled, Israel and South Africa—Ideology and
Practice.55 Alfred T. Moleah maintains that "the Zionist entity and the
Apartheid entity are an idea—an idea that has become a material force.
They are an idea that is racist, an idea that is anti-human" (p. 1). He
also notes that both apartheid and Zionism have relied heavily on religion
(especially Old Testament) to justify political purposes. Drawing an
analogy between the two situations, Moleah notes that while the central
question in Israel is who is Jewish, the question of who is white is vital
in South Africa. Moleah concludes: "The similarities between Israel and
South Africa are basic and fundamental and, therefore, totally unaffected
by the vicissitudes of politics in both countries" (p. 5). In an essay
published in the Journal of Palestine Studies.56 Alfred Moleah draws the
analogy between the "miserable" conditions of the Palestinians in Israel
and that of Africans in South Africa. He maintains that violation of
human rights in both situations is an inevitable result of the racist
ideology of Zionism and apartheid. He said: "In essence, therefore,
South Africa is a state for whites just as Israel is a state, not for
Jews, but of Jews ... In both States, discrimination is inherent" (p.
28). In another essay entitled "Zionism and Apartheid: An Unlikely
Alliance?",57 Moleah notices that the relationship between Israel and South
Africa has developed from a state of alliance to a state of organic links.
He maintains that the ties between the two countries "are based on an
identity of position and goals" (p. 158) and that both "are settler-
colonial entities" (p. 158) that robbed the land of the Africans and
Palestinians and both became "garrison states" (p. 159). In an article
entitled "The South Africanization of Israel,"58 Bruce Harris holds that
there is a striking similarity between Israel and South Africa. He said:
"Whether it is rigidly entrenched in law as in South African apartheid or
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embedded in custom as in Zionist Israel, social segregation is the
practice" (p. 177). "The Arabs," Harris continues, "like the Africans,
live in separate areas; though it is not as formalized or legalized in
Israel, it is just as real" (p. 179). Joe Toris,59 an editor of the
Berkeley Graduate, accused Zionism of "genocide" and emphasized its
"racist nature" which is manifested, as the author believes, in the
Israeli "Law of Return." Does a systematic policy of apartheid exist in
Israel? Joe Toris answers, yes. The question of "Israeli Apartheid" was
also discussed by two Israeli scholars. In his book, Israel: An
Apartheid State,60 Uri Davis argues that although it is different, in terms
of structure and pattern, from South African1 apartheid, Israeli-style
apartheid is a reality. He puts it clearly:
The legal regulation of apartheid in Israel is structured in
terms that are very different from the structures of legal
apartheid in the Republic of South Africa. Nevertheless,
apartheid in Israel is an overarching legal reality that
determines the quality of everyday life and the circumstance
of living for all the inhabitants of the state of Israel (p.
In the summer of 1988, Israel Shahak, a professor of organic
chemistry at the Hebrew University, wrote an essay in Race & Class61
entitled, "Israeli Apartheid and the Intifada," in which he suggests that
in regard to the land question (where to live or buy land), water
distribution, economic exploitation, and "Pass laws," Israeli apartheid
is worse than that of South Africa. Comparing the two systems, Shahak
explains:
South Africa invites any white person to emigrate to the
country and to join in the benefits of the apartheid regime.
Israel invites any person who can prove that he or she is a
Jew, either by descent or by converting to Judaism. If
someone converts today, then tomorrow they can go to Israel
and demand all the rights, in this case to the land, which are
denied to Palestinians under this allocation (p. 6).
The foregoing discussion outlines the controversy within the
literature regarding Zionism and its "parallel" with South African
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apartheid.
The Significance of the Study
The topic is timely, of great controversy, and of social and
political significance. The growing struggle of the Blacks against the
oligarchic regime in South Africa and the recent Palestinian uprising in
the occupied territories have caught the attention of the world community.
In South Africa, (despite the tendency towards dismantling apartheid) a
national state of emergency is now (March 1990) in its 41st month and the
popular uprising in the tribal homelands during March 1990 matched the
level of confrontation in the 1984-1985 nationwide rebellion in black
townships.
In the occupied territories, demonstrations, since December 1987,
occur almost daily against the harsh punitive measures Israel is
enforcing. Israeli soldiers are permitted to ruthlessly open fire on
Palestinian protesters. As the intifada (uprising) went into its third
year, it was reported that more than 700 Palestinian civilians were
killed, thousands wounded, and fifty thousand imprisoned by the Israelis,
many of them without trial.62 Since the beginning of the intifada, the
U.S. used its veto five times in the U.N. in order to rescue Israel from
the world's condemnation.63
A new Israeli official policy of "force, might, and beating" was
adopted after a series of measures—including arrest, curfews, and
deportations—failed to quell Palestinian protests. The Israeli Prime
Minister, Shimon Peres, said: "I am convinced that this is the most
crucial period that Israel has faced since 1948."64 As in South Africa,
the Israeli government decided to impose more restrictions on press
coverage in order to hide its repressive policy. It is interesting to
note that Henry Kissinger and Mayor Koch of New York City recommended that
television cameras be barred from the occupied territories until Israel
put down the uprising.65
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The method used by Israel in handling the Palestinian uprising
continues to draw condemnation from around the world. After a visit to
Gaza, the British Foreign Office Minister called Israeli policy in the
Gaza Strip "a blot on the face of civilization."66 Norway's ambassador to
Israel, himself a survivor of Nazi concentration camps, was quoted as
saying that the Israeli soldiers "used tactics shunned even by the Nazis
as the Israelis handled Palestinian unrest."67 However, it was hardly
pointed out that what has taken place and so shocked the world has long—
as the evidence reviewed later does suggest—been part and parcel of
Zionist ideology and practice.
The shooting and beating of Palestinian youths challenging the might
of the Israeli army with stones and bottles, and the increasing
restrictions on press coverage by Israeli authorities have intensified the
debate regarding the comparison with South Africa and have led many
critics to draw an analogy between the two countries. Moreover, attention
is being focused once again on the U.N. resolution of 1975 equating
Zionism with racism.68 Israeli officials have frequently rejected the
notion that Israel is becoming the South Africa of the Middle East and
have considered this accusation as "a disgusting and unfair comparison."
To help dismiss the analogy, the Israeli Foreign Ministry has recently
issued an internal guidance paper to its embassies and consulates abroad
explaining how Israel is different from South Africa.69
However, the dimensions of the comparison between Israel and South
Africa go beyond similar repressive styles of handling unrest. There are
questions of political power and its allocation, questions of the
structure of the political system, and questions of the ideology that
serves to maintain the status quo.
Much has been written about Israel and South Africa: their growing
political, economic and military relationships, and their sensitive
geopolitical roles within the general Western strategic framework.
Despite the importance of such studies, the ideological dimensions of the
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question have been overlooked. The author of this study believes that the
essence of their relationship goes far deeper than trade figures or even
military collaborations. It is a question of ideological affinity. Such
an affinity has both Biblical (Old Testamental) and secular (the
perception of being in the same boat as far as current international
politics is concerned) foundations. "The growing relations between Israel
and South Africa," Moleah pointed out, "are not the ordinary state
relations based on pragmatic national needs and self-interest, they are
the manifestation of a shared ideology of a common worldview."70 The
growth of apartheid and racism in our modern world and its inevitable
danger to world peace and security necessitate the need for cross-
national examination and indicate the obvious relevance of this study to
vital contemporary concerns. Hence, the pressing need for a comparative
analysis of the ideologies of these two systems. This analysis both
reveals the ideological basis of political domination and underlines the
component of settler mentality.
In addition to the seeming similarities between the two systems,
there is another motive which underlies this undertaking. It is what
seems to be as quantitative and qualitative inconsistencies in world
criticism directed against Israel and South Africa. The nature of South
African apartheid has been amply studied from various perspectives.
However, perhaps because of traditional western bias, the Zionist
enterprise and its consequences on the Palestinians has been overlooked.
Edward Said rightly pointed out:
In my opinion, the question of Zionism is the touchstone of
contemporary political judgement. A lot of people who are
happy to attack apartheid or U.S. intervention in Central
America are not prepared to talk about Zionism and what it has
done to the Palestinians. To be the victim of a victim does
present quite unusual difficulties. For if you are trying to
deal with the classic victim of all times—the Jew and his or
her movement—then to portray yourself as the victim of the
Jew is a comedy worthy of one of your own novels.
It seems to me unjustified and unfair—and, of course, I am not
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defending South Africa—for the world to condemn Pretoria's practice of
apartheid and at the same time keep silent with respect to Israel's
mistreatment of the Palestinians. Little is known about the dilemma of
the Palestinians, and what is known has generally been disguised by the
powerful influence of Zionism. Consequently, western opinion has been
seriously impaired through misinformation and has been "deliberately
disguised or suppressed ... by pro-Israeli pressure and propaganda."72
In this respect the British historian, Arnold Toynbee notes:
What is peculiar about the Palestinian question is that
the world has listened to the party that committed the offense
and has turned a deaf ear to the victim.
Whereas the African people enjoy international sympathy and support
against Apartheid, the victims of Zionism have been forgotten or ignored.
Many writers, journalists, and public figures who are willing to denounce
apartheid tend to overlook similar practices by Zionism. The Jewish
Israeli scholar, Dr. Israel Shahak, has this to say about the problem:
Very many non-Jews (including Christian clergy and
religious laymen, as well as some Marxists (from all Marxist
groups) hold the curious opinion that one way to 'atone' for
the persecution of Jews is not to speak out against evil
perpetrated by Jews but to participate in 'white lies' about
them. The crude accusation of 'antisemitism' (or, in the case
of Jews, 'self-hate') against anybody who protests at the
discrimination of Palestinians or who points out any fact
about the Jewish religion or the Jewish past which conflicts
with the 'approved version1 comes with greater hostility and
force from non-Jewish 'friends of the Jews' than from Jews.
It is the existence and great influence of this group in all
western countries, and particularly in the U.S. (as well as
the other English-speaking countries) which has allowed the
rabbis and scholars of Judaism to propagate their J-ies not
only without opposition but with considerable help.74
From its very inception, Israel has generally enjoyed favorable
western media coverage and stands as a country above criticism. Alfred
Moleah pointed out:
Whereas South Africa finds itself universally vilified for its
racist policies, the state of Israel is vaunted as an oasis
of democracy and decency. Given the worldwide, awesome power
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of Zionism, the Israelis can act quite brazenly and
arrogantly: they answer to on one.
When South African repression was intensified after the declaration
of a state of emergency, most Western powers issued official statements
condemning the Pretoria government and some withdrew their ambassadors.
No comparable action has been taken in regard to the recent daily killing
of the Palestinians by the Israelis. Compare Washington's invitation to
Nelson Mandela to visit the White House with the U.S. administration's
refusal to grant Yasir Arafat a visa to address the United Nations. Such
glaring inconsistencies between the two situations can, in part, be
explained in terms of an "anti-Semitism" paradigm.
Any attempt to examine Israel's ties with South Africa or to expose
what is considered as "discriminatory" practice against Palestinians will
immediately be branded as an "anti-Semitic" act. Alfred Lilienthal noted:
So strong has become the general aversion to anti-Semitism
that even full-blooded Semites, the Arabs and Palestinians,
find it difficult to defend themselves against the charge.76
In an interview conducted by the Christian Science Monitor, the
Jewish writer, Roberta Feuerlich, said:
If you offer criticism of Israel as a Jew, you are supposed
to be 'self-hating'. If you offer criticism of Israel as a
non-Jew, you are labelled anti-Semitic. We criticize Reagan,
we criticize the Soviets; we can criticise any country in the
world. But we cannot criticize Israel.
In a similar vein, Chris Haney wrote a letter to the New York Times in
which he stated:
We can deplore Nazi German's action and not be regarded as
anti-Christian. We can be revolted at My Lai and not be anti-
American. But we can never even question Israel's action
against the Arabs lest we be branded anti-Semitic. That is
psychological blackmail.
The concept of "anti-Semitism" was recently given a new definition.
In their book, The New Anti-Semitism. Arnold Foster and Benjamin Epstein,
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leaders of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, argue that
hostility toward Jews as Jews or toward Judaism is not necessarily the
only criterion determining the anti-semitism phenomenon. Criticism of
Israel and its policies can also be considered as anti-semitism because
of Israel's centrality for Jewish security and survival.79
Needless to say, anti-Semitism must be rejected at all levels but
must never be used as an ideological weapon to silence legitimate
criticism. It should be noted that the critical discussion of Zionism
pre- sented in this study does not imply any condemnation of Judaism which
is a matter of religious choice and should be seen as separate from
Zionism as a political ideology. I add this note because those who seek
to suppress criticism of Israeli policies have used the tactic of blurring
this distinction, charging that a critic of Zionism automatically
criticizes Judaism and is therefore anti-Semitic.80 It should also be
noted that not all Jews consider themselves to be Zionist and that not all
Zionists are Jews. As a matter of fact, Zionism, from its very inception,
has been bitterly opposed by prominent Rabbinical leaders as being in
conflict with the spiritual message of Judaism. As we shall presently
see, many Jewish intellectuals and writers such as Maxim Rodinson, Albert
Einstein, Noam Chomsky, Israel Shahak, Uri Davis, Alfred Lilienthal, Rabbi
Elmer Berger, and others are opposed to Zionism.
Method of Research
This study is multidimensional, coming under the fields both of
political sociology81 and comparative politics82 because it deals with
ideology and race relations, an important area of political sociology, and
because it compares two political systems. Further, it is a cross-
national analysis of ideology and race relations. Its purpose is to give
a descriptive and interpretive account of Zionism and apartheid in order
to expose the role of ideology in perpetuating political domination. The
study is concerned with an analysis and explanation rather than merely
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with description. In other words, the major concern is with understanding
why Zionism and apartheid play the role the way they do and not merely
with describing the pattern of ideological domination within the two
systems. The study devotes considerable attention to the functional role
of the ideology in the construction of the Zionist and apartheid
discourses on the non-Jews in Israel and non-whites in South Africa. The
study does not intend to examine and evaluate the growing relations
between Israel and South Africa: a variety of good studies on this
subject are available.83 Again, this study is primarily interested in the
ideological aspect of the problem. Its core is a discussion of Zionism
and apartheid as they actually operate in Israel and South Africa.
More specifically, the study attempts to test the fairness and the
usefulness of the argument—not popular in the West—which sees Israel as
a colonial-settler regime, like that of the former Rhodesia and South
Africa, and which maintains that Zionism is a no less "racist" ideology
than South African apartheid. In other words, this study attempts to find
out whether the ideology of Zionism and the laws of Israel sanction
discrimination against non-Jews in Israel. If so, how are these
conditions similar to that of apartheid in South Africa?
In so doing, the study examines the Zionist political literature
especially its position toward indigenous non-Jews as presented by
prominent Zionist thinkers and leaders such as Theodor Herzl, Ahad Ha'am,
A. D. Gordon, Vladimir Jabotinsky and others. Similar discussion is
devoted to the ideology of apartheid and its position toward non-white
Africans. Since South Africa is generally acknowledged to be the world's
most racist state whose apartheid is more familiar and generates less
controversy, the study puts more emphasis on Zionism and Israel, the main
bulk of whose discriminatory policies is not reflected in the terminology
of its legal system. It should be noted that the study not only explains
what was said, but places ideas in the context of social and historical
milieus. In other words, this study is not only concerned with the
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theoretical aspects of the intellectual-political positions of Zionism
and apartheid, but with their implementation or the way in which these
positions are translated into reality.
Thus, the study examines the official and unofficial policies that
seem to sanction "systematic discrimination" in both societies. Unlike
the situation in South Africa, such policies in Israel are not explicit.
However, a noted exceptions are Israel's Law of Return (1950), the Law of
Citizenship (1952), and The World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency
(Status) Law. A systematic "unequal treatment" seems also evident in such
areas as: land regulation, (Basic Law: Israel Lands - 1960, Agricultural
Settlement Law - 1967, Lands Law - 1980) and security legislation,
(Defense Regulation - 1945, Emergency Regulation Ordinance - 1949). While
in Israel the central question for the Zionist legislations appears to be
the distinction between "Jews" versus "non-Jews," in South African
apartheid, the key legal distinction is between "white" versus
"non-white". Laws were passed to justify and maintain white privilege.
Among them are: the Population Registration Act of 1950 which classifies
people as whites, coloreds, Asians, and blacks, the Immorality Act of
1927, 1950 which prohibits any carnal intercourse between whites and
coloreds, and the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act of 1949 which forbids
marriage of a European to a non-European. The South African law, the
Bantu Homeland Citizen Act (1970) (amended as the Bantu Laws Amendment Act
(1974) seems to have similar effects in terms of depriving citizenship,
to the Israeli law, the Absentee Property Law (1950). Besides discussing
these legal mechanisms, the study focuses on the role of religion within
the framework of Zionist ideology and apartheid.
The Old Testament has a special place in Zionist ideology, and the
Zionist literature is rife with the religious concepts of "chosen people"
and "promised land". The Jewish people are seen as "spiritual people,"
"Holy people"—a people set apart from the rest of mankind for having a
special relationship with God. Israel is seen as a fulfillment of God's
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promise as a holy possession of the Jews. In Afrikaner mythology, one
finds similar justification derived from the Old Testament and Calvinism.
Afrikaners draw a parallel between themselves and the ancient children of
Israel. Like Israel, South Africa is seen as a God-given area whose
survival and triumph is unique and miraculous. Thus, the study attempts
to explain the role of these religious myths as ideological weapons used
to justify the settlers' claim to the land and to maintain domination in
both societies.
The seeming similarity making a cross-national analysis of ideology
in Israel and South Africa fruitful is the common use of religion for
political purposes, the European settlers' attitudes toward the indigenous
population, and the policies of social segregation. I utilize causal,
evaluative, and comparative approaches in the course of my investigation.
It is no exaggeration to say that all good research in social science is
comparative. I believe that ideology and race relations can best be
understood through comparison.
The comparative method refers to scientific analysis involving
observations in more than one social system in order to explain
similarities or differences in philosophies and sociopolitical behavior.
The central task of the comparative approach is to distinguish between
those regularities in sociopolitical behavior that are unique and those
that are universal. The value of comparison is that it enables us to find
out whether a certain process or development in a given society is a
unique or a common phenomenon and to work toward a general rather than a
parochial theory of politics. Randall Collins points out:
The comparative method is an important means of generating
and testing theory. By comparing the conditions under which
similar activities and institutions appear, the social
scientists can approximate the advantages of the experimental
method of research. His aim is to generalize his explanations
beyond particular instances, to reject unsound inferences, and
to refine his explanations to take account of complex
processes. Comparative politics, therefore, should not be
viewed as a peripheral specialization within the study of
politics but as a crucial set of materials for developing our
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understanding of politics everywhere.84
Most of the data used in this research was collected from three main
sources: primary, consisting of official government documents; secondary,
consisting of published works dealing with the subject matter, and
tertiary, such as periodicals, newspapers, and magazines. In order to
fully document the record of Zionism, the study quotes extensively from
scholarly articles, public statements, and editorials of major Israeli
newspapers such as: Haaretz. Maariv. Jerusalem Post. Yediot Aharonot.
Davar. and others. The sociopolitical condition of the Palestinian inside
Israel and in the occupied territories is a subject of regularly
documented journalistic as well as specialist literature produced by many
investigatory bodies including the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, the
Special Committee on Israeli Practices in the Occupied Territories, the
International Committee of the Red Cross, Amnesty International and the
Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights. The search for resources began
in computerized social science and current periodical databases. These
searches have since been updated several times. Many important materials
were available in the library of the University of Georgia in Athens. The
staff of Woodruff Library of the Atlanta University Center helped
considerably in obtaining materials from other libraries. Before closing
the methodology section, a few words about "value-free" social science
seem to be useful.
Western scholarship always claims to be objective and accuses
Marxist social science of having an ideological bias. Shakhanzarov notes
that despite their claim of value-free science, the work of western
scholars "shows quite a wide spectrum of political views—from
conservative and ultimately apologist in regard to the status quo to
liberal and even radical (petty-bourgeois revolutionarism).85 In this
connection Wilmot writes: "Western social science was 'neutral' and
'objective' in the same sense that the bourgeois press and political
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system were 'free1, or the citizen in the bourgeois society was 'equal'. "86
In recent decades many scholars have begun to challenge the
traditional assumption that social science is neutral and should have no
ideological bias. Ake simply states that such social science is
impossible and does not exist.87 It is appropriate for scholars to place
a high value on accurate knowledge, but it is unrealistic to assume that
they are entirely value free. In this respect, Morgenthau acknowledges
the strong influence of social, economic, cultural, and political factors
on the course of investigation. He suggests that "the 'personal equation'
of the political scientists both limits and directs his scholarly
pursuits."88 As Ake notes, even the selection of subject matter for
investigation reflects an ideological bias. For example, one scholar
chooses to study the maintenance of political stability while the problem
for another scholar is how to engineer a revolution. Ake adds, "Whenever
social science defines something as a problem, it reveals and makes value
commitments."89 Furthermore, Ake notes that a solution to certain social
problems involves values and morality, and thus inevitably reflects an
ideological bias. However, Professor Mack Jones suggests that the value
judgment or the normative choice does not necessarily take place at the
expense of the truth of the investigation, and that the scientific method
can enhance the quality of value judgment. To sum up, although it seems
unrealistic to speak about value-free social sciences, scholars should
maintain high ethical standards in their research by presenting the truth
in a scientific manner.
To complete my introductory presentation, I will proceed to define




Ideology is a highly controversial topic. The meaning of the word
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is frequently debated. It is said that almost no two writers hold the
same definition. In its broad meaning, an ideology usually refers to a
set of ideas and beliefs held by a group of people. Jean Blondel defines
ideology as "a set of interrelated attitudes which indicate a specific
approach to society's problems."91 Others see ideology as "a concise set
of political, social, and economic beliefs—a well-formulated sequence of
pertinent and related ideas in the realm of world politics.92 Still others
define ideology as "the medium through which men make their history as
conscious actors."93 And similarly, it is defined as "the realm in which
people clarify and justify their actions as they pursue divergent
interests."94 In a more restricted definition, Hagopian sees ideology as
"a programmatic and rhetorical application of some grandiose philosophical
system, which arouses men to political action and may provide strategic
guidance for that action."95 Another narrow definition sees ideology as
"the study of ideas, identified with political movements and charismatic
leaders and falsely set apart from scientific knowledge or knowledge in
general."96 However, despite the above differences, it is generally agreed
that ideology refers to a form of social or political philosophy that
aspires both to explain the world and to change it.
The word "ideology" was first used in 1797 by the French philosopher
Antoine Destutt de Tracy, who saw it as a process of forming a "science
of ideas."97 Thus, ideology was a positive and progressive notion in its
origin. Napoleon gave a negative meaning to the word,98 and this negative
connotation was intensified by Marx.
Marx and Engels developed the first theory of ideology, and thanks
to Marx, the concept of ideology is still frequently debated in today's
social science. Anthony Pavel states that "all contemporary discussions,
consciously or unconsciously, tend either to confirm Marx or to find fault
with him."99 Marx argued that the ideology of society originated with and
is proclaimed by the ruling class. Control over material conditions
allows the ruling class to control the production of ideas. In this
28
context, the major purpose of the ideology is to justify the status quo.100
Marx was mainly interested in exposing the role of ideology in the
perpetuation of social inequalities. For him, "ideology was simply a
fabrication used by a group of people to justify themselves."101 Ideology
in this sense "is a false consciousness."102 Marger defines false
consciousness as "a belief on the part of nonruling groups that the
prevailing sociopolitical system works in their interest when in fact it
works primarily in the interests of the powerful few."103 Marxism sees
that false consciousness among the masses as an important factor which
permits the continuity of ideological hegemony. However, the editors of
the book A Dictionary of Marxist Thought took issue with the oft-quoted
definition of ideology as "false consciousness." They argued that it is
not correct to project the matter as a permanent Marxist position. The
Marxist negative definition of ideology should apply only to the situation
in which distortion and the concealing of economic contradictions take
place.104
The evolution of the concept of ideology within the Marxist
traditions resulted in attaching a positive meaning and dynamic function
to ideology. Lenin played an important role in this respect. Thus, for
Marxism "ideology is no longer a necessary distortion which conceals
contradictions, but becomes a neutral concept referring to the political
consciousness of classes, including the proletarian class."105 According
to Macridis, there is a general agreement among "New-Marxists" that to
accomplish a revolutionary change of the society, a revolution in the
ideology of that society must first take place.106 Thus, as Paul Lovejoy
points out, any scholarly discussion of ideology must take into account
both the negative and the positive aspects of the concept.107
Ideologies have several functions: (1) to legitimize or justify the
status quo, (2) to mobilize the people of the society, (3) to manipulate
ideas in order to incite people into action, (4) to serve as a channel to
express people's hopes and interests, and (5) to serve as a channel to
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criticize social and political beliefs.108 Macridis says that there are
three types of ideologies: (1) the status quo ideologies which
rationalize the existing order, (2) revolutionary ideologies which
advocate drastic change in the existing order, and (3) reformist
ideologies which call for gradual change in the existing order.109
In contrast to what became known in the academic world as the "end
of ideology" thesis, which claims that the age of ideology has passed, the
troubled nature of world politics during the last two decades shows that
political confrontation and social strife are still alive, and so is the
need to justify political interests. Ideas and ideologies have played an
important role in political life. As Macridis points out: "ideologies
are very much a part of our lives; they are not dead and they are not in
decline anywhere, as some authors have argued."110 Ideology has been used
by various groups and social systems to incite people into political
action. It is also inevitably linked to domination. In South Africa and
in Israel, apartheid and Zionism have been used as effective tools for
maintaining and justifying the continued power and privilege of the ruling
groups.
Racism
Racism generally refers to the notion that certain people are
superior to others on the basis of race. It can more narrowly be defined
as "a mode of thought that offers a particular explanation for the fact
that that population group that can be distinguished by ancestry is likely
to differ in culture, status, and power."111 In a broader definition,
racism can be seen as "any attitude, belief, behavior, or institutional
arrangement that tends to favor one race or ethnic group (usually a
majority group) over another (usually a minority group)."112 Such
definitions lead to six complementary and interconnected conclusions:
. . . two implications, two principles of faith and two
principles of practice. The implications are (1) that mankind
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is divided into groups of ethnic or racial or color
distinctiveness and these groups are distinct from one another
and different from one another, and (2) belonging to any of
these groups has an important—if not a decisive effect on the
aptitude, qualities and capabilities of the persons who
compose the group. The principles of belief are (1) that some
races, or at least one race, are superior and therefore the
others are inferior. The superior races are entitled to
privileges to which the inferior races are not entitled. (2)
Races cannot live in harmony with one another; coexistence is
precluded by the very nature of the relationship; racial
incompatibility is an essential corollary to racial diversity.
Two principles of practice follow: (1) since races cannot
live with one another, since they are essentially diverse,
they must be separated; racial segregation is an essential
prerequisite of a healthy international existence. (2) Where
races coexist, supremacy and discrimination by one race
against another are the inevitable consequence.
The division of the human race into superior and inferior is a
western product. "Indeed it was the colonial expansion of capitalist
European nation-states that set the historical stage for the ideology of
racism.114 Racist philosophies and practices were evident in European
policies toward Third World people. Racism has been used to justify a
diverse range of economic exploitation. Hence, one must have a deep
understanding of the economic dimension of racism. With regard to South
Africa, for example, many scholars emphasize a link between its racist
ideology and the development of its capitalist economy.115
A related concept is what came to be known as "scientific racism"
or "academic racism"—a notion which finds scientific proof for the
argument that some groups are superior to others. This concept was based
on Charles Darwin's evolution theory and later developed into an ideology
that "essentially legitimated the position of those on top and those on
bottom as a consequence of biology."116 Inspired by Darwin's Origin of
Species. Francis Gulton emphasized racial and hereditary elements in human
development.117 "Scientific racism" was widely advocated in Europe and
North America to justify colonialization of the non-European people.
Leonard Thompson pointed out that: "Scientific racism was a perfect fit
with the global political economy of the period of white hegemony. It was
used to justify white hegemony in North America and in the European
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empires in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean."118 However, by the 1930s,
"scientific racism" lost its influence and respectability.119
As to the related concept of "racial discrimination," the
International Convention on Racial Discrimination defines it as:
any distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference based
on race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin, which
has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political,
economic, social, cultural or any other field of public
life. °
It is obvious that most "multi-racial" societies have experienced
some form of racial prejudice and discrimination. However, Zionism and
apartheid appear to imply more than that. They seem to suggest, as the
evidence reviewed later propose, a systematic effort to make race, color,
or religion a qualification of membership in the civil community.
In examining Zionism and apartheid, there are three additional
chapters to this study. A brief account of the content of each chapter
follows. Chapter Two is about the ideology of apartheid. It discusses
the basic principles of apartheid and the centrality of the race question
in South Africa. This chapter pays considerable attention to the
religious, political, and historical myths of apartheid and their role in
perpetuating and legitimizing racial domination. Chapter Three is about
Zionism. It explains the basic principles of political Zionism. It
examines the early colonial efforts of the Zionist movement and its link
with the colonial powers of the time. This chapter also examines the
Zionist philosophy of separation and the use of religion for political
purposes. The Israeli laws that seem to sanction discrimination against
non-Jews are also dealt with in this chapter.
The fourth chapter is the concluding chapter in which the actual
comparison between Zionism and apartheid takes place. It seeks to test
the fairness and validity of those arguments which consider Zionism as a
liberation movement, and which deny the existence of apartheid in Israel.
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The discussion in this chapter focuses on the similarities and differences
between the two situations in regard to the philosophies of separation,
the mistreatment of the natives, and the use of religion in perpetuating
domination.
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This chapter begins with a brief historical background about the
coming of early white settlers in South Africa and their initial contact
with the indigenous population. The next section defines apartheid and
explains its basic themes. The third section discusses the question of
race, which is central in apartheid ideology. It begins with the use of
ideology since the Greece's time and discusses the concepts of "civil-
savage" and "Christian-heathen" and superiority-inferiority dichotomies.
That was a necessary background for the discussion of the race question
in Afrikaner ideology. The fourth section discusses the Afrikaner
literature concerning "black inferiority," and its use to justify the
apartheid policies of separation. The section about religion discusses
the role of religion in South African apartheid. The analysis of this
section explains the use of religious themes such as "chosen people,"
"promised land," and "children of Ham" to justify the white's privilege
and domination. The last section of this chapter is devoted to the
discussion of some "historical myths" that have been used within apartheid
ideology. The myths of the "vacant land" and "simultaneous migrations"
have been used to justify the claim of the white settlers to the land of
South Africa.
A Brief Historical Background
The Early European settlement in South Africa took place when the
Dutch founded a refreshment station at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652, an
era of outward European expansion. The Dutch East Indian Company had no
intention of establishing "a permanent colony" and sought "to keep the
establishment as small as possible."1 The main objectives of the company
"was business and profit."2 The general instructions of the Company's
directors were "to build a fort, plant a garden on the best land, and keep
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peace with the natives."3 The Company's instruction was to treat the
natives with gentleness in order to encourage the cattle trade that was
needed for the European ships.4 The early Dutch comers to the Cape were
servants of the Dutch East India Company. Because of the need for more
agricultural productions, some of these servants "were freed and allowed
to take up land as freehold farmers."5 This led to the creation of a
"class of free burghers" which "would gradually grow in number as the
company servants and soldiers fulfilled their terms of service and were
induced to remain at the Cape as free colonists."6 Bernard Magubane
suggested that the labor needed to operate the station motivated the
company's efforts "to dominate the local area."7 Thus, the relationship
between the settlers and the natives became one "of conflict over land and
cattle at first, then over industrial opportunities when towns grew up."8
The indigenous peoples, the Khoikhoi (the Hottentots, as called by
the Europeans) did not initially object to the presence of the Dutch since
"they had a long experience of trading with ships of various European
nations."9 But soon they began to realize the danger of the growing number
of the foreigners, and felt some restrictions on their freedom of
movement. Tension was developed and led to the first Khoikhoi-Dutch wars.
The fighting was resolved by a treaty that ensured the settlers' right
concerning the disputed territory.10 The Commander of the garrison
reported the opinion of a wounded Khoikhoi as follows:
The prisoner . . . who could speak Dutch fairly well,
having been asked why they caused us this trouble, declared,
for no other reason than that they saw that we kept in
possession the best lands, and grazed our cattle where they
used to do so, and that everywhere with houses and plantations
we endeavoured to establish ourselves so permanently as if we
intend never to leave again and take permanent possession of
this Cape land (which had belonged to them during all the
centuries) for our sole use. Yea! to such an extent that
their cattle could not come and drink at the fresh water
without going over the corn lands which we did not like them
to do.
He asked finally what we would have done had the same
thing happened to us. Moreover, he added, they observed how
we were strengthening ourselves daily with fortifications and
bulwarks, which according to their way of thinking could have
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no other object than to bring them and all that was theirs
under our authority and domination.11
War broke out again in 1659-60 and in 1673-77, which resulted in the
victory of the white settlers due to the fact that the Khoikhoi "were
divided into small and loosely organized tribes whose mutual jealousies
and animosities could be manipulated by the invaders for their own
advantage."12 The modern weapons the Europeans had at the time was also
an important factor that contributed to the White victory.
During the course of their expansion, the white settlers came into
conflict with another local people, the San (whom the whites called
Bushmen). The San used the tactic of hit and run raids "making life
precarious for Whites . . . until well into the nineteenth century."13 The
Trekboers (the white settlers) responded by organizing "hunting parties
which killed adult Bushmen and captured the children where they were used
as herdsmen. In one such party 250 Bushmen were killed."14 It was
reported that "men bragged about their bag of Bushmen as fishermen boast
about their catch."15
Khoikhoi and San were thus subdued and their way of life
disintegrated. "The indigenous herding and hunting societies had largely
disappeared as autonomous entities by the late eighteenth century."16 Once
they lost their ability to supply cattle to the Company, the indigenous
people's "continued survival as independent societies" became no longer
important "to the success of white settlement."17 Force was used to
satisfy the white's hunger for land. "The end result was dispossession
of the indigenes and their loss of power, independence, and cultural
cohesion."18
By the 1770's, the forefather of today's Afrikaners came into clash
with Bantu-speaking people. This became known as the first Kaffir War.
The Kaffir Wars lasted for over a century until the time when England
entered into her war with the Boer republics. With the establishment of
the Union of South Africa in 1910, the expansion of white settlers was
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carried out through "legal" devices such as the Natives Land Act of 1913.
The National Party won control of the state machinery in 1948. Since then
the ideology of apartheid became the framework within which the
subjugation and exploitations of the Africans were justified.
Definition and Basic Principles
Apartheid is a complex concept that has a variety of
interpretations. Literally the word in Afrikaans means "apart-ness," "the
state of being apart 'separateness' or 'separation,' and in the South
African context means racial distinction."19 In the South African
political language, apartheid refers to "separate development of each race
in the geographical area assigned to it."20 The white rulers have
frequently claimed that they have sought to help the Africans to advance
in their own areas and that apartheid is the proper framework within which
the Africans can fulfill their aspirations in life. The then Premier
Vorster stated:
I say to the Coloured people, as well as to the Indians and
the Bantu, that the policy of separate development is not a
policy which rests upon jealousy, fear, or hatred. It is not
a denial of the human dignity of anyone, nor is it so
intended. On the contrary, it gives the opportunity to every
individual, within his own sphere, not only to be a man or
woman in every sense, but it also creates the opportunity for
them to develop and advance without restriction or frustration
as circumstances justify, and in accordance with the demands
of development achieved.
Apartheid has been given a variety of names such as "white
leadership," "separate development," "parallel development," "multi
national development," and "co-operative co-existence."22 Opponents of
apartheid see it as racism, exploitation, and domination. For Bernard
Magubane apartheid is "more than mere racial discrimination or casual
exploitation of one group by another. It is a strict ideology of white
supremacy, racial oppression, and exploitation, whose logical extremity-
-genocide—is tempered by the need for African labor."23 In the words of
the South African poet Breyten Breyenbach:
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Apartheid is the state and the condition of being apart. It
is the no man's land between peoples. But this gap is not a
neutral space. It is the artificially created distance
necessary to attenuate, for the practitioners, the very raw
reality of racial, economic, social and cultural
discrimination and exploitation. It is the space of the White
man's being. It is the distance needed to convince himself
of his denial of the other's humanity. It ends up denying all
humanity of any kind both to the other and to himself.24
Apartheid, in the opinion of the French writer Jacques Derrida,
Concentrates separation, raises it to another power and sets
separation itself apart: "apartitionality," something like
that. By isolating being a part in some sort of essence or
hypostasis, the word corrupts it into a quasi-ontological
segregation. At every point, like all racism, it tends to
pass segregation off as natural—and as the very law of the
origin.
The word apartheid was used for the first time in 1943 in a South
African newspaper.26 Dr. Malan used the term apartheid for the first time
in parliament in 1944 when he stated: "To ensure the safety of the white
race and of Christian civilization by the honest maintenance of the
principles of apartheid and guardianship."27 Speaking in the House of
Assembly in 1963, the South African Prime Minister Henrik Verwoerd said:
"We want to keep South Africa White . . . 'keeping it white' can mean only
one thing, namely White domination, not 'leadership,' not 'guidance,' but
'control,' 'supremacy.'"28 Merle Lipton identified four features of
apartheid:
First, it is the hierarchical ordering of the whole social,
economical and political structure of South African society
on the basis of statutorily defined race. Whites (who
constitute some 18% of the population) are at the top of the
hierarchy; mixed-race coloureds together with Indians (roughly
12% of the total) are in the middle; and the indigenous
African population (the remaining 70%) are at the bottom.
Secondly, apartheid involves systematic political and economic
discrimination against all blacks, but particularly against
Africans. Thirdly, it involves segregation of the races not
only politically and economically, but also socially,
particularly in housing and social services, including
education and health care. Fourthly, apartheid is the
legalization and institutionalization of this hierarchical,
discriminatory and segregated system.
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The roots of apartheid indeed go back 300 years long before the
National Party gained control of the state machinery. It "evolved out of
the structures of segregation established during the course of colonial
settlement and conquest."30 Between 1910 and 1934 many laws were passed
which encompassed practically every aspect of life such as "land-ownership
rights, employment and wage conditions, the place and nature of a person's
residence, freedom of movement, political rights, the quality of
education, etc., on the basis of membership in a racial group."31
The backbone of the apartheid system is what became officially known
as "homelands" (originally called Bantustans) by which South Africa was
divided into eleven independent states. Ten "black states" comprise 72
percent of the population and occupy 13 percent of the area. Transkei,
Ciskei, Venda, and Bophuthatswana are now all "independent," and supposed
to be followed by other six black states. The eleventh white state
comprises a white majority and two minorities: the coloureds and the
Indians. According to the apartheid system, the population of South
Africa is classified into four main racial groups called White (16.1
percent), Coloureds (9.2 percent), Asian (2.9 percent), and Africans (71.8
percent), with the whites having a monopoly of political and economic
powers.32 The question of race is central in apartheid ideology.
Race and Ideology
Throughout history, ideology has been used to explain or rationalize
the ruler's action and their privileged position. Magubane maintained
that the ruling class has sought
To find theoretical and ideological weapons to supplement
their physical domination. They propagate these idealogies
in all the institutions of society in order to convince
themselves and the oppressed classes that inequality is
inevitable, the natural state of human society.33
In his Politics. Aristotle provided an elaborate rationalization for
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slavery. He wrote: "It is thus clear that, just as some are by nature
free, so others are by nature slaves, and for these latter the condition
of slavery is both beneficial and just."34 Plato for his part believed
that "truth was a vital virtue." However, to promote domestic harmony and
to ensure citizens' loyalty, "the rule of his model Republic should create
and propagate an official mythology—a 'royal lie1 an 'audacious
fiction.'"35 Plato's "royal lie" developed to "a rigid system of closed
classes." He explained:
Citizens, we shall say to them in our tale, you are brothers,
yet God has framed you differently. Some of you have the
power of command, and in the composition of these he has
mingled gold, wherefore also they have the highest honour;
others he has made of silver, to be auxiliaries; others again
who are to be husbandmen and craftsmen he has composed of
brass and iron; and the species will generally be preserved
in the children. But as all are of the same original stock,
a golden parent will sometimes have a silver son, or a silver
parent a golden son. And God proclaims as a first principle
to the rulers, and above all else, that there is nothing which
they should so anxiously guard, or of which they are to be
such good guardians, as of the purity of the race . . . For
an oracle says that when a man of brass or iron guards the
State, it will be destroyed.36
Aristotle's doctrine that some men are slaves by nature was used, in the
middle of the sixteenth century, by the great Spanish jurist Juan Ginees
de Sepulveda in his debate with Las Casas on the question of whether the
Aristotelian theory could be applied to the Indians.37 Thus, according to
the Aristotelian doctrine,
Society consists of people who differ not only in skin color
but in ability. Members of certain races are masters because
their achievements re-echo across the world, others are
capable of nothing. They can serve, at best, as fertilizers
for history, tilling the soil, digging the mines, and doing
other chores for the European bourgeois civilization.
The concept of "savagery" which was developed in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries became an important guide by "which the early
colonists assessed the potential and predicted the fate of the non-
European peoples they encountered."39 The human race was divided into
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superior and inferior, and accordingly non-Europeans were treated
differently from Europeans.40 The civil-savage dichotomy was used by the
Greeks who declared themselves superior to "barbarians."41 The Christian-
heathen dichotomy was also used to emphasize the notion of European
(white) superiority. The Spanish and Portuguese were guided by the Pope's
instructions to enslave and seize the lands and property of "all saracens
and pagans whatsoever, and all other enemies of Christ wheresoever
placed."42 Christianity was equated with civilization and slavery was
attributed to an inherited curse that God had placed on nonwhite people.
In the first quarter of the sixteenth century, Johan Boemus, a German
Hebraic scholar, argued "that all barbarous peoples descended from Ham,
while all civilized men were the issue of Shem and Japheth."43 The
Afrikaners, during the eighteenth century, referred to themselves as
"Christians" and the Africans as "heathen."44 "Indeed, the Africans who
were trained by European missionaries were considered heathen, while those
European farmers or cattlemen who had no religious affiliation were
considered Christian."45
That was the background of the superiority-inferiority dichotomy
which sought to rationalize "political and economic interest of conquering
and exploiting groups throughout history."46 Thus, "racial superiority
became the theory justifying conquest and territorial expansion: it was
the manifest destiny of the 'civilized' world to control and guide
'inferior' peoples for the good of all."47 The notion of "white supremacy"
which "refers to the attitudes, ideologies, and policies associated with
the rise of blatant forms of white or European dominance over 'non-white'
populations"48 became central in Afrikaner mythology. Most whites in South
Africa "assumed that any sensible, civilized person knew that Africans
were a culturally inferior race and should be treated accordingly."49 The
whites see themselves as "members of a race that was superior to all other
races in Africa."50 This has been manifested, they believe, in every
aspect of life: "religion, technology, politics, and the arts, as well
48
as the vast differences in power and wealth."51
Race has always been a vital factor in Afrikaner ideology. The
white South Africans see races as "static, self-perpetuating entities with
fixed cultural and linguistic as well as physical characteristics, and
that they themselves represented the summit of human achievement."52 White
supremacy became "a conviction deeply rooted in subconscious of all white
South Africans."53 Marianne Cornevin argued that "the absolute superiority
of the white race and the need to safeguard its political and economic
supremacy are the twin cornerstones of the ideology of apartheid."54
As is the case with Zionism, separation of races is central in
apartheid ideology. Apartheid believes:
That each race is predestined to lead its own special way of
life and development. Any assimilation is regarded as a
violation of "purity of blood" and branded as a path
jeopardizing the "supreme" white race. For the "lower" race,
the Africans, exposure to European culture is allegedly
harmful because deviation from the primitive way of lit?
predestined by God would result in loss of their originality.
The question of who is a white is just as important in South Africa is the
question of who is a Jew in Israel. "The fact that Africans, Indians, and
Coloureds have been collectively referred to as 'non-whites' in official
terminology," Manas Buthelezi said, "suggests that they have the identity
of non-persons who exist only as a negative shadow of whites."56 D.F.
Malan, who became Prime Minister when the NP took power in 1948,
explained:
Difference in colour indicates a simple but highly significant
fact, i.e., that Whites and Non-whites are not of the same
kind. They are different . . . The difference in colour is
merely the physical manifestation of the contrast between two
irreconcilable ways of life, between barbarism and
civilization, between heathenism and Christianity, and finally
between overwhelming numerical odds on the one hand and
insignificant numbers on the other.
The White perception of African inferiority goes back before the
arrival of the white settlers. By the time the Dutch East India Company
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decided to establish a supply station at the cape in 1652, Europeans had
already considered themselves superior to Africans. They tended to look
down at people who differed from them "in physical appearance and social
behavior."58 At the time, the Dutch had already participated in the
Atlantic slave trade along the west African coastline. Leonard Thompson
wrote:
Throughout northern Europe, Africans were stereotyped as
idolatrous and licentious, thieving and lying, lazy and dirty.
The stereotype persisted throughout the eighteenth century,
spiced by reports of wars and massacres, and allegations of
cannibalism and sexual relations between apes and Africans.
Abolitionists as well as defenders of the slave trade had no
doubt that Africans were inferior to Europeans. Explanations
for African inferiority varied. Environmental determinism was
a common explanation: tropical heat combined with the alleged
abundance of tropical natural conditions was responsible.
Nevertheless, few Europeans doubted that Africans were members
of the human species. They were immature people, to be
treated like children. They were lagging a thousand years or
more behind Europeans. This line of thought led to
justification of slavery. Europeans could save Africans from
the degradations of their own societies by taking them to the
Americas, where hard wqrk and civilized discipline would be
a step toward maturity.
By 1652 the Dutch had at their disposal enough information about the cape
collected from many Portuguese, English, French, Dutch, and other European
ships' crews. Most of these accounts emphasized the strangeness of the
natives' "speech, their physical appearance, their clothing, their mode
of life, and their customs."60 By the middle of the seventeenth century,
the term Hottentot "was becoming a symbol of human degradation in European
literature."61 The following passage written by Jacobus Hondius in 1652
seems to be representative.
The natives in the vicinity of the Cape of Good Hope are
generally called Hottentots by us on account of their speech,
which sounds very much like stuttering and, in fact, they even
refer to themselves as Hottentots . . . They have very ugly
countenances . . . They have everything in common with the
dumb cattle, barring their human nature, from which,
occasionally, some co-ordination of the senses may bring forth
a spark of intelligence ... So far as clothing is concerned,
they usually wear nothing but a small skin, as wide as a hand,
and as long as a span, which serves to cover their private
parts; both men and women being otherwise entirely naked . .
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. Since they hang the entrails of animals round their legs and
neck as containers to hold odds-and-ends of things . . .
(fresh as well as stale), dripping with fat, and plaited twice
or thrice, they all smell fiercely, as can be noticed at a
distance of more than twelve feet against the wind, and they
also give the appearance of never having washed . . . They are
thus very dissolute and in every way like animals, for they
are wild, rough, and unclean in their habits . . . There are
no signs of Belief or Religion to be found among them and it
is for this reason they are called Cafres, Caferes, or,
according to Marmol, Quefreres, in keeping with the name of
the country Quefrerie. 2
One account in 1609 described the natives as "cannibals."63 Thus, the
early Dutch settlers "were prepared to deal with a degraded people—human
indeed, but 'beast-like. "l64 In 1657 Johann Scrhreyer described Hottentots
as "false by nature, inconstant, revengeful, thievish, lazy and slow to
work, nearly always gay [cheerful]."65 During the eighteenth century
"'Hottentot' was a widely accepted symbol for irredeemable savagery and
the very depth of human degradation."66 The Oxford English Dictionary of
1899 defined Hottentot as a "person of inferior intellect or culture."67
According to a study published in 1937 by I.D. MacCrone, the unfair
treatment of the natives by the white settlers was justified "because they
were not Christians and also because their appearance and behavior
resembled those of wild beasts rather than civilized humans."68 The Dutch
East India Company, for its part, played an important role in emphasizing
the racial structure of the colonial society "by prohibiting interracial
marriages, appointing only white people as local officials, and making it
increasingly difficult for people who were not white to own land."69
Black inferiority was a constant theme in the literature of white
South Africa. Richard Godlonton, a white settler who edited the
Grahamstown Journal in 1820, emphasized "the barbarous state of nudity in
which [blacks] are found at the present day."70 William Harris, a British
military officer who conducted a hunting expedition north of the Vaal
River in 1836-37, expressed dissatisfaction with the British government
which in his opinion
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Should not long ago have seen the imperious necessity,
dictated alike by reason, Justice, and humanity, of
exterminating from off the face of the earth, a race of
monsters, who, being the unprovoked destroyers, and implacable
foes of Her Majestyrs Christian subjects, have forfeited every
claim to mercy or consideration.7
The conclusion of a commission appointed in 1852 by the British Colonial
government, read in part:
The Kafirs are lazy by nature and accustomed to do their work
under the influence of fear; they are protected in this
district, they live on land for nothing, and as they have
little wants in their condition of life, they can live without
working. Their own work must be done by their women, who they
treat as slaves. But I consider it with respect to their
civilization, as well as to their own improvement, as an act
of justice to the white inhabitants that they should be
compelled to go into the service of the Boers.
Most of the British witnesses who gave evidence to the Commission
stereotyped Africans in a similar fashion. Benjamin Blaine suggested that
the African
Position on the scale of civilization ... is almost as low
as humanity has fallen since the creation of man . . . They
are crafty and cunning, and at the same time indolent and
excitable; averse to labor, but when their passions are roused
bloodthirsty and cruel, and are apparently unaffected by those
influences which tend to raise barbarism to civilization.
S.J. du Toit, the author of an influential book published in 1877,
suggested that:
It was self-evident that all the precolonial inhabitants of
. South Africa were savages. That required no explanation.
Some people, he wrote, say that the Bushmen are not human;
that was not true; nevertheless, the Boers could do nothing
else but shoot them dead. The Kaffers are more human than
the Bushmen, but their customs stamped them as savages; by
practicing witchcraft, buying women with cattle, and making
the women do all the work.74
Another influential study conducted by Theal described the "Bushmen" as
an "unimprovable race, one of the lowest, if not the very lowest, of all
the races on the face of the earth."75 According to Teal, "The
intelligence of an African child stops developing at about the age of
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puberty"—a popular notion in nineteenth century Europe.76 He explained:
"The growth of his mind, which at first promised so much, has ceased just
at that stage when the mind of the European begins to display the greatest
vigour."77
By the end of the nineteenth century, these ideas were published in
major textbooks in the Cape Colony. Alexander Wilmot, a major textbook
writer, a Cape Town politician and a fellow at the Royal Geographical
Society, wrote:
The existence of the coloured races is an immense benefit, as,
by means of them, cheap labour is obtainable, and large
agricultural supplies can be constantly procured; but Southern
Africa, although its population chiefly comprises the
descendants of stalwart nomadic races who have migrated from
a northern part of the continent, is eminently a white man's
country, where homes can be found for millions of the
overflowing population of Europe.
These studies formed the basis for future publications on South Africa
that flowed from the British presses. James Bryce, who wrote an important
book on American democracy, was a clear example of "the racism that
permeated the British ruling class in the high imperial age."79 After
touring South Africa for several months, he, in his Impression of South
Africa, emphasized the notion of "inferior races." Bryce wrote:
Here in South Africa the native races seem to have made no
progress for centuries, if, indeed, they have not actually
gone backward; and the feebleness of savage man intensifies
one's sense of the overmastering strength of nature . . . When
the Portuguese and Dutch first knew the Kafirs, they did not
appear to be making any progress toward a higher culture.
Human life was held very cheap; women were in a degraded
state, and sexual morality was at a low ebb. Courage, loyalty
to chief and tribe, and hospitality were the three prominent
virtues. War was the only pursuit in which chieftains sought
distinction, and war was mere slaughter and devastation,
unaccompanied by any views of policy or plans of
administration. The people were—and indeed still are—
passionately attached to their old customs . . . and it was
probably as much the unwillingness to have their customs
disturbed as the apprehension for their land that made many
of the tribes oppose to the advance of the Europeans so
obstinate a resistance . . . Their minds are mostly too
childish to recollect and draw the necessary inferences from
previous defeats, and they never realized that the whites
possessed beyond the sea an inexhaustible reservoir of men
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and weapons.80
Another influential British publication was a Clarendon Press series, A
Historical Geography of the British Colonies, whose volume on South Africa
was published in 1897. The same stereotypes were repeated: Bushmen were
described as "the outcasts of South Africa, untameable, savage," while
Hottentots as "a desultory race, with little capacity except for loafing
and minding cattle," and "Kaffirs were much more primitive than American
Indians."81 The Boer President of the Transvaal, Paul Kruger (who was
influenced by Calvinism)82 stated that "the black man had to be taught that
he came second, that he belonged to the inferior class which must obey
and learn."83 "Savages," he continued, "must be kept within bonds, and
always overruled by justice and morality."84 The constitution of the Boer
Republics emphasized "no equality between coloured people and the white
inhabitants, either in church or state."85
The war of 1899-1902, which resulted in the defeat of the Boers at
the hands of the British, led to no basic change in the relations between
whites and blacks. The British backed off from "their previous intention
to extend the Cape franchise to the Transvaal and the Orange Free State"86
when they agreed in the Treaty of Vereeniging (1902) to leave the matter
to the white settlers "to determine the extent of black's political rights
in a British-dominated South Africa."87 Lord Milner, the British High
Commissioner, who headed the "reconstruction" efforts in South Africa in
the years immediately following the war, put it clearly in 1903:
A political equality of white and black is impossible. The
white man must rule, because he is elevated by many, many
steps above the black man; steps which it will take the latter
centuries to climb, and which it is quite possible that the
vast bulk of the black population may never be able to climb
at all.88
The British racial policy sought to treat the "natives" differently from
the "coloured" people. Lord Selborne, who was the high commissioner for
South Africa and governor of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony from
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1905 to 1910, recommended:
Coloured people. Our object should be to teach the Coloured
people to give their loyal support to the white population.
It seems to me sheer folly to classify them with Natives, and
by treating them as Natives to force them away from their
natural allegiance to the whites and into making common cause
with the Natives. If they are so forced, in the time trouble
they will furnish exactly those leaders which the Natives
could not furnish for themselves. It is, therefore, in my
opinion, unwise to think of treating them as natives; and it
would be as unjust as unwise. There are many Coloured people
who are quite white inside, though they may be coloured
outside. There are some, indeed, who are quite white outside
also. The problem of the treatment of the Coloured people,
is, indeed, sadly complicated by the fact that they vary in
every shade of character and colour from pure white inside and
outside to pure black inside and outside.
I suggest that the wise policy is to give them the
benefit of their white blood—not to lay the stress on the
black blood, but to lay the stress on the white blood, and to
make any differentiation of treatment between them and whites
the exception and not the rule. A case for such
differentiation would only arise when a Coloured man showed
by his manner of living, e.g., by the practice of polygamy,
that he had reverted to the tribal type.
Natives. The objects which the Government must have in
their Native policy are: (i) to preserve the peace of the
country, for nothing is so demoralizing or injurious to its
true welfare as a native war; (ii) to ensure the gradual
destruction of the tribal civilization among the Natives;
(iii) to ensure the gradual destruction of the tribal system,
which is incompatible with civilization. An important feature
of this policy will be teaching the Natives to work. A large
proportion of them do work now, but mostly in a desultory and
inefficient manner. The object must be to teach them to work
as continually and effectively as the whites are supposed to
but do not always do.
In his address to the Cape House of Assembly, Cecil John Rhodes said:
I will lay down my policy on this Native question . . . either
you receive them on an equal footing as citizens or call them
a subject race ... I have made up my mind that there must
be class (race) legislation . . . The Native is to be treated
as a child and denied the franchise. We must adopt the system
of despotism such as works well in India in our relations with
the barbarians of South Africa . . . These are my politics and
these are the politics of South Africa.90
The legal mechanism of apartheid was established when the political
power was granted to the White minority by the British in 1910. The
constitution legalized the oppression and the exploitation of the non-
White population. During the period 1934-1948, several Afrikaner
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intellectuals returned to South Africa with doctoral degrees from German
universities. They were "attracted by the cruder elements in German
national socialism," which emphasized "the supremacy of the nation over
the individual."91 Race purity became a central issue for Afrikaner
nationalists. A pamphlet by G. Eloff, entitled "Race and Races Mixing,"
read:
The preservation of the pure race tradition of the Boerevolk
must be protected at all costs in all possible ways as a holy
pledge entrusted to us by our ancestors as part of God's plan
with our People. Any movement, school, or individual who sins
against this must be dealt with as a racial criminal by the
effective authorities.*'
This ideology laid the basis of the policy of apartheid. Sociologist G.
Cronje argued:
The more consistently the policy of apartheid could be
applied, the greater would be the security for the purity of
our blood and the surer our unadulterated European racial
survival . . . total racial separation ... is the most
consistent application of the Afrikaner idea of racial
apartheid.
The policy of apartheid was crystallized by the conclusion of a special
commission appointed by the Nationalist Party. It read:
The policy of our country should encourage total
apartheid as the ultimate goal of a natural process of
separate development.
It is the primary task and calling of the State to seek
the welfare of South Africa, and to promote the happiness and
well-being of its citizens, non-White as well as White.
Realizing that such a task can best be accomplished by
preserving and safeguarding the White race, the Nationalist
Party professes this as the fundamental guiding principle of
its policy.
White domination was stated clearly in the statements of the National
Party leaders. Mr. Strijdom said:
Our policy is that the Europeans must stand their ground and
must remain baas in South Africa. If we reject the herrenvolk
idea and the principle and the idea that the White man cannot
remain baas, if the franchise is to be extended to the non-
Europeans, and if the non-Europeans are given representation
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and the vote and the non-Europeans are developed on the same
basis as the Europeans, how can the European remain baas . .
. our view is that in every sphere the Europeans must retain
the right to rule the country and to keep it a White man's
country."
Similar to Zionism, the ideology of apartheid is based on separation.
Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd, who was the prime minister from 1958 until his
death in 1966, stated:
True unity in a racial group can only develop amongst its own
people, separated from the others. The only national unity
for the whites is unity amongst the whites. We do not only
seek and fight for a solution which will mean our survival as
a white race, but we also seek a solution which will ensure
survival and full development—political and economic—to each
of the other racial groups, and we are even prepared to pay
a high price out of our earnings to ensure their future . •
. We want each of our population groups to control and to
govern themselves, as is the case with other Nations. Then
they can cooperate as a Commonwealth—in an economic
association with the Republic and with each other. In the
transition stage the guardian must teach and guide his ward.
This is our policy of separate development. South Africa will
proceed in all honesty and fairness to secure peace,
prosperity and justice for all, by means of political
independence coupled with economic interdependence.
Needless to say, the above statement does not reflect reality. We all
know the plight of the Africans under the white rule as well as the plight
of the Palestinians despite the nice words of the Israeli Declaration of
Independence. On the South African case Leonard Thompson commented:
However, the results were anything but peace, prosperity, and
justice for the vast majority of the population. Going far
beyond previous laws and practices, the government made racial
segregation and discrimination pervasive and unescapable; it
suppressed dissent with the utmost rigor; and it ensured that
the most Africans would live in squalid poverty by limiting
their rights to land ownership and citizenship to the former
reserves, which, in Orwellian style, it redesignated as
"Homelands." In those scattered and impoverished territories,
African communities could survive only by sending their
healthy adults out to earn wages as laborers in the "white
areas"; but the government tried to ensure that no more
Africans should exist in the white areas than those whom white
employers needed to work in their homes, on their farms, and
in their industries.
Like Zionism, apartheid exclusiveness is based on several religious
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themes.
The Role of Religion in Apartheid Ideology
As in Zionism, religion in South Africa has been used to justify a
wide range of exploitation, discrimination, and racial policies. It has
also been a dynamic force in the development of Afrikaner nationalism.
George Fredrickson pointed out that
The idea that there was a divine plan to establish independent
white Christian communities in what is now Natal, the Orange
Free State, and the Transvaal contained the seeds of an
Afrikaner nationalism that would eventually lay claim to all
of South Africa in the name of ethnic and racial supremacy.98
Dr. D.F. Malan, the Nationalist leader who became a Prime Minister in
1948, stated:
Our history is the greatest masterpiece of the centuries. We
hold this nationhood as our due for it was given us by the
Architect of the Universe. His aim was the formation of a new
nation among the nations of the world . . . The last hundred
years have witnessed a miracle behind which must lie a divine
plan. Indeed, the history of the Afrikaner reveals a will and
a determination which makes one feel that Afrikanerdom is not
the work of men but the creation of God.
He further continued:
It is through the will of God that the Afrikaner People exists
at all. In his wisdom He determined that on the southern
point of Africa, the dark continent, a People should be born
who would be the bearer of Christian culture and civilization.
In His wisdom He surrounded this People by great dangers. He
set the People down upon unfruitful soil so that they had to
toil and sweat to exist upon the soil. From time to time he
visited them with droughts and other plagues.
But this was only one of the problems. God also willed
that the Afrikaans People should be continually threatened by
other Peoples. There was the ferocious barbarian who resisted
the intruding Christian civilization and caused the
Afrikaner's blood to flow in streams. There were times when
as a result of this the Afrikaner was deeply despairing, but
God at the same time prevented the swamping of the young
Afrikaner People in the sea of barbarianism.
Leonard Thompson suggested that religion has been a major force in
Afrikaner politics.100 W.A. de Klerk noted that "Afrikaner politics was
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slowly but fatally being theologized." The National Party, he continued
to say, "was itself becoming, if not a church, then a party imbued with
religion—a secular religion—at its very roots."101 The Constitution Act
of 1961 "refers to South Africa as having been given by God to a specific
people, 'this their own' land."102 The Official Yearbook of the Republic
of South Africa (1982) indicated the increased importance of the role of
religion in South African life. It stated that "the defence and police
forces regard religious instruction as an indispensable adjunct to the
training of recruits."103 Dunbar Moodie noted that the ideas of "divine
calling" and "special destiny" have played an important role in the
interpretation of Afrikaner history and became a sort of "civil
religion"104 or a "folk theology" in the words of Alton Templin.105 Leonard
Thompson noted that:
The Afrikaans press has always given immense prominence to
religion, printing numerous biblical quotations, editorials,
special articles, and letters to the editors on religious
themes on the leader page. Indeed, despite the inroads of
urbanization and capitalism, religion continues to be a
determining influence over the personal beliefs, the corporate
behavior, and the self-justification of the Afrikaners.106
In his book, The Church Struggle in South Africa, de Gruchy suggested that
the use of religion in Afrikaner politics led to a "distortion of the
biblical belief in providence." Such a distortion, de Gruchy maintained,
was manifested in four points:
First of all, national history is given a quasi-sacred
character. It functions as another norm beside the kingdom
of God for evaluating history and for determining future
plans. In all past and present events—the Great Trek, the
Wars of Independence, the National Party victory in 1948, the
establishment of the republic in 1961, or South Africa's role
in war-torn southern Africa today—God is declared to be our
God. With him on our side, victory is assured, our cause will
be vindicated and our enemies vanquished. We are given an
assurance upon which we may build for the future. Secondly,
the Afrikaner nation (volk) has become a special people, a
holy people, a church. Afrikanerdom has a peculiar
relationship to the Almighty; it has assumed the mantle of
Israel in southern Africa; it has a particular vocation among
the nations. Thirdly, the policies of Afrikaner Nationalism
have become transfused with a sense of divine calling and
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mission, if not to the whole world, then at least to this
subcontinent. This means that separate development has
become, for many, more than a pragmatic attempt to solve a
complex political problem; it is regarded as part of the
divine purpose. Opposition to it is, per se, unchristian.
And fourthly, because providence has led us to this point, the
present order must have been ordained by God. Separate
development may evolve, but it cannot be allowed to change
radically without denying the very order of creation.
Similar to Zionist political socialization, Afrikaner children are
taught the notion of divine intervention in the creation of their nation.
A boy of twelve related what he had learned:
We came here, and there was the bush, with wild grass growing.
My father says the hills must have wondered who these strange
people were! But we showed the hills. God had the sun smile
on us. God told the skies to give us the water we needed.
God asked the land to be kind to us; it took our seeds and
gave us back our crops. We worked all the time, no vacations,
only Sunday to pray to God. This is our country of South
Africa ... We love our fatherland; and we'll fight for it,
and we'll die for it . . .10B
Like the Jews, Afrikaners consider themselves as a chosen people with a
God-given destiny. They have frequently emphasized the notion that God
himself placed them in Africa to fulfill a particular calling as a nation,
that he gave them the Afrikaans language, and that he entrusted them with
a mission to spread Christianity among the heathen. In the words of P.J.
Cilliers, editor-in-chief of the Afrikaans daily Die Burger. Afrikaners
"see themselves as a sort of Israel in Africa, with a sense of God-guided
destiny that it would be as perilous to discount as in the case of the
original mode."109 The Chairman of the Afrikaner Broederborn, J.C. van
Rooy, stated in 1944:
In every People in the world is embodied a Divine Idea and the
task of each People is to build upon that Idea and to perfect
it. So God created the Afrikaner People with a unique
language, unique philosophy of life, and their own history and
tradition in order that they might fulfill a particular
calling and destiny here in the southern corner of Africa.
We must stand guard on all that is peculiar to us and build
upon it. We must believe that God has called us to be
servants of his righteousness in this place. We must walk the
way of obedience to faith. 10
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Paul Kruger, who was the President of the Transvaal between 1884 and 1900,
stressed on "God's leadership in the history of the Afrikaner people;
whatever happened to them was His will; He was the sovereign of history
and its central theme."111 In the same line of thinking, Daniel Francois
Malan, leader of the "Purified" National Party, stated:
The history of the Afrikaner reveals a determination and a
definiteness of purpose which make one feel that Afrikanerdom
is not the work of man but a creation of God. We have a
divine right to be Afrikaners. Our history is the highest
work of art of the Architect of the centuries.112
The idea of chosenness, an element of Judaism that has been
manipulated by the Zionist movement, has played a significant role in
Afrikaner politics. "The Christian doctrine of election," j. Alton
Templin wrote, "has its origin in a modification of the concept of a
chosen people, developed by Apostle Paul and the early church and used by
Augustine and Reformers such as Luther, Calvin, and Zwingli."113 in his
The Institutes and De Aeterna Dei Predestinatione. "John Calvin spelled
out the doctrine more completely ... as he coordinated the concept with
his doctrine of the Providence of God."114 The tenets of the orthodox
Calvinism to which the White settlers in South Africa adhered were
basically
[A] belief in the sovereign God, sole creator and ruler
through his Providence of the universe; the inborn sinfulness
of both man and the world as a result of the Fall; the
election by predestination of the few through grace to glorify
God in building his kingdom on earth; and the damnation of the
rest of mankind, also to the glory of God.115
Templin maintained that the Afrikaners' interpretation of themselves as
elect or chosen was that:
(1) Their election by God was assured to those who maintained
the scriptural pattern in organizing their government and
their personal lives; (2) their election was substantiated by
the cultural advantages they enjoyed; (3) their election must
be defended in the face of British imperialism that sought to
compromise the Afrikaner cause; (4) their election must be
maintained through their own language, Dutch or Afrikaans; (5)
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their election assured them of an innate superiority when
contrasted to African races; and finally, (6) their different
interpretations of the doctrine of election were functionally
related to the total social development.116
Templin maintained that after the Great Trek the concept of chosen people
began to play a significant role in the Afrikaners' struggle against the
British and the Africans and also in the development of their nationalism.
Like the ancient Israelites, the Afrikaners saw themselves as a chosen
people "with England in the role of Pharaoh, the highveld as the promised
land, and the Africans as the Canaanites."117 Fredrickson wrote:
Their mission, as they saw it, was not so much to spread
Christianity among the heathen as to preserve themselves as
a Christian community amid a horde of savages who needed to
be ruled firmly in the name of order and civilization but were
unlikely candidates for conversion. Their struggle with the
British missionaries in the Cape had in fact encouraged some
Boers to take the view that propagating the gospel among the
Africans was tantamount to making them their equals—an action
that was "contrary to the laws of God." According to a
missionary who visited the independent Boer republics in the
1860's, 'they have persuaded themselves by some wonderful
mental process that they are God's chosen people and that the
blacks are wicked and condemned Canaanites over whose head the
divine anger lowers continually.8
The Afrikaners interpreted the doctrine of their election to meet their
practical needs. They, Templin suggested, saw that
[T]hey must maintain a scriptural framework for their
government and for their personal lives; they assumed that
cultural advancement was a sign of God's approval; they sought
freedom from Dutch, or more usually from British, domination;
they fought to maintain their language whether Dutch or
Afrikaans; they assumed they were superior to Africans
educationally and culturally, and hence more surely were
chosen; and they integrated the theological ideology into
their total culture. Afrikaner leaders saw themselves as a
special people led as the pastoral children of Abraham in
search of prosperity and religious peace or as the followers
of a new Moses or Joshua going to a promised land. They had
made their covenant with God, and they believed implicitly
that He was to be their God in a special way, and they were
special people in His sight. This interpretation soon ceased
to be strictly theological and entered the realm more properly
called legend, or even rationalization, as the leaders
attempted to justify their position in the last half of the
nineteenth century. With this understanding of themselves and
the theological interpretation of their own cultural destiny,
they conquered the wilderness while they oppressed the
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Africans; they exploited the land while they opposed social
reforms inspired by European intellectual developments; they
became more orthodox in their theology while they reacted
against various new theological and philosophical ideas of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In many ways the
Afrikaner society retained its seventeenth-century character
until after the Boer War. The theological and scriptural
doctrine of an elect people afforded a means whereby the
Afrikaners could both create a new society and react against
a foreign influence.liy
Marianne Cornevin linked three ideas to the concept of Afrikaners'
election:
The first is that this chosen people is endowed with the
divine mission1 of guiding and civilizing African peoples.
The Acts of the Apostles and the Epistles of St. Paul furnish
many quotations that can be used in this sense. The second
is that this 'chosen people1 cannot and must not interbreed
with other peoples: hence the enactment of sexual
prohibitions (the 1927 Immorality Act, amended in 1950 and
1956). The third is that the ^chosen people's* right of
ownership over the land is inalienable, because it is the
'promised' land given by God. °
Alfred Moleah pointed to the similarity between Zionism and South African
apartheid in their use of the chosen concept for political purposes:
People become agents of God's will; human acts are attributed
to a divine calling, and responsibility is avoided. Actions,
and the consequences of those actions, become unquestionable
and unassailable. This is the claim of Zionists and that of
Afrikaner nationalists: they claim to be chosen peoples, the
elect of God put into this world to fulfill a divine mission.
These claims also have a virulent racist component.121
Similar to Zionism, the ideology of apartheid has frequently used
religion to interpret the events of national history. This was manifested
in the myth of the "covenant" which was a pledge supposedly made by the
white settlers to God that ensured their victory over the Africans. To
escape the British rule, the trekkers (the Boers) emigrated further inland
(this migration became known as the Great Trek of 1835-1937), where a
full-scale war broke out with the Zulu. In the Battle of Blood River on
December 16, 1838, the 470 trekkers won a decisive victory over a Zulu
army of approximately 10,000 men. That was possible, according to the
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myth, because of a covenant between God and the settlers. The vow read:
Brothers and fellow-countrymen, we stand here before the Holy
God of Heaven and Earth to make a vow that, if He will be with
us and protect us and give the foe into our hands, we shall
ever celebrate the day and date as a Day of Thanksgiving like
the Sabbath in His honor. We shall enjoin our children that
they must take part with us in this, for a remembrance even
for our posterity. For the honor of God shall herein be
glorified, and to Him shall be given the fame and the honor
of the victory.'"
The Afrikaner historians considered the Great Trek as "a turning-point in
South African history, and one of the greatest single events of the
nineteenth century."123 The voortrekkers were given "all the qualities
that . . . deemed necessary to promote the nationalist cause." The "were
profoundly and uniformly religious. They were adamantly opposed to the
mixing of the races. They stood for Afrikaner freedom and solidarity .
. ."124 According to the Reverend L.N. Botha, "The Solemn covenant
[verbond] locks the voortrekkers with God. They take a vow [Gelofte] in
the name of the volk of South Africa."125 G.F. Combrinck described the
Great Trek as "the central event in the history of South Africa
Blood River made the Afrikaner volk a covenanted volk [Verbondsvolk]."126
Trying to use the occasion to promote Afrikaner solidarity, Combrinck
declared:
Afrikaners, after you have again considered anew the heritage
of your Fathers, what right have you before the God of the
Voortrekkers to stay divided any longer? The oxwagons and
Blood River call you to come all together in a mighty
. Afrikaner laager with a circular wall of Spiritual Voortrekker
wagons around you.ld/
D.F. Malan commented on the same subject:
Behind you lie the tracks of the Voortrekker's Oxwagons,
deeply and ineradicably imprinted across the wide high plains
and over the sneering dragon-like mountain areas [Drakensberg
= Dragons' Mountains] of South African history. They heard
the voice of South Africa. They received their task from
God s Hand. They gave their answer. They made their
sacrifices. There is still a white race. There is a new
volk. There is our own language. There is an undying urge
for freedom.1"5 3 3
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Then Malan linked current and future problems in South Africa:
You and your children will make history. Will South Africa
"JJ1.? a white man s country at the end of this new century?
Will there then still be a poor white problems which this rich
land of ours will face with weary eyes as a heavy reproach?1*5
The Great Trek became central in Afrikaner nationalism. Leonard Thompson
wrote:
In subsequent years, every 16 December was an occasion for
Afrikaner nationalists to use the mystique of the voortrekkers
to endorse their policies. In a modification of the 1938 Ox-
wagon Trek, dispatch riders rode on horseback to Pretoria from
fifteen starting points, and celebrations were held at more
than four hundred places. Once again there was a plenitude
SnH^oC *S3£bollSm: ^hile young boys and girls wore the
uniforms of the voortrekker movement—the Afrikaner breakaway
from the Boy Scouts—adults in traditional voortrekker costume
sang ethnic songs and performed ethnic dances.™
Like the Zionists who explained Israel's victories in religious terms, the
successful South African penetration in Angola was seen as a sign of
divine intervention.131
Comparison with the Israelit««
Afrikaners interpreted their history in a way that corresponds and
mirrors that of Israel in the Old Testament. Andre Du Toit pointed out:
Conscious analogies between Afrikaner history and that of
Israel in the Old Testament were already current in the
nineteenth century, and this sense of being a chose people was
later revived and codified in a particular interprltatiJn of
Great^rek ^ y' WhlCh Centered on selected events like the '
Afrikaners saw themselves as a new Israel. They believed that God
similarly chose them, protected them, and placed them in Africa for a
special mission. Alton Templin wrote:
?^h-reading of the Bible ^vealed several instances
ar to their own: Moses in the wilderness, Joshua and the
Judges opposed to "heathens," and Nehemiah's problems with
"uitlanders." They read about the covenant between God and
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Abraham establishing the old Israel as a people, and they
assumed that their covenant made in 1838 and renewed in 1879
and every year thereafter was the origin of their modern Zion
in south Africa. As they renewed their covenant with God
before certain crises in their history and as they knelt in
prayer before every battle, they were, they thought, faithful
to the example of Abraham. The more they read and reread the
rof« ^S l130^,1103?5' Joshua, and the Psalms, they were
SXZTF t k °.d S f^or' Their faith was biblical and
Calvimstic, but neither term was used in its accepted
iortff?^ k ?k* B?£h we£e now strictly South African terms,
modified by the culture for specific purposes.*33
Apartheid ideology sees the white control of South Africa as a covenant
with God that is similar to the Old Testament covenant with Israel.
Afrikaners equated their situation with the Israelites fleeing from Egypt
under Moses1 leadership. De Gruchy wrote:
The exodus of the people of Israel and their testing in the
?o ?Xnnromrf^ ihaP^nii^a!ain- Any obstacle along9the way
to the promised land had to be overcome, by sheer grit and by
the gun Any doubt of divine providence was not onlv
^urrhkSlef'h *? blasPhemy< * harbinger of disaste?? ?ne
israe? £ t'£ S? book w°as^er ^^^ bUt th« Saga °f
In their racial policies, Fredrickson suggested, the Afrikaners looked to
the Old Testament for support to make the "racial ancestry a qualification
for citizenship."13* The Israelites, according to Deuteronomy 23, "had
banned bastard, Amonites and Moabites from 'the congregation of the Lord'
to the tenth generation."136 Thus the constitution of the Potchefstroom
Republic (later to be incorporated into the South African Republic) stated
clearly that "No person of mixed race [bastards] shall be able to sit in
our meeting as members or judge, down to the tenth degree."137 Quotations
from the Old Testament have frequently been used by the Afrikaners to
"justify God's ordination of the diversity of people and their territorial
separation."138 Cornevin cited two examples: "So the Lord scattered them
abroad from thence upon the face of all the earth" (Genesis 11:8); and
"When the Most High divided to the nations their inheritance, when he
separated the sons of Adam, he set the bounds of the people according to
the number of the children of Israel" (Deuteronomy 32:8).139 Cornevin
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described the analogy with the Israelites as follows:
n-KT TheSf nomadic stock-breeders, nurtured solely on the
Bible, paid special attention to the accounts of the Hebrews'
long march to Palestine, and thought that the vast wilderness
the Karroo, scoured by several generations of trekboers,
?£Ur utlso lead ^° a Poised land. It is hardly surprising
that they reacted as they did when they finally reached the
lush meadows between the Sunday and Great Fish Rivers and
found them already occupied by Xhosa herdsmen. It seemed
obvious that the Xhosa were the Philistines settled in
Palestine when the Hebrews arrived and equally obvious that
«nfy of tv, chosen P^Ple > 'had every right to drive the blacks
out of the land promised to the whites. The same deep
SSSSS ^i ^ti their **
Like the Zionists who explained the birth of Israel in 1948 and their
consecutive victories over the Arabs as a sign of God's support to His
chosen people, Afrikaner history was interpreted within a similar
framework. Templin pointed out:
God's plan for Afrikanerdom was seen as a typological
reenactment on the South African frontier of various Old
Exodufn»nHP1^°deS' n°Hbly the makin9 of the Covenant, theExodus, and the conquests of Joshua and Gideon The Boers
SSi^ if th%y 1O°uked tO the Bible ^ humiil?^ B?^y
ansTers for their needs; nothing would be hidden
!Consequently, the situations which seemed to
J£ vf1 even£ were interpreted as direct signs from
n tJ11?^3?" the Great Trek became the new Exodus;
2str°,£ the land was blessed by God, with mention of
Joshua, Gideon, and others; and Providence was on the side of
^V?efS freed°n> fight against both African and British!
^^VtV"1113' the Boers kePt the stories of
S JfPhthah before their eyes as examples of God's
The freedom fighters at Slagters' Nek were bound by
OUS c.ove.nant. in opposition to the British. The Boers'
S against Dingane in 1838 was interpreted as a
confirmation of the covenant constructed on the basis of the
S'SSS covenant, and the victory in 1881 agalnlt Britain
cSS2!fJSfifi the covenant of 1879 drawn up in
favor
He further added:
»flbllC^1 PaJaHels which seemed to be re-enacted in
" ^f 3 proof of the correctness of preconceived
° in government. In every success God was
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1881, again corroborating the Boers' conception of the
Tightness of their cause. Boer fears for a government led by
liberal President Burgers were based on biblical injunctions,
mainly Leviticus. The religious orthodoxy and the pious
speeches, filled with biblical allusions, of President Kruger
gave the nation the strength it needed, for their confidence
was now in a higher power. God's favor seemed assured.'**
In apartheid ideology, religion has also been used to justify
inequality, exploitation, and discrimination against non-whites. Racial
differences among people must be maintained because it represents God's
will. This idea, it was argued, was supported by:
Such biblical writings as the letters of Paul, especially
those passages in 1 Corinthians (12:12-30; 15:39-41) and
Romans (12:4-5) that speak of the different kinds of bodies
or of how each of the various parts,of one body has its own
appropriate and distinct function.1"
The Reverend T.F. Dreyer said:
God created the color line ... So if we efface God's lines
of separation, we destroy his handiwork. if we go and mix
with Indians, Coloureds, and Natives, our descendants will be
mules who will not be able to hide their long ears, the sign
of their bastardization. it is a heritage from our
forefathers, which must be beautiful for us and which we must
honor and value. God has willed that we must be a separate,
independent volk.lw
D.F. Malan, who was a minister of the Dutch Church—the spiritual guide
of Afrikanerdom—stated:
The deep-rooted colour consciousness of the white South
African . . . rises from the fundamental differences between
the two groups white and black. The difference in colour is
surely the physical manifestation of the contrast between the
two irreconcilable ways of life, between barbarism and
civilisation, between heathenism and Christianity and finally
between overwhelming numerical odds on the one hand and
insignifxcant numbers on the other. Such it was in the early
S h " largely *«ains. [Emphasis in
in the same line of thinking, the report Human Relations in South
which was adopted by the General Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church
(1966), stated:
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God created everything including the different races, peoples
and nations on the earth. Had He wished to create all men the
same He would have done so ... God mercifully decreed that
man should have many languages and that he should be
diversified and spread to all parts of the earth. This
resulted in the formation of many different races, peoples
languages, and nations. This can be seen from His anger at
the sinful attempt at unity, manifest in the attempted
construction of the Tower of Babel.14ir
Similarly, H.G. Stoker of the University for Christian Higher Education
at Potchefstroom, stated:
God willed the diversity of Peoples. Thus far He has
preserved the identity of our People. Such preservation was
not for naught, for God allows nothing to happen for naught.
He might have allowed our People to be bastardized with the
native tribes as happened with other Europeans. He did not
allow it . . He has a future task for us, a calling laid
away. On this I base my fullest conviction that our People
will again win back their freedom as a People. This lesson
of our history must always be kept before our eyes."4?
The white settlers considered the native "as culturally inferior heathen
destined by God to be the 'hewers of wood and drawers of water1 for their
superior masters."148 Such white perception led "many blacks today [to]
regard white Christianity, if not Christianity itself, as a form of
European domination."149 They see that "the Christian faith seemed to
provide the rationale necessary to justify the situation"150 of
inequalities. On the eve of the Puritan colonization of Massachusetts,
John Winthrop declared: "God Almightie in his most holy and wise
providence hath so disposed of the Condicion of mankind, as in all times
some must be rich and eminent in power and dignitie, others mean and in
subieccon [sic]."151 a century later, Alexander Pope expressed a similar
view: "Order is Heav'n's first law; and this confest, / some are, and
must be, greater than the rest . . .»152 m his justification to South
African racism, the Reverend J.A. Kriel declared in Cape Town:
Discrimination, injustice and suffering will always exist
K1 Christ comes again, and then Christ will remove them?
Through fighting against discrimination now, people are trying
to take God's task over from Him, and thus open the way fol
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the Antichrist. 'He who wants to do more than what God wants
him to do, commits suicide, as will happen to the United
Nations and the world powers. 53
In this connection, Dr. John Phillips of the London Missionary Society
wrote:
While the missionaries have been employed in locating the
savages among whom they labour, teaching them industrious
habits, creating a demand for British manufactures, and
increasing their dependence on the colony, there is not a
single instance of a tribe thus enjoying the labour of a
missionary making war against the colonists, either to injure
their persons or to deprive them of their property
Missionary stations are most efficient agents which can be
employed to promote the international strength of our
colonies, and the cheapest and best military posts agreement
can employ.
The Afrikaners believed "that education, culture and skin color were marks
of, or proofs of, God's election."155 Thanks to Calvinism, a White skin
was equated with Christianity and Western European culture.156 in the
context of South African apartheid, the dichotomy between the elect and
the damned "was transmuted into racial categories, whereby all whites
belonged to the elect and all Africans and non-Whites belonged to the
damned."157 Like the case with Zionism, Afrikaners have frequently used
biblical themes to justify their political actions. Alfred Moleah
maintained that Psalm 105, which reads: "He brought forth his people with
joy, and his chosen with gladness: and gave them the lands of the
heathen, and they inherited the labour of the people" was used as a
justification for "African expropriation."158 Moleah also noted that:
Segregation and discrimination find their justification in the
advice given to the Corinthians which reads: 'Be ye not
unequally yoked together with the unbelievers: for what
fellowship hath righteousness with unrighteousness? Wherefore
come out from among them and be ye separate, saith the Lord,
and touch not the unclean thing and I will receive you.'**
The Old Testament curse (the curse on Ham), which was used to justify
slavery in America, was also used in apartheid ideology to rationalize
mistreatment of the Africans. According to the Old Testament, the blacks
70
were considered as descendants of Ham. The curse applies to all
descendants of Ham, Canaanites (predecessors of modern Palestinians) and
all black people.
In apartheid ideology, the Africans were presented to be of Arabian
origin, in 1882 F. Lion Cachet, a Dutch theologian, argued that "the most
reliable informants agree that the Kaffers [the Africans] are sons of
Ishameal who, in relatively recent times, have reached the South Coast of
Africa over land."160 Cachet elaborated:
They call themselves with one general name, Amakafula . . .
xn which Kafula is not an original Kaffer word but a
corruption of Kaffir. Now since that name is given by the
,*t ? ?v,eXe^one who re3ected Mohammed's doctrine, it is very
tho iLh«at ^ presrfc Kaffir tribes earlier trafficked with
the Arabs and are of Arabian origin. Not too risky even is
the interpretation that Kaffers were originally fugitives who
^J1"^0 S-Ubmit to Mohanimed' had to escape gpersecUtioA
»n/,n^i^?Vn a southeasterly direction, eventually found
an uninhabited country between Delagoa Bay and the Fish River
where they could settle, or out of which they could drivethe
thS^1 * °f Hottentots and Bushmen, whopreviously lived
Similarly, J.C. Voigt wrote:
It is a curious fact that circumcision was, and still is
prevalent among all the Kaffir nations. This seems toshow
that the original cradle of the race must have been somewhere
not very far removed from the influences of the ancient
Sat the CrYiliSfati°n and ^S CUStoms; for " is Wei? taS
Palestine ^a?*!.^"100 SPread fr°m E*ypt tO
Thus, similar to Zionism, religious themes have been central in
apartheid ideology. The concepts of "chosen people," "promised land," and
"children of Ham" have been used to justify white privilege and domination
in South Africa. However, in addition to those religious concepts,
apartheid ideology is also based on historical myths such as "vacant land"
/ "simultaneous migrations."
One basic feature of the settler colonialism is the notion of
"vacant land." The Zionists and the Afrikaners claimed that the
territories which they colonized were empty lands at the time of their
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arrival. South Africa was presented as a land filled with roaming wild
animals when Jan van Riebeeck built his station in 1652. The official
book South Africa 1977 reads:
After the devastation and disruption of the Difaqane, vast
sections of the interior were virtually depopulated. It was
mainly these parts that the Boer Afrikaner pioneers populated
. . . The Matabele depopulated the,, whole of the western
Transvaal in the years 1825 to 1832."53
A Standard~6 textbook, published in 1974, stated:
Two 'Commissie Treks1 sent out beforehand to gather
information about the interior (in 1834) . . . brought back
very favourable reports of fertile land and good grazing, it
appeared, too, that the land was almost uninhabited by
^tltl i'< 4-k hl» ,"as be,cause many had been massacred by the
inhiding ^ Matabele, and the survivors were
Similarly, in 1964, Dr. Muller stated:
•«-.n J!*101?1?*. afoer the establishment of the victualing
»f?^2 '£, the CapeJ the settlers started moving furthe?
afield. They crossed one mountain range, and then another
litl r ftd,frOm one fertile valley to the Aext. In their wake
f^eieft tiny settlements. With the years these grew into
towns, into cities. During all this time they met with no
indigenous people. This was no man's land.1^
In the same line of thinking the Zionists declared Palestine to be
a "land without a people for a people without land." Ben-Gurion, the
first Israeli Prime Minister, stated: "In a historical and moral sense,
"166 LeviPalestine, the Holy Land, is a country without inhabitants.
Eshkol, a former Israeli Prime Minister, asked: "what are the
Palestinians?"167 Golda Meir, a former Israeli Prime Minister, declared:
?et«rni-hfJU£! the oc£upied territories? There is nobody to
return them to There was no such thing as Palestinians
was n?t a? though there was a Palestinian people in
*S%£OnS3liering itself as a Palestinian people and we
Shey did no^ex^sT^ "* tO°k their COUntry away from t^
The other myth connected to the myth of "uninhabited land" is the
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notion of "simultaneous migrations." It maintained that the whites and
the blacks arrived in South Africa at the same time. The assumption here
is that Europeans and Africans arrived roughly at the same time, therefore
Africans "have no greater historical claim to dominion over the land than
whites."169 A typical argument within the ideology of apartheid is that:
"When the whites came to Africa in the sixteenth century, there were no
native blacks in South Africa—only some nomadic tribes, including the
Hottentots, who were of Arabic origin."170 South Africa 1977. which was
published by the Department of Information, stated:
Prior to the southward migration the forebears of the present
black groups apparently used to live in the region of the
great lakes of Central Africa. Their entry into what is today
South Africa roughly coincided with the arrival of the first
whites at the Cape in 1652.171
Another book of the Department of Information elaborated:
In the 1770's, some one thousand kilometres to the north-east
of Cape Town, the Afrikaner migratory stream came into
substantial contact with the vanguard of a second migratory
movement from the vicinity of the Great Lakes of Central
Africa. It would appear that by the end of the 15th century
these tribes had moved as far as present-day Zambia, Rhodesia,
and Mozambique. They probably crossed into the present-day
Republic of South Africa in appreciable numbers in the course
of the 17th century—at about the same time as the Afrikaner
freefarmers' settlement was expanding inland from the Cape of
Good Hope.172
The writer G.W. Stow considered the Hottentots as "recent immigrants,"
arguing that the Bantu-speaking people "invaded South Africa in a number
of successive 'waves' from Central Africa, driving the Hottentots before
them."173 In 1959 Eric Louw, then South African Foreign Affairs Minister,
declared that "the Bantu began to trek from the North across the Limpopo
when Jan van Riebeeck landed in Table Bay in 1652."174 Louw concluded that
the Bantu "are not the original inhabitants of the country," and thus
"have no greater claim to the southern end of the African continent than
the white population."175 In the same line of thinking, Dr. Hendrick
Verwoerd, a former South African Prime Minister, considered the Africans
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and the Whites as "two population groups equally foreign to South Africa,"
which "converged in rather small numbers on what was practically empty
country."176 Verwoerd concluded that "neither group colonized the other's
country or robbed him by invasion."177
Thus, the Afrikaners denied the colonialist origin, arguing that by
historical right they are now as indigenous, if not more so, than the
Africans. However, historical evidence indicates that the present-day
Bantu-speaking peoples have been settling in South Africa since the third
century A.D. (which means they were there fourteen hundred years before
the arrival of the whites at the Cape of Good Hope).178
Like every other ideology, apartheid has been used to justify the
privileged position of the ruling class. Throughout history the civil-
savage and the Christian-heathen dichotomies were used to emphasize the
notion of white superiority and to justify conquest and territorial
expansion. Dehumanizing the natives is central in apartheid. The
Africans were projected as a culturally inferior race which should be
treated accordingly. Separation of races became essential for white
domination. Apartheid exclusiveness is based on some religious themes.
The concepts of "chosen people," "promised land," and "children of Ham"
were used to justify a wide range of exploitation, discrimination, and
racial policies. Afrikaners became agents of God's will, and their
national history was given a quasi-sacred character. Their victories in
the Great Trek, the Wars of Independence, and the war with Angola were
attributed to divine support. Apartheid policies of separation were
connected with a sense of divine calling and mission. Conscious analogies
between Afrikaner history and that of Israel in the Old Testament became
evident. White control of South Africa was seen as a covenant with God
similar to the Old Testament covenant with Israel. Similar to the case
of Zionism, the myth of "vacant land" was used to justify colonialism.
The Afrikaners have frequently claimed that the territories which they
colonized were empty lands or their entry into what is today South Africa
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roughly coincided with the blacks' arrival. The assumption here is that
the blacks were not the original inhabitants of the country and thus have
no greater claim to the land than the white people. Similarly, Palestine
was declared to be a land without people for a people without a land.
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This chapter is divided into several sections. The first section
defines Zionism and explains briefly its basic principles. The second
section deals with "Anti-Semitism" and "Assimilation," which were the two
dynamic factors behind the rise of the Zionist movement. This section
analyzes the historical and theoretical developments of these concepts,
their interaction with each other, and their influence on Israeli
policies. This was a necessary background for the following section,
which deals with Jewish nationalism. This section discusses the thought
of Zionist thinkers such as Moses Hess and Herzl, who emphasized a
distinctive national Jewish identity. The next section deals with the
concept of a Jewish statehood and discusses the various Zionist projects
to find a piece of land for the proposed Jewish state. This section
analyzes the interaction between the interests of imperialist European
powers and the Zionist movement. The growing relationship led to the
Balfour Declaration—a document that contributed to the fulfillment of the
Zionist desire for a Jewish state in Palestine. The section on the
Balfour Declaration discusses the Zionist strategy in gaining the
Declaration and explains the British motives behind the Declaration. The
following section explains the Zionist tactics in dealing with the natives
an documents the thought of the Zionist leaders (such as Borochov, Herzl,
Weizman, and Jabotinsky) on how to deal with the Palestinians. It also
explains the actual behavior of the Zionist settlers who began to
immigrate to Palestine in 1882. It is said that colonialism goes hand in
hand with racism. The section on racism analyzes the concept of "Jewish
Purity/Jewish Superiority" and its connection with some religious concepts
such as "promised land" and "chosen people." The analysis in the next
section deals with the use of religious themes to justify the Zionist
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claim to Palestine and to justify current Israeli policies; such as the
invasion of Lebanon and the establishment of new settlements in the
occupied territories. Dehumanization of the native people is a basic
feature of every colonial enterprise. The next section discusses the
Zionist literature in this connection; and the section following it deals
with the question of education. It explains how Zionist education
influenced the minds of Jewish children and shaped the Jew's attitude
towards the Palestinians. The subject of the next section is the Zionist
philosophy of "separation," which is considered the root of Zionist
discrimination. The section after that analyzes the contradiction between
the notion of Israel's democracy and the concept of a Jewish-Zionist
state. The next section discusses the Zionist practice of "apartheid" and
its manifestation in the conditions of the Palestinian workers, the
Israeli army, and kibbutzim. As in the case of South Africa, laws were
passed to legitimize the practice of apartheid and discrimination. This
last section discusses certain Israeli laws such as the Law of Return, the
Law of Citizenship, and the Status Law.
Definition and Basic Principles
Zionism is a modern political movement officially founded by Theodor
Herzl in August 1897 when the First Zionist Congress met in Basel and
created the World Zionist Organization (WZO).
The first usage of the term "Zionism" was in Vienna in 1892 by
Nathan Birnbaum.1 Zion was the name of one of the hills of Jerusalem which
later "became a poetically descriptive term for all of Jerusalem, then for
all of Palestine, and, eventually, for all of ... Jewish religious
community."2 Uri Davis, an Israeli Jewish Scholar, defined Zionism as:
a political ideology formulated to rationalize a solution to
the Jewish problem in terms of the establishment of a Jewish
national home, and subsequently, a Jewish state in Palestine
based on the mobilization of mass Jewish colonial immigration
and settlement
. . . Zionism constitutes the immediate ideological and
political context for the emergence of the state of Israel,
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and the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 is the
culmination of Zionist colonial efforts in Palestine over a
period of half a century.
Zionism is a political ideology of complex European origins: "The
ideology was formulated in Western Europe" by Theodor Herzl (an
assimilationist Viennese Jew) while the masses "came from East Europe
where the ideology and conceptions articulated found a great resonance and
initial response."4 Herzl hoped that the Jews of Western Europe would
provide the diplomatic and financial resources of the movement while East
European Jewry would supply its desperate need of manpower.
The aim of the Zionist movement was to solve the "Jewish problem"
by creating a Jewish state in Palestine, in line with the spirit of the
nineteenth century national movements in central Europe and the Balkans.
"The Jewishness of this state," Elmessiri wrote, "lay neither in its
religious orientation nor in its commitment to Judaism and its values; it
lay in its presumed national (ethnic) Jewish character."5 The origin of
modern political Zionism was not connected to a messianic attempt of a
return to spiritual Zion, rather it was a modern political effort to
change the socio-political conditions of the European Jewish community.6
Max Nordau (1847-1923), one of the early fathers of Zionism, said:
"Zionism rejects all mysticism, does not believe in a Return to Zion
through miracles and wondrous happenings, but sets out to create it
through its own efforts."7 There is no doubt, however, that some pattern
of religious longing to Zion took place within most Jewish communities but
that was not associated with the movement of political Zionism. It should
be noted, however, that although Zionism is considered as a secular
movement, it heavily relies, as we shall see, on religious principles and
conceptions.
Basically, Zionism rests on the following arguments:
- The distinguishing characteristic of the Jews has been their
"Exile".
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The conditions of the Jews in Exile were conceived to be unnatural
or anomalous.
Despite their dispersion, division, and differences (living among
other nations throughout the world), the Jews are one (one people
or one race).
The Jews are unique people (the purest race or the chosen people)
for having special relations with God.
The Jews are different from others (in their culture, values, and
traditions).
Being unique and different, the Jews cannot be assimilated into
other nations.
Because they are unique and different, the Jews have become a
subject of anti-Semitism.
Anti-Semitism is an incurable disease (or eternal character) of
Gentile (non-Jewish) societies.
Living among other nations, the Jews would lose their heritage,
values, and identity.
To solve the "Jewish problem" (physical, spiritual, or
psychological), the Jewish situation should be corrected or
normalized.
Normalizing the Jewish conditions requires the establishing of a
Jewish state (like other nations).
Within a Jewish state and away from Gentile hostilities, the Jews
can carry on a normal and creative life.
The Jewish people have the capacity to set up a movement of
"national liberation." This movement is Zionism (no question about
who the "Jewish nationals" are, or what they are to be liberated
from, or how that liberation is to be effected).
The place of the Jewish state is to be Palestine (the promised land
or the homeland of the worldwide Jewish nation).
Palestine is not only a Holy Land (reflects religious
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consideration), but is also a Homeland (implies political
considerations).
Why Palestine? Because the Jews have continuing spiritual (God's
promise that He would give the land to Abraham and his descendants)
and historical (their ancestors first settled in Palestine sometime
around 20 B.C., until they were forcibly dispossessed by the
Babylonians in 587 B.C. and then by the Romans in A.D. 135)
connections to Palestine.
Beside such spiritual and historical considerations, Palestine was
seen as an ideal place on the grounds that it was "a land without
people" waiting for "a people without land."
The investment the Jews made in Palestine (draining the swamp and
making the desert "blossom like a rose") was seen as another factor
that enhanced the Zionist claim to the land.
The Balfour Declaration (by which the British Government in 1917
promised the Jews that they should have a national home in
Palestine) was also cited as an important "legal" document that
helped "legitimize" the Zionist cause.
The Jewish immigration to Palestine was considered as a vital step
on the road to Jewish statehood.
Because of the civilization and superior technology of the European
Jews, the native Palestinians (who were projected as "backward" or
"uncivilized") would benefit from Jewish socio-political
development.
The Palestinian Arabs who have been living in Palestine since at
least the seventh century A.D. were referred to as "inhabitants",
"residents living in the area," or "uncivilized tribes," but never
a "people."
Zionism arose out of two fears: Fear of anti-Semitism and fear of
88
assimilation. Hanna Arendt suggested that "anti-Semitism was the father
of both Assimilationism and Zionism."8 Anti-Semitism is a central theme
in Zionist ideology. Political Zionism grew out of, and was conditioned
by, the negative experience of the Jewish community in diaspora: anti-
Semitism.9
Anti-Semitism
During the feudal era, while religion was the dominant force,
European Jewry was culturally and legally segregated. Jews were
restricted by law to special areas (ghettos) and to special occupations.
However, with the advent of the Renaissance (the cultural revolution of
the European bourgeoisie), and later its political revolution, the
segregation was eliminated. Thus, secularization and liberalism opened
European societies for Jews as equals. Jews began to enjoy equality
before the law, and schools and the professions were gradually, though
never completely, opened to them. This process, which started in the
eighteenth century, became known as the "Emancipation."10 This
revolutionary atmosphere had a great impact on Jewish thought and
experience.
While a significant number of Jews considered Emancipation as a
serious threat to the maintenance of Jewish traditions and values, an
equally large portion of them responded favorably by adopting a variety
of programs and attitudes which became known as the Haskala. or the Jewish
Enlightenment movement.11 The Haskala "involved a radical rupture not only
with the traditional habits and beliefs but with the fundamental vision
according to which Jews had long understood the world."12 The Haskala was
based on the following principles: 1) that Jews should become normal by
adopting assimilation; 2) that Jewish nationhood is a false conception,
that Jews are not a people; 3) that the new Judaism should get rid "of
medieval obscurantism, including its messianic and folk nationalistic
elements."13 Opposing these views were those who rejected liberalizing and
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modernizing Jewish life, fearing the loss of Jewish identity. Smolenskin,
a Jewish scholar, stated that the Haskala made us (the Jews) "imitate the
Gentiles, abandon our own traditions, disdain our own manners, and ideas
i.14
However, the commonly held view of those emancipated Jews that the
"Jewish Question" could be solved by the fulfillment of political
emancipation, suffered a slight setback by the third quarter of the
nineteenth century when the liberal climate began to turn conservative and
resulted in some outbreak of anti-Semitism. A wave of pograms swept over
Russia in 1881 and 1882, the appearance of racist theories in France and
Germany, and the Dreyfus Affairs in France in the early 1880's. All these
events, it was held, disillusioned the effort of some Jewish intellectuals
to assimilate.15 Uri Davis summarized the situation of European Jewry as
follows:
For Jewish communities in Europe, enlightenment brought
emancipation and legal equality of civil rights. In parallel,
a newly secular racism manifested itself in the form of anti-
Jewish persecution . . . Those in the Jewish communities who
opted for secularism and enlightenment lent their support, in
one capacity or another, to democratic, socialist, or
revolutionary political organizations in the countries of
their residence. Those who opted for secularism and racism
turned, in one capacity or another, to political Zionism.
Herzl's Jewish State, published in 1896, was his response to the
anti-Semitism generated by the Dreyfus trial.17 It was believed that this
event transformed Herzl into an ardent Jewish nationalist. Born in
Budapest, Hungary, Herzl received a legal education in Vienna, where he
turned his talent to journalism. He became interested in the Jewish
question when he covered the Dreyfus trial in Paris as a representative
of a Vienna newspaper. Herzl (1860-1904) concluded that the policy of
Enlightenment and Assimilationism had failed and that anti-Semitism is a
natural phenomenon in Gentile society which needed a radical solution—
the creation of a Jewish state.
Even before Herzl, Zionist thinkers, like Pinsker and Hess,
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expressed dissatisfaction with the Jewish existence in the Diaspora and
maintained that the main cause of anti-Semitism is the homelessness of the
modern Jew. Leo Pinsker (1821-1891) expressed his thought in a small
pamphlet, Auto-Emancipation, which was published in 1882. He contended
"that anti-Semitism is a psychic disease which seems incurable."18 He also
believed that there was a "natural antagonism" between Jews and Gentiles,
and thus concluded that assimilation was impossible.19 Pinsker explained:
To the living, the modern Jew is dead, to the native-born he
is a stranger, to the long-settled a vagabond, to the wealthy
a beggar, to the poor a millionaire and exploiter, to the
citizen a man without a country, to all classes a hated
competitor.
Therefore, nationalism, Pinsker contended, became the only solution to the
Jewish problem, and this should take the form of creating a Jewish state
whether in Palestine or elsewhere.21 For Pinsker, a sovereign Jewish
entity will guarantee that other nations will treat the Jews equally.22
Accompanying Pinsker's nationalist appeal was the political movement of
Hibat Zion (Love of Zion) which called for the establishment of Jewish
colonies in Palestine, and which resulted in the formation of the earliest
Zionist settlement in Palestine.23
Like Pinsker, Herzl believed in the doctrine of eternal anti-
Semitism governing the relation of Jews and Gentiles everywhere and
always. "Anti-Semitism," Herzl said, ". . . is a bacillus which every
Gentile carries with him, wherever he goes and however often he denies
it."24 On another occasion, he wrote: "We [the Jews] might perhaps be
able to dissolve without a trace in the surrounding races if we were left
in peace for only two generations on end. But we shall not be left in
peace."25 On this Akiva Orr suggested that Herzl's belief "reveals a total
dependence on external hostility to save the Jews from "disappearing
altogether."26 The perception of constant Gentile hostility led Herzl to
define a nation as "... a group of people . . . held together by a
common enemy."27 In 1896 Herzl wrote:
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The Jewish question exists wherever Jews live in appreciable
number. Where it does not exist, it is brought in together
with Jewish immigrants. Naturally we move where we are not
persecuted; our appearance then gives rise to persecution.
This is a fact and is bound to remaijj a fact everywhere, even
in highly developed countries . . .
Zionism - Anti-Semitism Interaction
One would assume that, as Jews, the Zionist leaders would always
consider anti-Semitism as the prime danger. But this is not so, as the
following discussions suggest.
Herzl, the founder of the Zionist movement, wrote: "anti-Semitism
has grown and continues to grow—and so do I."29 On another occasion, he
declared "that only anti-Semitism has made Jews of us."30 For Herzl, anti-
Semitism is a blessing and it "... probably contains the Divine Will
to Good because it forces us to close ranks."31 When asked what could
generate Jewish immigration to Palestine, Herzl answered: "The anti-
Semitism."32 Herzl was on record as saying: "Above all, I recognized the
emptiness and futility of trying to 'combat' anti-Semitism."33 He added:
"I hold it to be a movement useful for the development of Jewish
character."34 Hanna Arendt held that the Zionists concluded: "That without
anti-Semitism the Jewish people would not have survived in the countries
of the Diaspora; and hence they were opposed to any attempt to liquidate
anti-Semitism on a large scale."35
However, Herzl was not alone in stressing the "naturalness" of and
the important need for "anti-Semitism." In 1925, Jacob Klatzkin, one of
the early Zionist idealogues, wrote: "instead of establishing societies
for defence against the anti-Semitics, who want to reduce our rights, we
should establish societies for defence against our friends who desire to
defend our rights."36 This seeming perception of a common outlook between
Zionism and anti-Semitism was reflected in an article written in 1969 by
the Israeli writer, Uri Harari.37
In the same line of thinking, the American Jewish Congress was of
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the opinion that discrimination against Jews "may well be a blessing," and
that "it is possible that some anti-Semitism is necessary in order to
ensure Jewish survival."38 This opinion was shared in 1959 by Nahum
Goldman, then president of the World Zionist Organization when he held
"that a current decline of anti-semitism might constitute a new danger to
Jewish survival; . . . the disappearance of anti-semitism in its classic
meaning, while beneficial to the political and material situations of
Jewish communities, has had a very negative effect on our internal life."39
On this the British historian Toyonbee suggested that "Zionism and anti-
Semitism are expressions of an identical point of view."40 In his book,
Israel An Apartheid State. Uri Davis suggested that "Political Zionism and
secular anti-Jewish racism share a common view on the existential status
of Jewish minority communities in non-Jewish (Gentile) societies."41 Both
movements see that "the Jew cannot, by definition, be—nor can he or she
be expected to be—an equal citizen and a free individual in a non-Jewish
society and polity."42 Davis elaborated:
Given the moral and ideological convergence of political
Zionism and anti-Jewish racism, the Zionist movement, as
represented in the official institutions of the World Zionist
Organization, has at critical junctures, opted for
collaboration rather than conflict with anti-Jewish racists,
even when that racism has taken the form of pograms and
genocide.
Ian Gilmour, one-time member of the British Parliament, maintained that
Jewish emigration to Israel from Arab countries was the result of Zionist
activities.44
Thus an important part of Zionist strategy was to inflame anti-
Semitic sentiment in non-Jewish communities in order to generate a flow
of Jewish immigrants. The following statement from one of the leaders of
the MAPAI party, Sharun, seemed to be representative.
If I have the power, as I have the will, I would select a core
of efficient young men—intelligent, decent, devoted to our
ideal and burning with desire to help redeem the Jews—and I
would send them to the countries where Jews are absorbed in
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sinful self-satisfaction. The task of these young men would
be to disguise themselves as non-Jews and plague Jews with
anti-Semitic slogans such as sBloody Jew,' *Jews go to
Palestine1 ...
And this statement was translated into reality. The immigration of the
Iraqi Jews is a case in point. It was reported that in the early 1950's
an Iraqi Zionist organization called The Movement was found responsible
for throwing grenades on Jewish gathering places in Baghdad. The aim was
to intensify Jewish immigration to Palestine. This story was published
in two Israeli magazines: Haolam Hazeh and The Black Panther.46
Zionism and anti-Semitism have influenced each other in the past and
will continue to do so in the future. Examining the complex link between
the two movements, one can see an ironic kind of welcome on the part of
the Zionists to anti-Semitism. Jacob Klatzkin, one of the early Zionist
theoreticians, said: "If we do not admit the rightfulness of anti-
Semitism, we deny the rightfulness of our own nationalism."47 The same
sentiment was reiterated by Max Nordau (1849-1923). He was delighted "to
see that honest anti-Semites applaud our proposed [nationalist] solution
for the Jewish question."48 Per Spiegal (December 1966), a leading West
German Magazine, pointed to this irony:
The Zionists were delighted by the victory of the German anti-
Semites, for this victory meant a defeat for the enlightened
Western Jewry which cared nothing for Zionism and preferred
to become a part of other nations. As the Zionists and the
Nazis had both made race and nation their fundamental
principle, it was inevitable that a common meeting-ground
would be found between them.
In the eyes of the Zionist leaders, Hitler's victory was a "positive proof
of the bankruptcy of assimilationism and liberalism."50 The Zionist
biographer, Emil Ludwig, stated: "You know . . . the coming of the Nazis
was rather a welcome thing . . . Thousands who seemed to be completely
lost to Judaism were brought back to the fold by Hitler, and for that I
am personally very grateful to him."51 The racist anti-Semites, for their
part, expressed admiration of Zionism because it suited their strategy.
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The following statement, written in 1912 by the head of the Pan-German
League (an organization that formally accepted the anti-Semitic ideology),
seemed to be representative.
One must take off one's hat to the Zionists; they admit openly
and honestly that their people are a folk of its own kind
whose basic characteristics are immutable . . . they also
declare openly that a true assimilation of the Jewish aliens
to the host nations would be impossible according to the
natural law of race . . . The Zionists confirm what the
enemies of the Jews, the adherents of the racial theory, have
always asserted; . . . Germans and Jewish nationalists are of
one opinion in regard to the indestructibility of the Jewish
race—who then wants to deny the Germans their right to draw
the necessary political conclusions? [Emphasis is in origin]52
The Anti-Zionist Committee of the German Jewish community issued, in 1912,
a statement which attributed racism to Zionism.53 The mutual understanding
or the meeting of the minds between the two movements led Regina Sharif
to conclude "that Zionism, racism and anti-Semitism are all part of one
phenomenon: the very nature of Zionism not only accommodated anti-
Semitism, but often welcomed it."54 She also suggested that there was an
"alliance" between the two movements which "operate on the same plane,
complementing and reinforcing each other."55 Current Zionist literature
indicates that Zionism's position regarding the question of anti-Semitism
has remained intact.
Anti-Semitism: Current Zionist Literature
The concept of "traditional Gentile hostility" is still rife in
today's Israeli society and in modern Zionist literature. Orr wrote:
"The phrase Ha'olom kulo negdeinu ("The whole world is against us") is
evoked recurrently (on the eve of the 1967 war it was turned into a song
which became a national hit) engendering a feeling not of despair but of
national purpose—"We shall overcome."56 Yehoshuah believed that "there is
something in the Jews" which "arouses "insanity1 among other nations."
And he explained "Arab hostility" in this context.57 Pinhas Sadeh, the
Israeli poet, described the Arabs as "the emissaries of the Christian
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world's need to liquidate the phenomenon of the Jews."58 Eliezer Liuneh,
the former co-founder of the Hagana (a secret militant Zionist
organization), emphasized the thesis "that the Holocaust was the "central
truth1 of European history."59 He also maintained "that the destruction
of the Jews was facilitated by the complicity of almost all the Western
nations, regardless of their political regimes."60 Similarly, an Israeli
Minister of Education believed that "... the Holocaust is not a
national insanity that happened once and passed, but an ideology that has
not passed from the world and even today the world may condone crimes
against us."61 A Knesset (the Israeli parliament) member held a similar
conviction: "even the best friends of the Jewish people refrained from
offering significant saving help of any kind to European Jewry and turned
their back on the chimneys of the death camps," he said. He added:
"Therefore all the free world, especially in these days, is required to
show its repentance ... by providing diplomatic defensive-economic aid
to Israel."62
The memories of the Holocaust have influenced current Israeli
politics. Dan Diner held that the Zionist position concerning the present
Palestine conflict is colored to a large extent by the negative experience
of the Holocaust. "As long as the consciousness of the Holocaust remains
interwoven with the real conflict in Palestine," Diner pointed out, "the
terror and the extent of mass extermination by the Nazi will function as
a relevant measure of the present killing."63 He also suggested that the
destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 by an Israeli air raid
can be explained within this context.64 In the midst of the siege of
Beirut (during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982), the then Israeli
prime minister Begin wrote a letter to President Reagan, in which he
repeatedly referred to World War II:
May I tell you, dear Mr. President, how I feel these days when
I turn to the Creator of my soul in deep gratitude: I feel
as a prime minister empowered to instruct a valiant army
facing "Berlin" where amongst innocent civilians, Hitler and
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his henchmen hide in a bunker deep beneath the surface.65
On this Amnon Rubinstein commented:
Begin justified the war and the cruelty inflicted upon the
civilian population by invoking repeatedly images and memories
of World War II and the Holocaust. What the Syrians were
doing before the war to the Christians was "exactly" what the
Germans had done to Jews in the forties, and Israel was not
going to let this happen. The bombing of Beirut was akin to
the bombing of German cities—Dresden was the unfortunate
precedent mentioned by the prime minister—and the PLO were
equated with the Nazis.65
Just two days before his death, the famed philosopher Bertrand Russell
said:
We are frequently told that we must sympathize with Israel
because of the suffering of the Jews in Europe at the hand of
the Nazis . . . What Israel is doing today cannot be condoned,
and to invoke the horror of ±he past to justify those of the
present is gross hypocrisy.
The Zionist perception of "world hostility" has led to a distrust
of non-Jewish communities and has shaped Israeli policies. In their
Introduction, the editors of Dissent & Ideology in Israel pointed out:
From Zionist ideological point of view, anti-Semitism is not
a socio-political phenomenon with some clearly identifiable
contexts. Rather it is defined as an intrinsic aspect of non-
Jewish human nature . . . every non-Jew in support of the
Zionist endeavor will invariably be treated as a quisling, if
not overtly then covertly. His support and cooperation are
crucial to the success of the endeavor, but he is never to be
trusted and he is always ultimately despised.68
Similarly, Alan Taylor suggested that:
The Zionist emphasis on the necessity of "auto-emancipation"
in an "anti-Semitic world" is basic to Israeli psychological
perceptions. It involves an essential distrust of non-Jewish
communities, however overtly sympathetic they may be. For
this reason many Israeli feel insecure in a situation that
involves accommodation to foreign pressure.
Rabbi Abraham Avidan said: "We should not, according to religious law,
trust a gentile."70 Amnon Rubinstein suggested that the Zionist reaction
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to critics of certain Israeli policies can be explained within the context
of "inherent" world hostility toward the Jews. Thus, objection to Israeli
policies has not been seen as "a valid criticism but merely another
manifestation of the old disease."71 Hence, the attitude: "We can't do
right anyway. So let's do what we ought to do regardless of what others
say."72 In 1965, Ben-Gurion (one-time Israeli Prime Minister) "emphasized
that what the Jews do is more important than what the Gentiles say."73
More recently, Geula Cohen, a Zionist leader, said: "We always get the
blame, whatever we do . . . Throughout the history of the people of
Israel, we have always been accused of the worst evils."74
The perception of "natural Gentile hostility" was reflected in the
attitude of the early Zionist settlers toward the native Palestinians.
In a discussion at the Seventh Zionist Congress (1905) over a possible
Palestinian reaction as a result of their displacement, a Zionist settler
insisted "that Arab peasants would turn against Jews no matter how the
Jews behaved . . ."75 Such a Zionist attitude was also observed by others,
though in different terms. In her book, Prophecy and Politics. Grace
Halsell cited the conviction of an Israeli writer: "the greatest danger
facing Israel today is the "collective version1 of Samson's revenge
against the Philistines—"Let me perish with the Philistines'—as a case
in point. Halsell held that "this modern-day "Samson Complex' is
reinforced by the feeling that "the whole world is against us1 because of
its ineradicable anti-Semitism."76 In his Ph.D. dissertation, Benjamin
Joseph pointed to a similar South African attitude concerning the
conception of a "world hostility." He stated:
There are telling similarities in the ways dominant groups in
the two countries [Israel and South Africa] view the world.
From the perspective of a fortress mentality, the world is
unjustly hostile, a "pack of wolves" ganging up with double
standards and no regard for fairness, truth or principles.
In this respect, Heribert Adam suggested that "the manufacturing of
enemies and threats" was needed for both Israel and South Africa in order
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to mobilize internal support.78 And so, the Zionist leaders have
frequently tended to emphasize the idea of a "hostile environment" by
projecting Israel a "little David" under constant threat of genocide by
the "Arab Goliath" who wants to throw him into the sea!"79 Amos Elon
believed that this perception of constant threats became "more powerful
a weapon than a mighty armored division ... it adds resolve,
inventiveness, devotion, cohesion . . . "80 to the Israeli society. Some
observers maintained that external threats tended to enhance internal
cohesion in Israel. They charged that in order to quell unrest and
generate public support, the Israeli authorities might have instigated
some incidents.81 Louis Guttman, the academic Director of the Israeli
Institute of Applied Social Research, noted that the October War of 1973
"had saved the Labor Government of Golda Meir," and that "the air raid on
Syria and the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear facility enabled Begin"s
cabinet to win the 1981 election."82 In the same line of thinking, Alan
Taylor held that the Six-Day War of 1967 was intended to rekindle the
emotional support of world Jury to Zionism. "The war itself was welcomed
and triggered by Israel," Taylor wrote, "not so much for the sake of
security and expansion, but to galvanize the Zionist image and to
intensify Jewish support for the State."83 Thus, the question of anti-
Semitism has influenced Zionist strategy and Israeli policies. The other
factor which played an important role in the emergence of the Zionist
movement was the question of "assimilation."
Assimilationism
Besides anti-Semitism, the question of assimilation was considered
another driving force behind the rise of Zionism. It was held that "the
emancipation and assimilation of the Jews triggered off the de-Judaization
of Jewish life--and also paved the way for Zionism and the State of
Israel."84 Assimilation in principle saw the Jew as a person belonging to
the country of his residence, contributing to the culture of that country
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and at the same time being able to keep his own religious values. The
assimilationists raised the question of a "double loyalty," arguing that
it was impossible to be a French or Russian patriot and at the same time
Zionist.
In contrast to this outlook, the Zionists declared that assimilation
was impossible, because of the "inherent" anti-Semitism of non-Jewish
communities, and because the Jews are "different" people. B. Borochov
(1881-1917), one of the early "socialist" Zionist thinkers, saw that
widespread assimilation failed to solve the Jewish question. "We will
consider the Jewish question fully solved and its anomalies wholly removed
. . .," he wrote, "only when territorial autonomy for the Jewish people
shall have been attained."85
The opening up of European society during and after Emancipation
created, it was held, a new dilemma to a large part of European Jewry.
Some Jewish intellectuals feared that the "unique" Jewish heritage might
ultimately disappear through assimilation. Sholomo Avineri argued that
liberalism and tolerance did not solve the problem of the "Jewish
identity" but, in a way, exacerbated it. And what shocked Herzl most was
not the Dreyfus affairs but, Avineri held, the existence of "a completely
emancipated, successfully integrated, and largely secularized Jewish
person."86 For the Zionists, assimilation, as a means to solve the Jewish
problem, "meant suicide."87 Arthur Ruppin, an early Zionist thinker,
described assimilation as an "imminent danger"88 and in the words of
Klatzkiri it was an "infecting" disease.89 Further, a statement released
after a joint meeting of the Israeli Cabinet and the Zionist Executive
considered "the danger of assimilation" as a major problem facing Diaspora
Jewry.90 In a similar vein, Dr. Nahum Goldman, a former President of the
World Zionist Organization, stated in 1978:
The real motivation for creating the modern Zionist
movement was fear for the survival and future of our people
after the emancipation in the 19th century and the practical
end of anti-Jewish persecution.
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It may sound paradoxical and brutal but, as I said on
other occasions, the survival of our people seems to be more
threatened today than in the worst days of the Nazi regime.
Reliable statistics predict that, with the present rate
of mixed marriages, the lack of a real system of Jewish
education and the indifference of the majority of the young
generation toward their Jewishness, the number of convinced
Jews in the United States may decrease in a few years to four
or five million and may be less than one million within a
decade or two.
Such a position led some writers to notice a kind of inherent
paradox in Zionist ideology. Harold Fisch pointed out:
The history of Zionism in the nineteenth century is rooted in
paradox. On the one hand Zionism was an expression of the
desire to abolish the difference sensed by the Jews between
themselves and other men ... On the other hand the Zionist
movement constituted the ultimate affirmation of this
difference, a courageous, even defiant gejsture against all
attempts at assimilation by Jews in exile.
Similarly, Yonatan Ratosh pointed to the Zionist "paradoxical
formulation":
Zionism is essentially an attempt to provide an undefined
answer (from a "spiritual center" to an empire) to an
undefined problem (the Jewish question, all depending on the
various attitudes towards the question of what Judaism is) of
an undefined human grouping (all the Jews, according to the
various conceptions of Who is a Jew?"—or portions thereof)
in an undefined territory (from Wester Palestine, or a portion
thereof—to the borders of Egypt and the Euphrates)."
Thus, while anti-Semitism was considered a useful force to enhance the
Zionist cause, assimilation was seen as a real threat to Jewish
nationalism.
Jewish Nationalism
It was against this background that the anti-assimilationist
Zionists sought to "normalize" the situation of the Jews to be like all
the "other peoples." Max Nordau maintained that the "sole purpose of the
Zionist movement was the desire to normalize a people . . ." M.J.
Berdichevski, who had a great influence on the labor Zionists, shared
Herzl's view of the "abnormality" of the Diaspora Jewry. He saw "Jewish
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life outside Palestine as a tragic mistake of history that Zionism had set
out to correct."95 Thus, the only solution, the Zionists held, was to
"rebuild" their homeland and their identity on the "ancestral" soil in
Palestine. That is, a Jewish statehood in Palestine. In other words, the
position of the Jews should be "normalized" through the realization of a
Jewish political sovereignty. Menachem Brinker argued that by identifying
the Jewish life to be "abnormal," the Zionist movement got the chance to
emerge and to succeed.96
The question of "Jewish nationalism" is central in Zionist ideology.
"In the thought of Zionists," Mikhail Gershenzon wrote, "the development
of mankind occurs exclusively in national forms; it is nothing other than
the general results of national developments."97 Amos Elon maintained that
Jewish nationalism was "derived from French positivism, German idealism,
and Russian populism."98 It began in Eastern Europe during the second half
of the nineteenth century. European nationalism had a great impact on
Zionist philosophy. Alan Taylor held that "... the primary stimulus
to the founding and development of Zionism was the impact of chauvinistic
nationalism on the social and intellectual life of the West."99 Political
Zionism, according to Alvin Rubinstein, "reflected late nineteenth-
century European nationalism, with its stress on ethnic identity, self-
determination, and the idea of a nation-state."100
Early Zionist thinkers had stressed the idea of Jewish nationalism.
In his attack on the Haskalah movement, Smolenskin, in 1883, spoke of "one
Jewish nation."101 In 1880, Eliezer Ben Yehuda (who was considered the
father of the modern Hebrew language) emphasized the importance for the
Jews to "revive the nation and return to its fatherland."102 Similarly,
Moshe Leib Lillienblum believed that a Jewish political independence is
the only solution to the crisis of Jewish identity. He suggested that
Jews indeed have only one choice which was "to initiate efforts for the
renaissance of Israel in the land of its forefathers, where the next few
generations may attain, to the fullest extent, a normal national life."103
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The development of the idea of "Jewish nationalism" by Moses Hess
(1812-1875) was "the first expression" of Zionist ideology. Hess grew up
in Germany and was associated with Marx and Engels until he dissociated
himself from them over the materialist approach of Marxism. In his book,
Rome and Jerusalem, published in 1862, "Hess subscribed to the notion of
distinct ethnic types as the basic components of human society."104 He
believed that "every Jew, whether he wants to or not, is solidly tied with
his own nation."105 He called for the reasserting of Jewish "uniqueness"
and the creation of a Jewish national center in Palestine.106
The emphasis on distinctive "national Jewish identity" is central
in Zionist philosophy. Elmessiri noted that:
The Jew, who is at the heart of the Zionist Program, is at
times biologically determined, at others the determination is
cultural or even religious, but at all times he is determined
by the one or two exclusively "Jewish elements" in his
existence, which turn him into an immutable element or
essence, existing above all Gentile time and place and
therefore, like all Gentiles, he needs to be "ingathered" in
his own Jewish homeland, on his own soil.107
It was Hess who first emphasized the idea "of a biologically or racially
determined Jewish identity. Herzl, for his part, spoke of "uplifting the
Jewish race" and observed the "likeness between the Jews of Vienna and
Persia" with regard to "bold misshapen noses; furtive and cunning eyes."108
All this emphasis on the question of "Jewish nationalism" pointed to the
need to "normalize" the situation of the Jews which required, according
to Zionism, a Jewish independent political entity.
A State for the Jews
Thus a state for the Jews was considered to be the only solution to
the "Jewish Question." In his small book, The Jewish State, published in
1896, Herzl wrote:
Yes, we are strong enough to form a State, and indeed, a model
State. We possess all human and material resources necessary
for the purpose . . . Let the sovereignty be granted us over
a portion of the globe large enough to satisfy the rightful
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requirements of a nation; the rest we shall manage for
ourselves . . . The Governments of all countries scourged by
Anti-Semitism will be keenly interested in assisting us to
obtain the sovereignty we want.
He further elaborated:
The idea which I have developed ... is an ancient one: it
is the establishment of a Jewish state. The whole plan is in
its essence very simple . . . The poorest will go first to
cultivate the soil . . . They will construct roads, bridges,
railways and telegraph installations, regulate rivers and
build their own dwellings. Their labor will bring trade
markets, and markets will attract settlers . . . The Jewish
company is partly modelled on the lines of a great acquisition
company, but it cannot exercise sovereign power and has no
other than purely colonial tasks.110
Herzl had a clear vision about the proposed Jewish entity. For him
scattered agricultural colonies were not an effective means because the
authority which controls that territory might stop the influx of the Jews
as a result of possible natives' demand. Thus "immigration is only truly
viable if it is based on assurance of our sovereignty,"111 Herzl
maintained. And this should be done under the protection of the European
powers when "they find the arrangement to their liking"112 Herzl said.
As one can see, the feeling and the interests of the native population in
question had no place in Herzl's proposal.
In August 1897, at the First Zionist Congress, the Zionist movement
stated clearly its goals and strategy. Its statement read:
Zionism strives to create for the Jewish people a home in
Palestine secured by public law. The Congress contemplates
the following means to the attainment of this end: 1) The
promotion on suitable lines of the colonization of Palestine
by Jewish agricultural and industrial workers, 2) The
organization and binding together of the whole of Jewry by
means of appropriate institutions, local and international,
in accordance with the laws of each country; 3) The
strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment and
consciousness; 4) Preparatory steps toward obtaining
Government consent where necessary to the attainment of the
aims of Zionism.
Again, it is important to note that there was a total absence of any
reference to the native Arabs, who at the time constituted 95 percent of
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the population of Palestine and 99 percent of Palestine's land was owned
by Arabs. The Zionist movement has been ignorant of the national
existence of the Palestinians. This attitude has underlain Zionist
policies ever since their inception. However, to implement the Zionist
goal of establishing a Jewish statehood, extensive efforts were made to
find a piece of land.
The Search for a Land
In its effort to locate the territory for the proposed Jewish
entity, the Zionist movement was not motivated by a "mystical yearning for
Zion" or the fulfillment of Biblical prophecies. The central question,
instead, was to find a piece of land, any land. According to Zangwill
(one of the fathers of Zionism), Herzl's search for a state was "anywhere
so long as it brought Jewish independence and freedom from persecution."115
Pinsker, for his part, was not interested in Palestine. He wrote: "The
goal of our efforts must not be the Holy Land, but a Land of Our Own. All
we need is a large territory . . . that remains our own property."116
Herzl stressed the importance of the geological, climatic, and other
"scientific" factors instead of religious or historical ones. He said:
"... I shall now tell you everything about the "promised land1 except
its location. This is a purely scientific question." From there he went
on to say: "We must have regard for geological, climatic and other
natural factors" taking into account the "consideration of the latest
research."117 Indeed, before he got the British offer of a Jewish
autonomous territory in East Africa, Herzl negotiated a possible Jewish
settlement in El-Arish, Cyprus, and Southern Syria.118 At the Sixth
Congress of the World Zionist Organization, Herzl lobbied hard in favor
of the Uganda project.119
Indeed Palestine, for most early Zionist leaders, was declared to
be unsuitable for Jewish settlement. Baron de Hirsch, one of the
wealthiest Jews in France, established the Jewish Colonization Association
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which financed Jewish immigration to Argentina. The Zionist movement was,
at various times, interested in other locations such as "Cyprus, the Sinai
peninsula, the Belgian Congo, Mozambique."120 British Honduras, Australia,
Angola, Brazil, and Mesopotamia (now Iraq) were also under Zionist
consideration.121
The Uganda project was the most interesting one for it became a
subject of official negotiation. Only several years after the publication
of Herzl's Jewish State, the British Minister for Colonial Affairs, Joseph
Chamberlain, proposed Uganda (now part of Kenya) to be a territory for
Jewish settlement—a proposal that was adopted by the Sixth Zionist
Congress in 1903.122 Herzl was more than happy about this British offer.
Writing to Max Nordau, Herzl stated:
Look at England: She pours her excess population into the
immense empire she has acquired . . . Their national base has
enable many nations to build colonial empires that are making
their fortune. Let us seize the opportunity offered us to
become a miniature England. Let us begin by acquiring our
own colonies. On the strength of our colonies we shall
conquer our own homeland . . . other countries will follow the
example of England; we will establish new "reserves of powers"
in Mozambique, Congo, and Tripolitajiia with the help of the
Portuguese, Belgians, and Italians.123
Israel Zangwill, a British Zionist and a close collaborator of
Herzl, shared Herzl's conviction to go anywhere under imperial protection.
"Zion is not the only possible center for a restored Jewish nationality"124
Zangwill declared. He founded the Jewish Territorial Organization (JTO)
whose "objective was to procure territory upon an autonomous basis for
those Jews who cannot or will not remain in the land" of their
residence.'" At one time Zangwill preferred a "Jewish colonization in
Mesopotamia" on the ground that it was better than East Africa for
strategic and economic consideration.126 in 1909, he contacted the Turkish
authorities (which ruled Iraq at the time), proposing "to enrich the
Ottoman Exchequer and to develop Mesopotamia" in exchange for Turkey's
help "to set aside a definite territory there within which the Jews should
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be able to form the predominant majority."127 Not successful in this,
Zangwill turned to Britain. He suggested that the Zionists could be of
help to England in her efforts to establish white settlements in British
dominions. He stated:
There are not enough British settlers to go out to the
Transvaal or Canada, countries much further developed . . .
The whole white population of the British colonies is only
some twelve millions. So that if Britain can attract all the
Jews of the world to her colonies, she would just double their
white population ... A far better statesman than the Sultan,
Mr. Chamberlain sees that although we need a land, East Africa
needs a population. ZB
Other territories like Surinam, Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola, and
Cyrenaica, were also subjects of consideration for possible Zionist
settlement.129 The white settlers of South Africa were especially in favor
of the JTO's activities. Speaking at an JTO meeting in Johannesburg in
1906, Lord Selborn, the High Commissioner for South Africa, described
JTO's members as "wise, noble and practical."130 Even the famous South
African General Smuth, it was reported, had joined one of the local
branches of the JTO in South Africa.131 Finally, in 1925 the JTO died off.
It is not difficult to place these Zionist projects within the
framework of European imperialist policies. Maxim Rodonson contended that
all these Zionist projects would:
. . . Unquestionably fit into the great movement of European
expansion in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the great
European imperialist groundswell. There is no reason
whatsoever to be surprised or even indignant at this. Except
for a section (only a section) of the European Socialist
parties and a few rare revolutionary and liberal elements,
colonization at the time was essentially taken to ..Qiean the
spreading of progress, civilization and well-being.132
Eventually, the Zionist endeavour would focus on Palestine alone.
After the death of Herzl and the dissolution of the JTO, the Zionist
movement became dominated by the so-called "Practical Zionists" who for
cultural, historical, and practical considerations, favored penetration
into Palestine.133
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It is not the purpose of this study to detail the various colonial
projects of the Zionist movement. However, the foregoing discussion was
necessary as an argument against the Zionist thesis of "national
liberation," for it is obvious, as we have seen, that the Zionist movement
was eager to get any piece of land, protected by imperial powers, for its
enterprise. As the Israeli writer, Uri Eiesenzweig put it: "Beyond the
political, pragmatic needs dictated by circumstances, there is an
inherent—indeed tragic—correlation between the very nature of the
Zionist idea of the needed territory and its inscription in the colonial
world."134 However, the idea of a Jewish settlement and its connection to
the colonial powers goes back to the fifteenth century.
The Imperialist Connection
The search for a land in order to establish a Jewish settlement can
be traced back to the beginning of European colonialism. It was recorded
that in 1652 (the same year in which the Cape station was created), the
Dutch East India Company was interested in founding a colony of Jews on
the island of Curacao, off the coast of Venezuela.135 Other colonial
powers followed suit. In 1654, Britain proposed a Jewish settlement in
Surinam.136 In 1659, the French East India Company was interested in
establishing a Jewish colony in Cayenne.137
History also told us that Napoleon Bonaparte was the first statesman
to suggest a Jewish statehood in Palestine. Dr. Chaim Weizmann (the head
of the Zionist movement after Herzl's death) described Bonaparte as "the
first modern non-Jewish Zionist."138 During his great Oriental Expedition
in 1799, Bonaparte issued a Proclamation in which he appealed to the
African and Asian Jews to fight under his leadership in order "to re
establish the Ancient Kingdom of Jerusalem."139 The Jewish historian Salo
Baron suggested that "although of little immediate consequence," the
Proclamation "symbolized Europe's acknowledgement of Jewish rights to
Palestine."140 In 1860, Ernest Laharanne, private secretary to Napoleon
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III, suggested that Jewish settlement in Palestine would lead to economic
gain to Europe and that injection of European civilization, through a
Jewish presence, would save the Middle East's "decadent" civilization.141
Likewise, Lord Palmerston (1784-1865), the then British Foreign Minister,
held that a Jewish presence in Palestine was beneficial to Britain and
that by their financial and industrial power, the Jews would advance "the
progress of civilization" in the Middle East.142 Edward L. Mitford, a high
ranking official in the British Colonial Office in London, shared a
similar view. In case of a Jewish state in Palestine, Mitford believed
"the management of our steam communication" would be "entirely in our
hands" and we would be "in a commanding position in the Levant from whence
to check the process of encroachment, to overawe our enemies and, if
necessary, to repel their advance."143 Taking the British colonial
interests into account, General Sir Charles Warren, in 1879, proposed the
establishment of a "chartered company" that would negotiate a Jewish self-
government in Palestine.144 In 1879, Lawrence Oliphant (a member of the
British parliament) negotiated with the Turkish government over obtaining
special facilities for Jewish settlement in Palestine.145
The leaders of the Zionist movement, for their part, had frequently
emphasized the importance of European protection to the proposed Jewish
state which would, in return, protect Western interests in the region.
Herzl declared:
We should there form a rampart of Europe against Asia,, an
outpost of civilization as opposed to barbarism. We should
as a neutral state—that is, neutral among European powers-
-remain in contact with all Europe, which would have to
guarantee our existence.
Before finally relying on Western powers, the Zionist leaders tried to win
the Turkish support. "If His Majesty the Sultan were to give us
Palestine, we could undertake to regulate Turkey's finances"147 Herzl
proposed. Two weeks after the war of 1897 between Turkey and Greece
started, Herzl sided with Turkey and expressed friendship:
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I beg to congratulate Your Excellency on the splendid
victories of the Turkish arms. The desire of several Jewish
students to attach themselves voluntarily to the armed forces
of His Majesty the Sultan is a small token of the friendship
and gratitude which we Jews feel for Turkey. Here and in
several other places I have organized committees to initiate
collections of money for wounded Turkish soldiers.
Yet this loyalty to Turkey was not real. In 1904, Herzl sought to
convince King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy to personally intervene with
the Sultan in favor of a Zionist settlement in Palestine. In return,
Herzl offered Zionist help to the Italians in their effort to take
Libya.149 Herzl recorded the conversation with the King:
And finally, I broached my Tripoli scheme also: "to
channel the surplus Jewish immigration into Tripolitania,
under the liberal laws and institutions of Italy."
"Ma e ancora casa di altri" (But that again is someone
else's house), he said.
"But the partition of Turkey is bound to come, Your
Majesty."™
However, the Ottoman Empire was on the verge of collapse; and the
British should have the upper hand in determining the future of the
Ottoman provinces, including Palestine. Hence courting Britain was vital
to realize the Zionist goal. In 1898, Herzl declared: "From the first
moment I entered the movement my eyes were directed toward England."151
Two years later, at the Fourth Zionist Congress in London, Herzl publicly
announced: "England, the great, England, the free, England with her eyes
roaming over all the seas, will understand us and our aims."152 He added:
"From this place the Zionist idea will take a still further and higher
flight: of this we can be sure."153 With their great experience about
colonial enterprises, "The English were the first to recognize the
necessity for colonial expansion in the modern world"154 Herzl suggested.
He concluded: "I believe the Zionist idea, which is a colonial idea, must
be understood in England easily and quickly"155 [emphasis added]. These
were the words of the founder of the movement. Abdeen Jabara noted that
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in its early days Zionism "had no difficulty in seeing itself as a
colonizing movement," for "it called its first bank the Colonial Trust
Company and its settlement department the department of colonization."156
In a letter to Herzl in 1905, the South American Zionist official Samuel
Goldreich wrote: "I did my best to convince Lord Milner that what he
called Imperialism is identical with Zionism . . ."157 The identity with
Western colonialism was also manifested in the following passage written
in 1930 by Abba Achimeir, one of the Zionist leaders:
In every East-West conflict, we will always be on the side of
the West, for the West has represented a more superior culture
than the East over the last thousand years, after the
destruction of the Baghdad Caliphate by the Mongols . . . and
we today are the most prominent and loyal bearers of the
culture . . . our interest lies in expanding the British
Empire even further than intended by the British themselves. ^
Herzl believed that by supporting the Zionist project in Palestine, the
British would gain a great deal:
. . . At one stroke . . . ten million secret but loyal
subjects active in all walks of life all over the world . .
. As at a signal, all of them will place themselves at the
service of the magnanimous nation that brings long-desired
help. England will get ten million agents for her greatness
and influence.'59
Again strategic or security benefits were officially acknowledged by the
British. Meinertzhagen, a chief British political officer, held that:
In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that, for the future,
a strong and friendly Palestine is vital to the future
strategic security of the British Commonwealth. It can never
be strong and healthy under divided control, still less under
any form of Arab government. °
In the same line of thinking, Jabotinsky, the father of Zionist
revisionism (during the 1920's, the Revisionists had separated from the
Zionist mainstream, accusing the latter of betraying Herzl's legacy and
thus needing "revision"), stated:
I needn't dwell on the well-known truism of Palestine's
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importance from the viewpoint of British imperial interests;
I have only to add that its validity absolutely depends on one
paramount condition: namely that Palestine should cease being
an Arab country . . . Should Palestine remain Arab, Palestine
will follow the orbit of Arab destinies—secession, Federation
of Arab countries, and elimination of all traces of European
influence. But a Palestine predominantly Jewish, surrounded
on all sides by Arab countries, will in the interests of its
own preservation always tend to lean upon some powerful
empire, non-Arab and non-Mahommedan. This is an almost
providential basis for a permanent alliance between England
and a Jewish (but only a Jewish) Palestine.
Examining the Zionist strategy toward the great powers, Maxim
Rodonson noted that the Zionists tended "to play upon their [European]
rivalries; to pressure them" through "the electoral or financial power of
their Jewish" communities, or "to play on their anti-Semitism and their
desire to get rid of the Jews."162 Rodonson further pointed out:
The Europeanism of the Zionist made it possible for them to
present their plan as part of the same movement of European
expansion that each power was developing on its own behalf.
Hence, the many statements pointing out that it was in the
general interest of Europe or civilization (which amounted to
the same thing), or even in the particular interest of this
or that power, to support the Zionist movement. This was
perfectly natural given the atmosphere of the period.
Obviously, the Zionist lobbyists were all Europeans who occupied key
positions in their societies and who could easily interact with the
European leaders both politically and socially. In other words, the
Zionists were in the right place at the right time following the rules of
European politics and influence. This situation led to their success in
gaining the Balfour Declaration of 1917—a document that largely
contributed to the fulfillment of their desire for a Jewish state.
The Balfour Declaration
Following Herzl's death in 1904, the Zionist movement made
significant progress during World War I under the leadership of Dr. Chaim
Weizmann (1874-1952), who created an executive apparatus in England to win
support for the Zionist cause. "To him, more than to any other single
individual, goes credit for the creation of the State of Israel,"164 John
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Davis said. Through his diplomatic contacts, Weizmann was successful in
winning the support of high ranking British officials such as "Lloyd
George, Balfour, Churchill, Samuel, Grey, Cecil, Milner, and of key
members of the Rothschild family."165 After assuming the leadership of the
Zionist movement, "Weizmann hit upon the approach of relating the Zionist
goal to British interests and ambitions in the Middle East."166 The result
of his efforts was the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917, in which
the British government expressed sympathy for and support of a Jewish home
in Palestine. The Declaration took the form of a letter written by Arthur
Balfour, then British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and
addressed to Lord Rothschild. It read:
I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of
His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of
sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been
submitted to and approved by the Cabinet.
His Majesty's Government views with favor the
establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish
people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the
achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that
nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and
religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in
Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews
in any other country. I should be grateful if you would bring
this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.
Thus the Jews got two promises: one from God, the other from Lord
Balfour. Although "the document bears Balfour's name," David Hirst
suggested, "... in reality it was the Zionists themselves who, in very
large measure, both inspired the Declaration and framed its text."168 He
added: "It must be reckoned the finest flower of Zionist diplomacy and
its most sophisticatedly ambivalent."169
Despite some opinions (such as of Amos Elon)170 that tended to
belittle the importance of the Declaration, it was indeed vital to the
Zionist endeavour. In one of his speeches, Weizmann described the
Declaration as "the golden key which unlocks the doors of Palestine . .
."171 and "the Magna Charta of the Jewish people."172 On the occasion
Weizmann said: "We the Jews got the Balfour Declaration quite
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unexpectedly ... it came to us overnight."173 David Hirst considered the
Declaration to be "one of the key documents that have shaped the modern
history of the Middle East."174 Despite ambiguity (concerning the term
National Home), the Zionist leaders, as did the author of the Declaration,
interpreted it to mean a Jewish State. Weizmann declared:
It [the Declaration] meant, as I say, at that time, and
speaking in political parlance, a Jewish State; and when I was
asked at the Peace Conference, quite impromptu, by Mr.
Lansing, "What do you mean by a Jewish National Home?" I gave
this answer: To build up something in Palestine which will
be as Jewish as England is English.
In their contact with Weizmann, Lloyd George and Balfour told the Zionist
leader that by using the term "national home" in the Declaration, "we
meant a Jewish state."176 The real intention of the British government was
stated by Sir Hubert Young, a senior official in the Colonial office, who
said:
The problem which we have to work out now is one of tactics,
not strategy, the general strategic ideas as I conceive it
being the gradual immigration of Jews into Palestine until
that country becomes a predominantly Jewish State . . . But
it is questionable whether we are in a position to tell the
Arabs what our policy really means.
As to the reality of the second part of the Declaration, which deals
with the rights of the "non-Jews," it is appropriate to quote from the
former Liberal Foreign Secretary, Lord Grey, who in 1923 pointed out:
The Balfour Declaration promised a Zionist home without
prejudice to the civil and religious rights of the population
of Palestine. A Zionist home, my Lords, undoubtedly means or
implies a Zionist government over the district in which the
home is placed, and if ninety-three percent of the population
of Palestine are Arabs, I do not see how you can establish
other than an Arab government, without prejudice to their
civil rights.1"5
Sharif believed that "the term 'civil rights,' if indeed it meant anything
at all, could only have referred to the rights of aliens in a foreign
country."179
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Thus the future of the Palestinians was already decided regardless
of their will. In his memorandum, the author of the Declaration, Lord
Balfour, admitted:
For in Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form
of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the
country, though the American Commission has been going through
the form of asking what they are. The Four Great Powers are
committed to Zionism. And Zionism, be it right or wrong, good
or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs,
in future hopes, of profounder import than the desire and
prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient
land.™
The above passage is indicative. The Declaration came as a result of
extensive negotiation (with the Zionist leader and other European
governments) from which the indigenous inhabitants were excluded. Lord
Balfour elaborated more on this point when he said:
The weak point of our position is that in the case of
Palestine we deliberately and rightly decline to accept the
principle of self-determination. If the present inhabitants
were consulted they would unquestionably give an anti-Jewish
verdict. Our justification for our policy is that we regard
Palestine as being absolutely exceptional; that we consider
the question of the Jews outside Palestine as one of world
importance and that we conceive the Jews to have an historic
claim to a home in their ancient land; provided that home can
be given them without their dispossessing or oppressing the
present inhabitants.
The Zionist position concerning the rights of the Palestinian
natives was one of misleading. Weizmann declared that "Palestine must be
built up without violating the legitimate rights of the Arabs—not a hair
of their heads shall be touched."182 He further assured the Arabs, while
he was in Palestine, that "our objective" is not "to seize control of the
higher policy of the province of Palestine. Nor has it ever been our
objective to turn anyone out of his property."183 Behind the scenes,
however, Weizmann showed a different attitude. While he was in Palestine,
Weizmann wrote a letter to Lord Balfour stating:
The Arabs, who are superficially clever and quick-witted,
worship one thing, and one thing only—power and success . .
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. The British authorities . . . knowing as they do the
treacherous nature of the Arab, have to watch carefully and
constantly that nothing should happen which might give the
Arabs the slightest grievance or ground of complaint. In
other words, the Arabs have to be "nursed," lest they should
stab the army in the back. The Arab, quick as he is to gauge
a situation, tries to make the most of it. He screams as
often as he can . . . the fairer the English regime tries to
be, the more arrogant the Arab becomes.
Simha Flapan, an Israeli historian, suggested that the legacy of
Weizmann's prejudice toward the Arabs has had a great impact on future
Jewish-Arab relations.185
It is important to note that the Declaration was issued at a time
when the British government had no sovereignty over Palestine and was not
even in occupation of the country. As Henry Cattan put it: "A donor
cannot give away what he does not own."186 Arthur Koestler put it this
way: "One nation solemnly promising to a second nation the country of a
third."187 Similarly, W.T. Stace noted that the Declaration was in
contradiction to the principle of democracy and self-determination; and
that Britain had no "right to make promises about the disposal of
Palestine contrary to the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants of
that country."188
The Declaration was of great value to the Zionist cause. It
provided the recognition of the Jews as a nation. Thanks to the effort
of the British government in securing the approval of the League of
Nations to the Mandate, the ""Jewish people' became a national entity
recognized by international law."189 Furthermore, the Declaration denied
the existence of the Palestinian people (who compromised 90 percent of the
population at the time) by referring to them merely as "the non-Jewish
communities."190
Why the Declaration
The first motive behind the Declaration was the British strategic
interests. The British writer, Herbert Sidebothman, suggested in 1915
"that Palestine was crucial to the defence of Egypt and the Suez Canal."191
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Mixing together the biblical theme of ancient history with British
security needs, Sidebothman stated:
Mesopotamia was the cradle of the Jewish people and the place
of its exile in the captivity. From Egypt came Moses, the
founder of the Jewish State. The wheel of destiny will have
come full circle round if at the end of this war the
extinction of the Turkish empire in Mesopotamia and the need
of securing a more defensible frontier in Egypt were to ,Aead
to the re-establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.
Sidebotham did not forget to mention the civilizing mission of the Jews:
Nor is there any indigenous civilization in Palestine that
could take the place of the Turkish except that of the Jews,
who already numbering one-seventh of the population, have
given to Palestine everything that it has ever had of value
to the world.193
Then he concluded: "... so strong is the argument for Zionism to our
own security that if there had been no Zionism ready made to our hands .
. . we should have had to invent it."194 A European-Jewish settlement in
Palestine was seen to be helpful to the war effort of Britain and its
allies. "It is indicative of this importance that texts of the
Declaration in large quantities were thrown from low-flying planes over
German towns, "l33 Jabbor stated. Explaining the circumstances that
necessitated the Declaration, David Lloyd George (the British Prime
Minister at the time of the Declaration) said:
The French army had mutinied, the Italian army was on the eve
of collapse and America had hardly started preparing in
earnest ... It was important for us to seek every legitimate
help we could get. We came to the conclusion, from
information we received from every part of the world, that it
was vital we should have the sympathies of the Jewish
community . . . They were helpful in America and in Russia,
which at the moment was just walking out and leaving us
alone.13"
Similarly, in a straightforward statement, Winston Churchill said:
It [the Declaration] was made to world Jewry and in particular
to the Zionist associations. It was in consequence of and on
the basis of this pledge that we received important help in
the War, and that after the War we received from the Allied
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and Associated Powers the Mandate for Palestine.197
Lenni Brenner maintained that Zionism suited perfectly the British
colonial scheme which followed the prinicple of "divide and rule."198
A second factor behind the Declaration was the confrontation with
Communism. Zionism was seen as helpful in the fight against Bolshevism.
In his article "Zionism versus Bolshevism" (1920), Churchill suggested
that Zionism was helpful in frustrating Trotsky's effort of "world
revolution," on the grounds that Zionism could divert "the energies and
the hopes of the Jews in every land towards a simpler, a truer, and a far
more attainable goal,"199—that is a Jewish state in Palestine.
Another motive which promoted the Declaration was the British desire
to avoid a large influx of Jewish refugees into Britain. Lord Balfour was
hostile to the idea of England as the place for immigrant Jews of Eastern
Europe. Being the head of the British government at the time, Balfour
played an important role in passing the 1905 Aliens Act.200 Most likely,
Balfour's position was influenced by Herzl, who, in his speech before a
British Royal Commission on the immigration of Jews to England (1902),
suggested that transferring the Jews to Palestine was the solution to the
British problem.201 Likewise, the Tsarist leaders were informed by Herzl
that Jewish settlement in Palestine would be a good solution to get rid
of radical Jewish elements in Russia.202
Besides Britain, the U.S. also stood against the idea that the
expelled Jews come to America. By 1925, the U.S. had begun to impose some
restrictions on its free immigration policy. The new regulations were
based on a quota system which favored immigrants from Western and Northern
European countries over those of Eastern and Southern Europe. This new
policy restricted Jewish immigration since most Jews came from Eastern
Europe.203 In his protest note to the Russian Government, the then
American Secretary of State indicated that because of the "oppressive
measures" of the Russian Government, a huge Jewish settlement took place
118
in America, and that the American hospitality "should not be turned into
a burden."204 Palestine was seen as the perfect place for the unwanted
Jewish refugees. President Roosevelt said: "We favor the opening of
Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and colonization . . #"205
Richard Stevens commented: "To Roosevelt it seemed dishonest to demand
immigration concessions from the Arabs while the United States retained
its tight and selective quota laws."206 Speaking about the position of the
Western countries concerning Jewish immigration, W.T. Stace observed "that
none of the great nations want these refugees." Instead "we have found
a small country, Palestine, and a remote and defenseless people, the
Arabs, on whom we can unjustly shove the burden of our duties."207
Thus, the Balfour Declaration was made by Britain (and supported by
Western powers) to solve the demographic problem, to enlist Jewish support
in the fight against world communism, and to protect western interests in
the Middle East. The Zionists, for their part, were successful in their
tactics to mislead the Palestinian natives.
Zionist Strategy and Attitude Toward Palestinian Natives
Examining the Zionist literature, one sees that the Zionist leaders
were deliberately ambiguous concerning the nature of the Jewish settlement
in Palestine. Instead of a Jewish state, the Basle program of 1897 spoke
of "home in Palestine secured by public law." Twenty-three years later,
Max Nordau took pride in his effort to dissimulate the real Zionist aim.
He wrote:
I did my best to persuade the advocates of the Jewish State
in Palestine that we might find a circumlocution that would
express all we meant, but would say it in a way that would
avoid provoking the Turkish rules [who ruled Palestine at the
time] of the coveted land. I suggest "Heimstatte" [Homeland]
as a synonym for "state" . . . this is the history of the much
comit meant . . . to us it signified "Judenstaat" (Jewish
State) and it signifies the same now . . . 8
Nahum Sokalov, a participant in the drafting of the Balfour Declaration,
denied in 1919 that the objective of the Zionist movement was to establish
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a Jewish state in Palestine.209 In his speech to open the tenth Zionist
Congress (1911), the President of the movement declared that "only those
suffering from gross ignorance, or actuated by malice, could accuse us of
the desire of establishing an independent Jewish Kingdom."210 And yet,
according to Herzl's diaries, not published until twenty-six years after
his death in 1904, the founding father related:
Were I to sum up the Basle Congress in a word—which I shall
guard against pronouncing publicly—it would be this: at
Basle I founded the Jewish state ... If I said this out loud
today, I would be answered by universal laughter. Perhaps in
five years and certainly in fifty everyone will know it. 1
In 1919, Weizman (who became the first president of Israel), in a letter
to one of his associates, expressed hope to form in "Palestine a Jewish
commonwealth under British trusteeship."212
"Force and cunning," according to Alan Taylor, were to be used in
transforming the status quo in Palestine.213 The settlers were to follow
Herzl's strategy which was clearly stated by the founder in 1895:
We must expropriate gently the private property on the
estates assigned to us. We shall try to spirit the penniless
population across the border by producing employment for it
in the transit countries, while denying it employment in our
own country. The property owners will come over to our side.
Both the process of expropriation and the removal of the poor
must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly. Let the
owners of immovable property believe that they are cheating
us, selling us things for more than they are worth. But we
are not going to sell them anything back.
The voluntary expropriation will be accomplished through
our secret agents. The company would pay excessive prices.
We shall then sell only to Jews, and all real estate will be
traded only among Jews.
It is important to note that when Herzl wrote this piece, Palestine was
not specifically in his mind. It was meant to apply to any natives
anywhere.215 In case of possible natives' resistance, force could be used
to handle the situation, Herzl recommended.216 David Hirst believed that
the use of violence was seen inevitable to achieve the Zionist goal. He
wrote:
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Violence, then, was implicit in Zionism from the outset. The
prophet of Zionism foresaw that coercion and physical force
were inevitable; they were not unfortunate necessities thrust,
unforeseen, on his followers. To his diaries, not published
until twenty-six years after his death in 1904, Herzl confided
the beliefs which, in his public utterances, he had been
careful to omit: that military power was an essential
component of his strategy and that, ideally, the Zionists
should acquire the land of their choice by armed conquest.
And what about the future of the Palestinian natives? Borochov the
"socialist" Zionist leader answered:
The native population of Palestine will be economically and
culturally absorbed by those who will bring order to the land
and develop its productive forces. The Jewish immigrants will
build up Palestine, and the native population will in time be
absorbed by the Jews, both economically and culturally.28
And no word whatsoever about the natives' national inspiration.
Anticipating armed resistance by the natives, Borochov prepared his
Zionist followers:
Those who think that such a radical transformation of Jewish
life as territorialism implies can occur without a bitter
struggle, without cruelty and injustices, without suffering
for the innocent and guilty alike, are utopianists . . . They
are written in sweat, tears, and blood.
Similarly, Weizmann emphasized that a Jewish state "... will come about
not through political declaration, but by the sweat and blood of the
Jewish people . . . "220 Faithful to the Herzlian guidelines, Weizmann
instructed his followers:
... We require evolutionary tactics. For example, we should
not ask the Government if we are to enter Palestine as masters
or with equal rights to the Arabs. All depends on the number
of Jews living in Palestine at the time or in the future.
From the Declaration it appears that we are being offered the
opportunity of becoming the masters of the country. As long
as we have neither people nor money at our disposal we can ask
no more than that. If we set ourselves small goals and
implement them in the best possible fashion, we will some day
win the confidence of the British Government. But if we make
sweeping demands and do not immediately follow up with
actions, they will no longer have confidence in us.
Englishmen operate empirically, by experience and not by plan.
Everything depends on the people, their ability, and their
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iron patience. There is an English proverb about the *camel
and the tent': first the camel pushes a foot into the tent,
then he slips inside. This is the policy we must adopt. We
must avoid sharp corners.
More direct and blunt was Jabotinsky. He believed in the doctrine of
"Iron Wall" which means that only immensely superior force could compel
the natives to accept the occupation of their land. He wrote that there
is an:
. . . Iron law of every colonizing movement, a law which knows
of no exceptions, a law which existed in all times and under
all circumstances. If you wish to colonize a land in which
people are already living, you must provide a garrison on your
behalf. Or else—or else, give up your colonization, for
without an armed force which will render physically impossible
any attempts to destroy or prevent this colonization,
colonization is impossible, not difficult,' not *dangerous1
but IMPOSSIBLE! . . . Zionism is a colonizing adventure and
therefore it stands or falls by the question of armed force.
It is important to build, it is important to speak Hebrew,
but, unfortunately, it is even more important to be able to
shoot—or else I am through with playing at colonialization. 2
Jabotinsky elaborated more:
Zionist colonialization, even the most restricted, must either
be terminated or carried out in defiance of the will of the
native population. This colonization can, therefore, continue
and develop only under the protection of a force independent
of the local population—an iron wall which the native
population cannot break through. This is, in total, our
policy towards the Arabs. To formulate it any other way would
only be hypocrisy.
When one Zionist warned the Twelfth Zionist Congress (1912) about a
possible increasing of native hostility that might lead to a total war
with the Arabs, Jabotinsky replied: "History teaches that all
colonization has met with little encouragement from the natives on the
spot; it may be very sad but so it is and we Jews are no exception."224
Lenni Brenner commented:
Jabotinsky was quite correct in defining Zionism as a colonial
racist enterprise. He envisioned a triumphant Zionist state
amidst a Middle East and a world dominated by imperialism,
with the Palestinian population accepting their lot, as so
many native peoples had been forced to do before them.22*
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And Hilton Obenzinger said this about Jabotinsky:
The least that could be said of Jabotinsky was that he was not
a hypocrite. Indeed he saw Zionism as explicitly colonialist
and racist, casting aside any of the Utopian niceties that the
"socialist" Zionists entertained to obscure the basic
underpinning of the entire project.
David Ben Gurion (who became the first Prime Minister of Israel) echoed
Jabotinsky's position: the Palestinian problem would be solved "by force
of arms and not through official resolution."227 On another occasion Ben
Gurion said:
At the present time we speak of colonization, and only of
colonization. It is our short term objective. But it is
clear that England belongs to the English, Egypt to the
Egyptians and Judea to the Jews. In our country there is room
only for Jews. We will say to the Arabs: "Move over;" if
they are not in agreement, if they resist, we will push them
by force.228
The following conversation which took place in 1891, seemed to be a
representative reflection of the settlers' attitude toward the native
Palestinians.
We should go east, into TransJordan. That would be a test for
our movement.
Nonsense . . . isn't there enough land in Judea and Galilee?
The land in Judea and Galilee is occupied by the Arabs.
Well, we'll take it from them.
How? (Silence.)
A revolutionary doesn't ask naive questions.
Well then, "revolutionary," tell us how.
It's very simple. We'll harass them until they get out . .
. Let them go to Transjordan.
And are we going to abandon all of Transjordan? (Asks an
anxious voice.)
As soon as we have a big settlement here we'll seize the land,
we'll become strong, and then we'll take care of the Left
Bank. We'll expel them from there, too. Let them go back to
the Arab countries.
The organized newcomers translated such a Zionist outlook into acts which
led to the violence that has stamped the Arab-Jewish relationship.
The year 1882 marked the first organized wave of Jewish immigration
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(Aliyah) to Palestine. At that time, there were already in Palestine
about 24,000 Jews (as compared with 525,000 Palestinians), mostly
immigrants, who came to Palestine for religious purposes: Dwelling in
Zion was considered as a religious duty.230 According to David Hirst,
those Jews "were often old, and many spent their time in perpetual study
of the Talmud. Most lived in great poverty."231 The newcomers of the
first Aliyah (called lovers of Zion) were more politically conscious
though they had no clear-cut vision of a Jewish statehood.232 With the
heavy financial support of Baron Edmond de Rothschild of Paris, the
settlers were able to establish thirty-nine agricultural colonies.233 The
second wave of Jewish immigration (beginning in 1905 and lasting until
1914) consisted of very committed Zionists who were inspired by Herzl's
philosophy and who were to become the leaders of the Zionist movement two
or three decades later. They were the vanguard in the process of
transforming Palestine into a Jewish state.
Up to the end of the First World War, Palestine was part of the
Ottoman Empire. Between the Wars it was ruled by Britain until the
establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. According to a book
(published in Hebrew, 1980) written by the Israeli writer A.L. Auneri, the
ratios between Jews and Palestinians were as follows: In 1800, the ratio
of Arabs to Jews was 40:1; in 1880 it was 22:1, and in 1914 (according to
a Turkish census) it was 11:1;234 in 1915, it was 6-7:1; in 1931 the ratio
was 5:1, and by 1947 it had become 2:1.235 It should be noted that the
Jewish community in Palestine was protected, according to the
"capitulations" agreement, by the consuls of foreign powers.236 Through
their consuls, the Great Powers pressured the Turkish authorities in favor
of more Jewish immigration into Palestine.237 The many protests by the
Palestinians against the increasing Jewish immigration failed to stop a
future influx of settlers. "The Port would periodically impose
restrictions on immigration," Hirst wrote, "only to lift them again under
European pressure, or to allow venal officials on the spot to turn a blind
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eye to the continued defiance of them."238
Thus, the increased number of the settlers had led to a lot of
friction and hostility with the natives. As is the case with all settler
enterprises, hostility revolved above all around the question of land.
The Zionists often emphasized that "the Jews have too much history and too
little geography."239 A purchase agency, the Keren Kayemet Le Israel
Company, was set up to purchase Palestinian land for the settlers. It was
mainly non-Palestinian absentee landlords who cooperated with the settlers
in giving them large areas of the most fertile Palestinian land.240 In his
book, Israel: Utopia Incorporated. Uri Davis pointed out:
The successful accomplishment of the Jewish colonial task and
the establishment of the Jewish state of Israel followed
rather standard patterns of colonial dispossession. Sensing
clearly and correctly that the task required first and
foremost the consolidation of monopoly over the land resources
of the country, the Jews felt that their allies could not
possibly be the impoverished, dominated local peasantry,
divested of all legal rights, and transformed under the
Ottoman imperial rule into tenants and serfs. Their allies
could only be the big absentee feudal land owners who were
thirsty for cash in order to enter into the capitalist market
economy, introduced into the area by the European imperial
powers.z
According to Dr. A. Ruppin, the master mind of the early Zionist
colonization, "ninety percent of all land bought before 1929 came from
absentee landlords."242 Again, pressures were used by the Great Powers to
relax Turkish restrictions concerning land sale to the settler Jews.243
The native peasants who lived under conditions of feudal tenancy and
serfdom244 did not confront the actual sale of the land (a process of which
they had no knowledge because it was usually done between the absentee
landlord and the settler). They resisted the following step which was the
process of their evacuation.245 Dr. Ruppin said: "on every site where we
purchase land and where we settle people, the present cultivators will
inevitably be dispossessed."246 Sometimes Turkish troops were needed to
ensure the transferral of land to the settlers.247 The position of the
Turkish rulers was to approve the sale of the land to the Jewish settlers,
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hoping to "attract Jewish capital to their exhausted economy."248 However,
despite vigorous Zionist effort to buy Palestinian lands, "only 8% of
Mandatory Palestine" came under Jewish ownership by 1947.249 Thus it
became essential that new avenues be devised to expand the Zionist control
of Arab land. This was facilitated by the dispersion of the Palestinians
during the 1948 fighting. In 1948, according to United Nations sources,
more than 726,000 Palestinians were forced to leave their country during
the war. At the same time there were 340,000 European Jews waiting in
Cyprus to go to Israel. Don Peretz wrote:
. . . The property abandoned by the Palestinian Arabs was a
valuable resource helping to make room for hundreds of
thousands of Jews who replaced the Arab refugees. The
abandoned Arab fields, orchards, vineyards, homes, shops,
factories, and businesses provided shelter, economic
sustenance, and employment for a significant percentage of the
nearly 700,000 new immigrants who came to Israel between May,
1948, and the end of 1951. Israel would have found it far
more difficult to more than double its population during this
period without access to abandoned Arab property.
Thus, the problem of the Palestinian tenants cultivating land sold to
settlers marked the beginning of the conflict between the newcomers and
the indigenous people. Mistreatment of the Palestinian native became an
inevitable outcome. In 1891, the Zionist philosopher Ahad Ha'am
criticized the settlers' attitude toward the Palestinians:
Slaves [the Jews] they were in their country of exile, and
suddenly they find themselves in a boundless and anarchic
freedom, as is always the case with a slave that has become
king; and they behave towards the Arabs with hostility and
cruelty, infringing upon their boundaries, hitting^ them
shamefully without reason, and even bragging about it.
These words were written in 1891. When the Palestinian resistance reached
its peak in 1908, Yitzhak Ben Zui (who became Israel's second president)
described the Palestinian reaction as "anti-Semitic pograms."252 However,
"The Zionists were hardly concerned at all about the reactions of the
Arabs," Maxim Rodonson noted. He added: "and it is here that the
unconsciously imperialist element in their thinking stands out."253
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The colonial settler character of the Zionist movement and the state
of Israel was evident. The course of the Zionist enterprise was not
dissimilar in essence to that of European colonialism in Africa and Asia.
The Zionist project was set up to establish an exclusive colonial society
with the support of colonial powers. Raphael Shaprio maintained that
seeking the support of an imperial power was quite natural for Zionism and
other colonizing movements. But Zionism was different in that it had no
specific sponsor power. Instead, it had sought the support of Western
imperialism in general.254 Therefore, Shaprio concluded, "Zionism's
antagonism towards the Orient was more a part of its character, and hence
more radical and complete, than one normally finds in colonial
movements."255 Egbal Ahmed pointed to the specific character of the
Zionist movement. He argued:
It is a pioneering colonialism, one that seeks to exclude and
eliminate the native inhabitants rather than to occupy and
exploit them. Although produced by the process and power of
imperialism, it is a form of colonialism which offers refuge
to the disinherited, to persecuted minorities and to the
surpluses, marginals and misfits created by industrialism and
modernization in the metropolis. A colonialism committed to
replacing the native people, ifc,.,is racist and extremist by
nature. [Emphasis in original]"6
Similarly, Maxim Rodonson pointed to the colonial nature of the Zionist
enterprise.257 Writing about the same subject, Alfred Moleah concluded:
. . . Israel, like South Africa, is a settler-colonial state.
Political Zionism is a 19th-century colonial movement of some
European Jews to found an exclusive Jewish colony, preferably
in Palestine. This was European settler colonialism with the
outlook and objectives reflective of other European colonial
and imperialist ventures of the period.25B
Abdeen Jabare held that the history of world colonialism indicated that
the colonizer would have three options in handling the native population:
1) to eliminate all or part of them (genocide), 2) to subjugate them in
a specific "system of inclusion and exclusion, or 3) to deport them
outside of their land (population transfer).259 The Zionist movement,
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Jabara noted, adopted the latter two options: "pushing the bulk of the
population out and subjecting the remainder to a system of inclusion and
exclusion." He added: "It was, as Jacques Berque wrote, "a total
colonialism1 because the native Palestinian Arab could derive no benefit
from it."260
The settler-colonial character of Zionism was acknowledged by
Zionist leaders. Moshe Dayan, at one time Israel's Defense Minister,
said:
We are a settler generation and without the steel helmet and
the cannon we cannot plant a tree or build a house. Let us
not flinch from the hatred inflaming hundreds of thousands of
Arabs around us. Let us not turn our heads away lest our
hands tremble. It is our generation's destiny, our life's
alternative, to be prepared and armed, strongand harsh, lest
the sword drop from our fist and life cease.
During the expulsion of 6,000 Palestinians from the Gaza strip in the
spring of 1972, Israel Galili, a leading veteran architect of the original
colonization programs, and Premier Golda Meir's top advisor, stated:
""Our right on Gaza1 is "exactly like our right on Tel Aviv."1 He added:
"We are colonizing Gaza exactly in the same manner in which we colonized
Jaffa. Those who doubt our right on Gaza should doubt our right on Tel-
Aviv as well."262 The dilemma for the Zionist establishment is quite
clear: If land occupied in 1967 should be given back, then why not land
seized the same way in 1948? The Zionist leaders had not hesitated to
emphasize the expansionist nature of their state. After the six-days war
of 1967, Moshe Dayan declared:
Our fathers had reached the frontiers which were recognized
in the Partition Plan [that of the United Nations in 1947].
Our generation reached the frontiers of 1949. Now the six-
day generation has managed to reach Suez, Jordan and the Golan
Heights. That is not the end. After the present cease-fire
line, there will be new ones. They will extend beyond Jordan-
-perhaps to Lebanon and perhaps to central Syria as well.253
It is interesting to note that this reference to Lebanon was stated
fifteen years before the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.
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Other evidence of Zionist colonialism can be found in the support
of the colonial powers to the Zionist cause. The European powers were
guided partly by self-interest and partly by strong internal pressure from
their Jewish communities. The pressure on President Truman is a case in
point. In his address to the American ambassadors to Arab countries,
President Truman stated in 1945: "I am sorry, gentlemen, but I have to
answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of
Zionism; I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my
constituents."264 In his "Memoirs," Truman again mentioned the pressure
put on him in 1947.
I do not think that I ever had so much pressure and propaganda
aimed at the White House as I had in this instance. The
persistence of a few of the extreme Zionist leaders—actuated
by political motives and engaging in political threats—
disturbed and annoyed me. Some were even suggesting that we
pressure sovereign nations into favorable votes in the General
Assembly. "b
It should be mentioned that the original United Nations recommendation of
1947 to establish a "Jewish state" in Palestine was rejected by all Asian
and African states (with the exception of South Africa). Only the
European states, the United States, and Australia voted for it.266
The Great Powers, according to the Israeli writer Yosef Gorny,
provided "considerable contribution" to the advancement and the success
of Zionism. "The modest achievements of the Zionist movement in Palestine
in that period would probably not have been possible without" the
involvement of the Great Powers.267 During the Palestinian revolt of 1936-
1939, the British provided significant military support that paved the way
to the ultimate Zionist victory in Palestine. The military correspondent
of the Israeli daily Haaretz stated:
With respect to the events of 1936, it seems to us that had
they not happened in the manner and at the time in which they
did in fact occur, it is doubtful that the Jewish community
could have waged a war for independence eight years later.
The Jewish community emerged from these dangerous 1936 events
in a stronger position as a result of the strong support it
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received from the British government and army in Palestine.268
Likewise, Lenni Brenner believed that without "the presence of the
protecting British troops" the Zionist settlers "would have been driven
into the Mediterranean by the Palestinians and the millions of Arabs in
the surrounding countries."269 Brenner also suggested that the association
with the British colonial power "demonstrates the reactionary nature of
Zionism."270 Similarly Elmessiri pointed to the link between Zionism and
European colonialism:
Given the colonial frame of reference within which the idea
of the Zionist state was conceived and implemented, one can
argue that it is by no means a coincidence that the Balfour
Declaration and the South African Act of Union (1909) were
both effected in "large part by the same handful of
politicians"—Lord Milner, Lord Selbourne, Lord Balfour,
Joseph Chamberlain, and General Smuts. In implanting and
backing white settlers in South Africa and Zionist settlers
in Palestine, the British Empire was founding two little
pockets of settler-colonists who would owe allegiance to the
imperial metropolis 9and would serve as bases of operations
when the need arose.
In an attempt to link Zionism to the worldwide system of imperialism,
Patrick F. Wilmot argued that Israel, like South Africa, is "part of
imperialism's design to box in and destabilize the continent and divert
its historical destiny from the primary task of uplifting its
population."272 In the same line of thinking, the writer of an article
published in the Israeli daily Haaretz (September 30, 1951) acknowledged
that "Israel has been assigned the role of a kind of watchdog" which "can
be relied upon to punish properly one or several of her Arab neighbor
states whose lack of manners toward the West has exceeded permissible
limits."273
The foregoing discussion clearly indicates the colonial-settler
character of Zionism and Israel—a fact that has not been widely
recognized by world public opinion. Far from being a movement of national
liberation, the Zionist movement was part of an imperialist wave sponsored
by Western powers to serve as a base to protect Western interests in the
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region. Israel, like South Africa, constitutes a beach head of Western
Capitalism in an underdeveloped world. However, it is said that
colonization goes hand in hand with racism. And the Zionist case is not
exceptional.
RACISM; Jewish Purity/Jewish Superiority
Racism basically is based on the idea that a certain group of people
is naturally (physically or culturally) superior to others. Western
colonialism emphasized the genetic and cultural superiority of Western
civilization. In common with the dominant outlook of nineteenth century
colonialism, the rule of the white man over the indigenous population
seemed quite normal on the assumption that he could boast a moral
superiority derived from advanced socio-political order. "The development
of racism in all its different forms of expression," Sharif suggested,
"corresponded to the emergence and expansion of European imperialism based
on the colonization of the non-European world."274 Racism was used to
justify a diverse range of economic and socio-political exploitation.
""The White man's burden1 was to civilize the "backward1 nations incapable
of helping themselves." Military ingenuity or technological advance
might be considered as signs of superiority. In the case of Zionism,
Jewish superiority was based on two concepts: "pure race" and "chosen
people." Sharif maintained that Zionist racism was manifested in "its
essential claim that the Jews make up a "chosen Race1 which should not be
assimilated with other "inferior races."'276
The Zionist philosophy emphasized the question of "racial purity."
Zollschan, an early Zionist thinker, wanted "to prove that Jews constitute
a pure race."277 Martin Buber, an early Zionist philosopher, claimed that
"the deepest layers of our being are determined by blood; that our
innermost thinking and our will are cloved by it."278 Similarly,
Jabotinsky spoke of "... one single red thread, leading from Zion to
Zion, traverses the entire history of our people."279 He believed that
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"racial traits" are the criteria "which determined the singular nature of
different nations."280 Naum Sokolow, a Zionist scholar, maintained that
"... absolute purity does not exist, but relatively the Jews are
doubtless the purest race among civilized nations . . ."281 After denying
the existence of a pure race or a pure nation, Edward Said suggested that
all efforts and claims to purify one race "are tantamount to organized
discrimination or persecution," and he cited Nazi Germany and South Africa
as clear examples.282
The question of "Jewish Purity" became equivalent to the concept of
"Jewish superiority." Arthur Ruppin, an early Zionist theoretician,
suggested that "a highly cultivated race deteriorates rapidly when its
members mate with a less cultivated race, and the Jew naturally finds his
equal and match most easily within the Jewish people."283 Ruppin opposed
intermarriage on the ground that it is "detrimental to the preservation
of the high qualities of the races," and that preventing mixed marriage
"is necessary ... to preserve Jewish separation."284 The necessity of
preserving "Jewish purity" led the Zionist religious leaders to introduce
a new social category, the "mamzerim." The term "mamzerim" referred to
a Jewish child of a marriage that was not sanctioned by biblical law as
interpreted by orthodox rabbis. Accordingly, thousands of children whose
parents re-married after a divorce fell in this category. "The mamzerim
and their children—to the tenth generation—are not allowed to marry
*pure' Jews."285 Ruppin believed that although other nations might have
some kind of superiority, the Jewish people, with regard to intellectual
gifts, "can be scarcely surpassed by any nation."286 Joseph Kohler
(another thinker who contributed to the theory of race) described the Jews
as "one of the most gifted races mankind has produced."287 The Jewish
Press (November 1972) referred to "the fact that three of five American
Nobel Prize winners were Jews," asserting "that this percentage was
certainly higher than the Jewish share of the U.S. population."288 Max
Nordau went on record as saying that the "Jews were more enterprising and
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more talented than the average European, not to mention the *sluggish1
Asians and Africans."289 A. Bartal claimed that "the Jewish culture is in
actual fact the driving force, the dynamo behind other cultures, and
behind European culture in particular."290 Morris R. Cohen suggested that
the "Zionists fundamentally accepted the racial ideology" of anti-
Semitism, "but drew different conclusions. Instead of the Teuton, it is
the Jews that is the pure or superior race."291 On this Mick Ashley
stated:
It is ironic, to put it mildly, that Israel and the Zionists
use the memory of the Jewish victims of the Nazi gal chambers
to justify building a society based on the same concept of a
racially pure and superior people, minus only the gas
chambers, as they deny the Palestinian Arabs the right to
return home because it might imperil the "Jewish state."*92
Within Zionist ideology the ideas of Jewish purity and Jewish superiority
are linked to several religious themes such as "chose people" and
"promised land."
The Role of Religion
Beside "racial superiority," religious themes have been used to
indicate "Jewish superiority." Martin Buber maintained that "the Jews are
not like 'all other nations' but a res sui aenm« a unique national
unity."293 Such uniqueness derived from the mission of the Jews to
introduce "Judaic morality into the international system."294 This view
is shared by all Zionist leaders who repeatedly emphasized the role of
Israel as the Light unto the Nations. Rabbi Kook insisted that the Jews
"are different from all nations, set apart by a historical experience that
is unique and unparalleled.«™ This uniqueness, Kook claimed, is based
on the argument that "the spirit of Israel is so closely linked to the
spirit of God."296 Kook's philosophy considered the state of Israel as
"the kingdom of heaven on earth," and thus "total holiness embraces every
Jewish person, every deed, every phenomenon, including Jewish secularism
. . . Rabbi Kahane articulated the thoughts of many:
133
Israel is indestructible, it is unique, it is holy, it is the
Chosen of the Lord, it has a reason for being. Its national
uniqueness is built on an idea, on an ideology tnS it alSne
«?; 4- iiat ,,1S\oindeed' reason to be different. The Jew is
selected and obligated to be a religio-nation, commanded to
obey the laws and follow the path of the Torah . theJeS
onlv°SeadnOISfftO createfKfor himself a holy n*tion and tnai can
?« l£ 2? f"e of ot*e?s> separate, different, apart. That
™-« Y }he unique Jewish nation, chosen for holiness and a
unique destiny, was given land for itself: so that it might
£?«* a tJniqUei'^h°ly societv that would be a light untS the
nations who would see its example and model/98
On this, Goodman Smith commented: "Kahane's idea of Israel's mission to
the world . . ., is shared by almost all shades of Zionists, even the most
liberal."299 He continued to say: "This is so to speak, the Jewish
version of the *White Man's burden' or the 'mission civiliatrice' of
European colonialists."300 M. Begin# former IsraeU prime
stated:
Other nations started out as savages, living in iunales and
caves, in fear of thunder and lightning, and *in starrershiS
Foreign nations came and forced their religion up" them'
. Our nation arose differently. it began with a dii
Palestine
Ofira Seliktar attributed such outlook of being a "world master race" to
the teaching of the Talmud (a compilation of rabbinical commentaries and
decisions on the Torah). Seliktar stated: "The Talmudic definition of
the Jews as a moral religious community might have actually created a
feeling of superiority over the Gentiles, who were perceived as lacking
in spiritual, scholarly and intellectual values."302 Similarly, Israel
Shahak believed that the Talmud's teaching contributed to an anti-
Christianity attitude. He stated:
For example, in addition to a series of scurrilous sexual
allegations against Jesus, the Talmud states that his
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copy of the New Testament that comes into their hands. (This
^ «\.onlE ?o^1uinJfo^ce but actually practiced today; thus
on 23 March 1980 hundreds of copies of the New Testament were
publicly and ceremonially burnt in Jerusalem under the
auspices of Yad Le'akhim, a Jewish religious organization
subsidized by the Israeli Ministry of Religions.)5*
Henry Cattan attributed "what can be considered racist teaching and
discrimination against non-Jews" to the Old Testament. He cited the
following examples:
Neither shalt thou make marriages with them; thy daughter thou
shalt not give unto his son, nor his daughter shalt thou take
unto thy son.
Again, it is stated in the Book of Exodus,
iiVUlJ ViU uend.vy fear,bef°re thee, and will destroy all
the people to whom thou shalt come, and I will make all thine
enemies turn their backs unto thee.
(23:28) And I will send hornets before thee, which shall drive
thee Hlvlte' the Canaanite, and the Hittite, from before
them out from before thee in one
#■ 1* i«T- i -d become desolate, and the beast of the
field multiply against thee.
(23:30) By little and little I will drive them out from before
To?e4,un«1i thou be increased, and inherit the land.
id ' d I Wl11 set thy bounds from the Red Sea even unto
the sea of the Philistines, and from the desert unto the
river: for I will deliver the inhabitants of the land into
your hand; and thou shalt drive them out before thee."®
The Talmud, according to Israel Shahak, "commands every Jew, whenever
passing near a cemetery, to utter a blessing if the cemetery is Jewish,
but to curse the mothers of the dead if it is non-Jewish."305 it was
reported that two members of an "Ultra orthodox" urban settlement in
Israel:
»-U*- *em°ved the body of a Christian-born woman, who had been
™«~i ? £° an Israeli (and had accompanied him to a
r2mo^ra^10S- Cuamp durin9 the Nazi Period), from a Jewish
gJJIter7 ^ Rlshon Lezion and dumped it into a nearby Muslim
According to Israel Shahak, the Jewish orthodox have frequently emphasized
the idea:
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. . . That the cosmos is divided into five parts- the
inanimate; plants and vegetables; animals; human beings and
Jews—and the differences between human beings and Jews is as
great as between human beings and animals ™f
This concept was also emphasized by the Zionist philosopher Ahad Ha'am who
put it this way:
dTlf^r2n*-^te n?tu5fn7 tfkes ^ for granted that there are
different steps in the ladder of creation: The appearance of
nonorganic matter the plants, the animal kingdom, then the
beings endowed with speech, and above all the Jews.31*
In the same line of thinking, Mordechai Piron, Chief Military Rabbi in
Israel, declared:
As a result of the selective process within the human
community the people of Israel have alone been endowed with
■£■ ll1Cal and metaPhysical special capacity operating
within the cosmos . . . Only within the people of Is?aelhal
the miraculous phenomenon of the prophecy appeared which is
During the invasion of Lebanon (1982), an Israeli soldier made this
comment to the British journalist, Robert Fisk: "And for us, I guess, I
hope you understand this, the death of one Israeli soldier is more
important than the death of even several hundred Palestinians."310
Thus religious principles have been used to justify practical acts
of abuse. For example, with regard to the murders of Palestinian students
carried out by members of the Jewish underground, Rabbi Lichtenstein, head
of a Yeshiva in the occupied territories, declared that those Jews must
be punished "but should not receive the same punishment as a Jew convicted
to murdering a fellow Jew, because the soul of a non-Jew has a different
quality from the soul of a Jew."311 Israel Shahak considered this as "a
moderate statement." He stated:
the religious Knesset members voted without
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exception for this proposal. Or take the statements of the
fanatical chief Rabbi Lior of Kiryat Arab. When asked in 1985
why Israel had to retreat from Lebanon, he said it was obvious
that God, by making Israel fail in Lebanon, was punishing it
for the crime of returning Sinai to Egypt.
Rabbi Mordechai issued the following instruction to Israeli soldiers
during the invasion of Lebanon:
When our forces encounter civilians in war, in ambush, or in
a raid, so long as there is no definite evaluation that those
civilians are incapable of damaging our forces, it is
permissible and even obligatory by the Halukhic Law to kill
them. In every case one should refuse to trust the Arab, even
when he gives the impression of being a civilized person. 3
Asked if he would "accept the fact that Arab civilians are being killed,"
Rabbi Kahane replied: "Of course. Sure. In the same way that I wholly
approved of the Israelis bombing Lebanon."314 It was reported, according
to Ofire Seliktor, that rabbinical authorities issued a number of
statements which "Justified killing civilians—including women and
children—in wartime."315 Seliktar further noted that Biblical
interpretations of "religious Jewish law" justify such killing "even if
they contradict Israeli military policies."316 It was documented that the
Israeli rabbinate officially selected the following psalm to be read by
the Israeli soldiers during the war of Lebanon:
0 my God, make them like the whirling dust;
As stubble before the wind.
As the fire that burneth the forest,
And as the flame that setteth the mountains on fire;
Let them be ashamed and dismayed for ever;
Yea, let them be confounded and perish.
In Israel, like in South Africa, religion has been used to serve
political purposes. The Zionist colonization of Palestine was justified
on the grounds of Biblical promises of four thousand years ago. In his
Ph.D. dissertation, Benjamin Joseph observed that the Zionists heavily
leaned on the Old Testament to justify political actions. For instance,
the project of settlement which "in effect involves the reclamation of an
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ancient but eternal title to the land," was based on "a divine promise to
a chosen people who established an ancient kingdom, events for which the
Old Testament is the primary available record."318 Joseph believed that
"this is a major reason for the significance attached to the Old Testament
in Zionist ideology."319 Joseph elaborated further:
The Israeli child in public school begins to study the Old
Testament as soon as he can read and write. It remains"~a
mandatory subject through graduation from high school
Biblical verse can be heard at the beginning and end of each
day on the state broadcast media. Some of the verse mention
the conquest of the Land of Canaan and God's desire that the
Canaanites be removed or turned into "hewers of wood and
drawers of water", their rightful place (Book of Joshua).32*
The Relationshin Between Zionism and Jewish Religion
Although Zionism has some disagreements with Jewish religion (i.e.
about the religious definition of the Jews and the use of "historical
rights" as a secular substitute for "divine promise"), such disagreements
are considered minor ones. "The Zionists do not hesitate to make full use
of mystic elements and to take advantage of any religious sanction they
can get,"321 Elmessiri wrote. He added: "They form many government
coalitions with the ^religious' parties, and make many concessions to some
of the formalities of orthodoxy."322 Similarly, Ehud Ein-Gil stated:
From its very beginning, Zionism was marked by an alliance
between secular' and 'religious' elements. Claiming to be
a national movement, Zionism always regarded the
£dS!rt~OI\°f Je?iSh >tional «nity' as a supreme value?
n™ *h ® a.lways the religious members of the movement who
drew the red line,• beyond which they would prefer to cause
a split. Thus the tradition whereby the secular Zionists
S ?£ concessions to the religious Zionists when the
e^en t°1 Cause a split is as old as the movement
religious iit h l
1
*tBJtf- The Z onists ave a ways kept the
initiative in the movement on matters involving religion.3"
As an example of religious hegemony is the law of marriage and divorce.
Uri Davis considered Israel as a "theocratic" state in which:
£^, marriage is not permitted under Israeli law, and
X £h*rf»Ca£ t lega.ily consecrated only by Rabbinical, Church
or Sharia courts. The same applies to divorce. Under Israeli
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law (Jurisdiction of Rabbinical Courts (Marriage and Divorce),
1953), religious courts are state courts and the religious
judiciary (Rabbinical, Church and Sharia) are paid by the
state.324
Ein-Gil further elaborated on the connection between Jewish religion and
the Zionist movement:
It is a fact that Zionism from its very beginning was not (as
some secular Zionists try to argue) a progressive movement of
%rebellion against religion1 but, on the contrary, a reaction
against secular trends towards the integration of Jews in the
society in which they were living—individual integration by
assimilation, or political integration through participation
in democratic or socialist movements. All these facts
constantly undermine the repeated attempts of secular Zionists
to sever the organic connection of Zionism with religion. For
Zionism and the Jewish religion are tied to each other
ideologically as well as in practice. If zionism were to lose
its last ideological line of defense, which is provided by
religion, then its true nature would be exposed even to its
own adherents—its nature as a colonisatory, xenophobic and
racist movement.
The Zionists have frequently used religious symbols and conceptions
to enhance their cause, Alfred Moleah pointed out:
It freely misuses names and symbols sacred to Judaism. A
prime example is the name Israel for the Zionist state. The
Zionist land acquisition fund's name in Hebrew is Keren
Kayemeth Leisrael; Keren Kayemeth meaning permanent fund or
lasting reward, is taken from the Jewish daily morning
prayers. Even more cynically, this term traditionally implies
the reward for piety, good deeds and charitable work. The
state symbol of Israel is the menorah (candelabrum). This is
extremely conical. The Israeli army fights under an emblem
that means not with armed force and not with power, but in
My spirit says the Lord of Hosts.' Even the special relation
between God and the children of Israel, so predominant in the
Old Testament, has been cynically transmuted. The idea of
chosen-ness as regards the Jewish people in Judaism is a
religious one, signifying a community of true believers who
put faith in one true God, and whose membership in that
community is conditional on their obeying God's commands.
Zionist leaders reject this, except in its totally prostituted
form.Mb
One of the Biblical concepts which has been used by the Zionists, is the
idea of "chosen people"—an idea that gives them the right to populate,
civilize, and rule a God-given land. Moleah wrote:
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Jewish religious tradition has a rich vocabulary referring to
the Jewish people variously as the chosen people, the holy
people, the spiritual people—a people set apart from the rest
of mankind by having a special relationship with a
transcendent God. This derives from the Bible which, as a
holy book, is linked in a supernatural way with the people of
Israel who produced it, and with the land of Israel which
nurtured it.
Fayez Sayegh noted that after being:
—secularized, and given a new political temporal meaning that
was not implicit in the original Biblical spiritual
connotation, the concept of the chosen people [became] at the
root of the Zionist belief in the superiority of the Jew to
the non-Jew and therefore in the necessity for the Jew to
enjoy privileges which he denies to the non-Jew both in theory
and in practice.
The idea of "chosen people," as will be demonstrated in the next chapter,
was used by the white settlers in South Africa to justify their claim to
the land and to legitimize their domination over the African natives.
Religious arguments were used to legitimize the establishment of the
state of Israel. Rabbi Kahane argued that the basis of Israel's
legitimacy is a divine law. For him, "the Jews are a nation only by the
will of God."329 He explained:
The legitimate reason why we have the right to come back here
is that we are Jews and because we are Jews we have a 2,000-
year bond with this land. We have always prayed three times
a day to be able to come back to this land. And we have never
given up this hope. It's not the fact that we have come back
and that we have created an Israeli state. That's not the
reason^ The reason is that, first and foremost, we are
Jews.33D
The "holy mission" of the Jews was linked to a unique piece of land.
Kahane explained:
A unique people given, uniquely, a particular land Unlike all
other faiths that are not limited to one special country, the
Jew is given a particular land and commanded to live there.
And for a reason, as Moses explains: "Behold, I have taught
you statutes and judgments, even as the L-rd my G-d, commanded
me, that you shall do so in the Land whither you go to possess
it" (Deuteronomy 4:5) (Kahane's emphasis)331
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For Kahane "redemption" of the land is a religious duty of the Jews. He
wrote:
The land was given as a reward, as a blessing. But it is
more, much more, than that. The people of Israel have more
than a right to the land; they have an obligation. "For you
shall pass over the Jordan to go in to possess the Land which
the L-rd your G-d gives you, and.vpu shall possess it and
dwell therein" (Deuteronomy 11:31)3*
In the same line of thinking, Hanan Porat, a Knesset member and a leading
organizer of the Gush Emunim, believed that the "Land of Israel" is
central "in the process of the redemption of Israel," and that "the
connection between the people and the land is analogous to the connection
between the body and the soul."333 a statement appearing in an Israeli
religious journal read:
We must stay in the Land even at the price of war. More than
^ W»^B ^°4-J;nitia^e war in order to conquer and free the
$*thout the Land of Israel we are not the People of
And what is the border of the unique land? Kahane answered by quoting the
Torah: "Unto thy seed have I given this land from the river of Egypt unto
the great river, the river Euphrates" (Genesis 15:18).335
elaborated further:
Kahane
tSl1 yOU What the minimal borders are, and which the
T9hree UP-°Kn' a=cordin9 to the description given in the
in all o^nS^-^ ?°f? up to El Arish' which takesin all of northern Sinai, including Yamit. To the east, the
frontier runs along western parts of the East Bank of the
Jordan river, hence part of what is now Jordan. Eretz Yisrael
a^° inciudes Part of Lebanon and certain partsof Syria, and
part of Iraq, all the way to the Tigris river.3*
The use of religious themes was not confined to a justification of
the establishment of the state of Israel, but it was extended to
legitimize the annexation of land seized as a result of the six-day's war.
For example, the Gush Emunim (literally "bloc of the faithful") believed
that settling the occupied territories was a religious imperative that
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superseded strategic considerations:
For us there was no question but that the liberation of those
ancestral territories of the Jewish people was an act of God,
the Finger of the Almighty at work, it would be sinful, not
politically mistaken, or a security slip, but positively
sin %' for us to have Permitted the undoing of such a divine
■
The Gush Emunim believed that the holy link of the Jews to the land
justified the expropriation of the Palestinian land. The process of
settlement in the West Bank was seen "as analogous to the Biblical
conquest of the land of Israel from the native Canaanites."338
What about the non-Jews, especially the Palestinian Arabs who live
in the "Land of Israel"? Kahane's answer: "They must go." Asked if he
favored forceful eviction of all Arabs from the Land of Israel, Kahane
replied:
Yes, obviously, but that won't be necessary for most of them,
id offer financial compensation for those who want to leave
the country voluntarily. I would only use force for those who
i?33^ 6" J d 9° aU the way' and thev
Kahane cited a previous biblical pattern to support his idea of the
expulsion of the non-Jewish population:
i'rdl £reat0,r 5^d Proprietor of the world-all the lands
™S* *?••. Ht-tO(& that which was His from the Canaanites and
gave it to His Chosen People Israel. "And He gave them the
SV^^^ ^rve^^itu^s iS^£ ffi
to the liffS n1o°t5:b4a4s;4d5)on hu^n 5a£rs°L
Z\ iS ? Vt19 g/anted by the Builder and <*££
+1 ? li as not taken from one set of nations in order
that others share it with the Jews. The land was given to
serve the Jewish people so that they have a distinct, separate
£w inKwh,lch nto fulfill their obligation. There can be no
n^=v," ° f«elyllve there, let alone share sovereignty and
ownership. To allow such a thing is to destroy and put an end
g?ven toTh2UJel°sr^^^ f°r Whi°h the Land °f Israel was
Again he supported his position with Biblical quotations:
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So basic and important is this concept [of not sharing the
Holy Land with non-Jews] that as the Jews prepared to cross
the Jordan into the land of Israel, as the waters rose to
enormous heights and the Children of Israel rapidly crossed
to the other side, as they were in the middle of now-dry
riverbed, suddenly Joshua paused and spoke to them, what was
so vital that could not wait until they had crossed safely to
the other side? . . While still in the Jordan, Joshua said
to them: Know why you are crossing the Jordan! In order
that you drive out the inhabitants of the Land from before you
a?11^,1SW£1^fn (Numbers 33:52). "And you shall drive out
?£■ th® inhabitants of the land from before you." "if you do
^1Sri s*1311^6 good. If not—the waters shall come and
inundate me and you." (Talmud, Sota 34a).^*r
Kahane argued that it was a religious duty to expel the Arabs from the
Land of Israel. He stated:
The Arabs of Israel represent Hillul Hashem in its starkest
form by their rejection of Jewish sovereignty over the Land
of Israel despite the covenant between the L-rd of Israel and
the Jews constitutes a rejection of sovereignty and kingship
?™f \l K~d °f Israel- Their transfer from the Land of
Israel thus becomes more than a political issue It is a
fritf^f 7 ^^'u B reli9ious obligation, a commandment to
erase Hillul Hashem. Far from fearing what the Gentile will
J?.1 "rdofs"<?1 aanth.ing' 1?t the Jew tr$?ble as he considers
the anger of the Almighty if we do not.2
It is further, in Kahane's view, a direct order from God to "clean up" the
land from all non-Jews:
?? It theuTo5ah dearly commanded: "And you shall drive out
all the inhabitants of the land from before you . But if
you will not drive out the inhabitants of the land from before
£2Ui<« * 4.tfc shal1^coJae to pass that those which you let
remain of them, shall be thorns in your eyes and thistles in
5£i 1 **, a?d Wl tO£ment you in th* land wherein yoS
ssf^1*11 do to you as x
Kahane further presented Rabbinical commentaries to support his position:
When you shall eliminate the inhabitants of the land, then you
shall be privileged to inherit the land and pass it down to
your children. But if you do not eliminate them, even though
you will conquer the land you will not be privileged to hand
r y°Ur children" (Sforno-Rabbi Ovadiah ben
Goodman Smith commented:
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It is obvious that Kahane's final redemption is linked by
necessity to the final solution of the "Arab question." The
Arabs are the definite obstacle to the final redemption and
to the fulfillment of God's plan for the world. On this
point, there is a meeting of minds between this brand of
Zionism and Fundamentalist Christian Zionism. The two differ
of f?f %?*}' J°rthe 7oruah zionist' it is the establishment
^tJheaSQt.at.e of.1I1s"el where a11 the Jews will ^ ingathered
and the State will become a model for the world. To Christian
Zionists, this is only a prelude and prerequisite to the
Second Coming of the Lord Jesus and the establishment of the
millennium, while the difference seems irreconcilable as far
as the final goal is concerned, the two groups meet on the
Sf^fS.*!ltermediate COUrSe of events, which is the building
of the State of Israel and the continuing "ingathering" of the
™?nr-in f ;v,-B°th P..art:L%are totally convinced of the divine
nature of this venture.
Kahane was critical of the policies and measures taken by the Israeli
government because they were not as strict or religious as they should be.
He explained:
Far better than foolish humans did the Almighty understand the
hSXSL1?1^?1? Kn allowin9 a P^ple that believed theland
belonged to it to be given free and unfettered residence, let
alone ownership, proprietorship, citizenship. what more
r^hf?1 ^?in9 than ^° ask to re^ain what it believed to S
rightly its own land? And this over and above the need to
win Chaar^"3?e and. ^stinctly separate Torah culture that
"niL P " iewish People into a holy nation. That
n^^^e*S 4-Can be 9»«f«nteed only by the non-Jew's having
™ f^ ff19nu^' ownership* or citizenship in the state that
could allow him to shape its destiny and character.3&
Kahane argued that every non-Jew person is a "resident stranger" who must
accept inferior status.
Land JLP«? « t°lear' The non-Jew has no share in the
< * • * It ael> He has no ownership, citizenship, or destiny
b^ir'h I B n°n-Jewwho wishes to live in Israel must Iccept
basic human obligations. Then he may live in Israel as a
offiffthf,trS"ffr' bUt^6Ver as one w^° ca" hold any puSicoffice that will give him dominion over a Jew or a share in
aSmitsXt^hfV^ c°untry Accepting these conditions? ne
ef ^It^^a^y *SZJ&?S?ZL ^i^
^'^1 and
This is Torah. This is Jewishness. Not the dishonest
Pseudo-"Judaism" chanted by the liberal secularists who pick
and choose what "Judaism" finds favor in thefr lyes and?who
reject w,hat their own gentilized concepts find unacceptable
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And what about possible international pressure on Israel because of her
policies toward non-Jews? Kahane said that there was no need to fear from
foreign powers because God is always on Israel's side. He explained:
£?. it.. thisuif /^ OI}ly the right of Jews but their
obligation, what do we fear? Why do the Jews tremble and
quake before the threat of the nations? is there no longer
a G-d in Israel? Have we so lost our bearings that we do not
understand the ordained historical role of the State of
Israel, a role that ensures that it can never be destroyed and
that no further exile from it is possible? Why is it that we
•*?°xu comPrehend that it is precisely our refusal to deal
with the Arabs according to halakic obligation that will bring
down on our heads terrible sufferings, whereas our courage in
removing them will be one of the major factors inothe hurrying
of the final redemption? (Kahane's emphasis).^8 «"^ny
Kahane, as might be expected, did not forget to present the theme of
"anti-Semitism." He said that the "Gentile world's anger and
condemnation" was after all a result of "a pathological hate that has its
root in the existence of the Jew."349 He added: "Nothing that Israel does
or does not do affects this [anti-Semitic] hatred."350 This view was
shared by others. Current "Israeli isolation" was interpreted as being
"the outcome of an everlasting hatred of Gentiles toward the Chosen
People."351 such hatred, according to Rabbi Ephraim Zemmel, "has little
to do with ordinary human envy." instead, "it is an expression of the
eternal confrontation between Good and Evil and of Satan's desire to
eradicate the Holy Torah."352
It should be noted, however, that Kahane and his party (Kach) are
not the only exponent of extremist policies. They are part of the so-
called "radical religious right" which is comprised of different groups:
Morasha, the National Religious Party, the Tehiya party, Herut, Gush
Emunim, and the settlement organizations. in the view of these
organizations, "the modern Zionist movement acts as God's agent in
returning his people from exile and establishing *the third
commonwealth.'"353 m this light, "Israel's wars are seen as miraculous
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victories advancing this process."354 Edward Said believed that many of
Kahane's ideas "(i.e., forced expulsion of Arabs) have been canonical
dogmas of Zionist thought and practice for may decades."355 Similarly,
Goodman Smith suggested that Kahane's position represented "... the
inevitable curse of Zionism in general" as a movement which sought to
emphasize "the distinction of the Jewish people and aims at the
ingathering of the Jews into a specific land (Palestine), and at keeping
Israel as a purely Jewish State."356
Within Israel's political messianism, Uriel Tal identified three
approaches concerning the issue of human and civil rights of the non-
Jews. They are "the restriction of rights, the denial of rights, and the
most extremist level preaching genocide based on the Bible."357 The first
approach which was considered moderate, saw the principle of human
equality as a foreign notion which "is essentially a European concept that
alienates Jews existentially from the Holy Land."358 Therefore, such a
democratic principle was not binding in the Jews' relationship with the
Arabs and thus "leaves only the status of aliens for them"359 (the resident
alien and the convert). The second approach, the denial of rights, was
based on the argument that the Jewish "existence in Eretz Israel is made
conditional on the emigration of the Arabs from the country."360 Tal cited
Rabbi Shelomo Aviner as saying "the command to conquer the Land is above
the moral human considerations about the national rights of the Gentiles
to our country."361 On this Tal commented:
Indeed, has been instructed in the Bible to h^ ^
ut not to be moral, and the general princiolp nf
which are customary for al
[srael
[Emphasis added]'
mitv. do not bind
M
they have been chosen to be at
The third approach in handling the issue of the Gentile's human rights "is
based on the Biblical command to annihilate the memory of Amalek, i.e.
real genocide."363 This resolution found its expression in an article
written by Rabbi Israel Hess and titled: "The Command of Genocide in the
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Bible" (1980). Hess suggested that "the day will still come when we all
shall be called to wage this war for the annihilation of Amalek."364
Similarly, Kahane saw "that all non-Jews in Israel were akin to the famous
biblical foe, the Amalekites, and as such should be decimated by God's
chosen."365 The method, according to Tal, is specified in I Samuel 15:3:
"Now go and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have and spare
them not: but slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox or sheep,
camel and ass."366 Tal noted that "the silence of most sages of Jewish
Religious Law" concerning this issue "is of special significance here,
because this is a group whose political leadership provides not only
guidance but also absolutions."367
Beit-Hallahmi, an Israeli scholar, "argued that religious sentiments
were more acceptable to the international community and were therefore
used by the Israeli Government to cover up the aggression."368 The Lebanon
war (1982), for example, was seen as:
... a Holy War, a war which was a good deed Israel's
presence in Lebanon is evidence of the fulfillment of the
biblical promise made in Deuteronomy 2:24: "Every nlace
whereon the sole of your foot shall treat shall S^ you?s?
from the wilderness and Lebanon, from the river, the river
Euphrates, even unto the hinder sea shall be your border."5**
It was also reported that:
During the Lebanon fighting, which the rabbinate designated
as a divinely inspired war1 (vmilhemet mitzva1) a daily
reading was recommended of Psalm 83, calling for the
destruction by fire and tempest of the enemies of Israel The
«riic^ rab^nate aiso "sued a map which laid claim to large
WuL?£ ^°"thern Lebanon as the inheritance of modern Israel
bequeathed by one of the original twelve tribes of Israel, the
nl f °J **£*?' whlch once Possessed the territory between the
™?U* STtainS,, ■fld Sidon- The SePhar<*i Chief Rabbi also
ruled that wounded Jewish soldiers should not be given non-
Jewish blood unless their lives were endangered, and even then
Ofira Seliktar held that the Israeli victory in the six-days war (1967)
was seen:
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«»«■• * ■ ♦• I • an f of divine intervention, rather than a
manifestation of Israel's military prowess. The occupation
of the West Bank and Jerusalem came to be interpreted as a
most important step in the process of Redemption, because it
restored the intrinsic wholeness of Eretz Israel. Moreover,
since the God of Israel promised the whole country to the sons
of Israel, this divine title deeply pre-empts any other claim
to either bank of the Jordan River. Giving up Judea and
samaria [the West Bank and Jerusalem] would constitute a
mortal sin by interfering with the unfolding process of
Redemption.
To sum up, in a country founded on religious exclusivity, where the
biblical scriptures influence foreign and domestic policies, and where
religious parties can determine the government decisions, religion has
played an important role in justifying wide ranges of practical political
abuses such as annexation of territories seized by wars, expulsion of the
Palestinians from their land, and the discrimination against non-Jews in
Israel.
Racism: Dehumanization of Arab Imag*
"Jewish Superiority" (whether based on the notion of ^purest race1
or the concept of *chosen people1) has frequently been associated with a
Zionist tendency to dehumanize the image of the Orient in general and that
of the Arabs in particular. Jabotinsky, the father of Zionist
revisionism, had frequently emphasized his pro-Western outlook. He
stated:
llJ*"5 l%VB*.i?Oi2li2gA 1? COmmon with what is denoted "theEast, —and thank God for that. To the extent that our
uneducated masses have traditions and sptrftual prejudices
?rom\K reminisce"t of the East, they must be weaJed «2J
owS affair' w fh °r -the AraJ>S °f Pales^^' that is thai?
thL 55 f£' b?v the,re 1S °ne favor ^9, can do them: to help
them to free themselves of the East.372
According to Yosef Gorhy:
Jabotinsky saw the East as representing passivity as aoainst
f&ZZt? *anCrftiViS-m;i submissi°n to oppression agaiL? lo?e 2nd
liberty; and social oppression and discrimination against some
as compared to the Western love of equality and justicl SI
conclusion was the Jews, even though they7orTginateJf in ?he
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«aS£'37*?elonged/ as re(3arde6 their spiritual traits, to the
W6St
Jabotinsky held that the Eastern orientation of the Arabs was in conflict
with the Jews who were bearers of progressive Western values.374 This
position reflected on identical outlook of Zionism's founder, Theodor
Herzl, who wrote: "Everybody in the Orient is frightened of everyone
else." He added: "The people are like a raging animal, which can be
released, but can also be directed and led in any direction."375
Jabotinsky's racism was manifested in his reaction after he, along with
Arabs, was released from prison. He sent a telegram to the British High
Commissioner in Palestine protesting: "Don't make this mistake! Better
leave me here in Acre, but don't put me in the same level with a
blackie."376
It is important to note that hostility toward the Orient even
extended to the Israeli Jews of non-European origin. In a speech to the
Knesset in 1960, Ben-Gurion expressed his belief:
. that the Oriental Jews should be made to acquire the
r^^ inqtellfctual characteristics of SoS wSo
S5K
rather
Further, according to Ofira Seliktar,
S^cTh°" °"??. described ^ contemptuous and derogatory
terms the "primitive Arab mentality" of the Oriental Jews and
expressed apprehension that even the children of thSe
immigrants "whose forebears have been uneducated for
ISTK10118^1^811* tO the level of Arab Peasant children "
Abba Eban, the then Minister of Education, was equally uneasy
JJX ^ newcomers would drag Israel into aA "unnatural
In practice, discriminatory treatment against Oriental people was
manifested in the following during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Dr.
Chris Giannou from Canada was arrested by the Israeli army with other
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doctors from various countries who were working in the International Red
Cross institution in Lebanon. He noted that "darker-skinned" doctors
(Arabs, Africans, Asians) got more punishment than European white
doctors.379
The Zionist identification with western racism can be traced back
to nineteenth century Europe where the notion of "European Superiority"
was an accepted and powerful concept. George Jabbor suggested that in
Palestine "the *ordinary1 European superiority toward the natives is
reinforced by the Zionist ideology and the whole religious-historical
concept of the Jews being a chosen people.380 Zionism projected itself as
a movement with a mission to civilize and modernize backward Palestine.
Herzl wrote: "For Europe we shall serve there [in Palestine] as a bastion
against Asia, and be the vanguard of civilization against the
barbarians."381 The same tone was struck by Max Nordau:
We shall in the Middle East, endeavour to do what the British
aid in India, namely undertake cultural activities and not
nnShfhaifmi^at^°"; • We are 9oing to Palestine as an expedition
on behalf of civilization. Ours is the mission of spreading
Europe's ethical code out to the Euphrates.*® 9
Edward Said pointed to the common origins of imperialism and Zionism and
drew the following analogy between them:
Thus the concept of a land without people is exactly
analogous with Westlake's theory of unpopulated territory
The concept of Jewish Labor (Avodah ivrit) and an
unassimilated or separate European enclave in Asia is exactly
analogous with Leopold de Saussure's theses on the necessity
of maintaining separate European and native structures in
S«f,^nafquirTed territory. The concept of an unlimited Law of
Return for Jews and none for non-Jews is based on the same
thing to be found in every white colony in Asia, Africa, and
America Most important of all, the militant concept of a
Jewish "race" derived itself not simply from the age-old
persecution of Jews in Christian Europe, but from the racial
typologies of Gobmeau, Stewart Chamberlain, and Renan.
r-~ I.-J" the°ry and in practice then Zionism is a degraded
repetition of European imperialism. As Marx said of Napolean
III, that he was a parody of his uncle Napoleon I, so too
Zionism is a parody of European imperialism, as a nephew is
to a greater uncle. Like imperialism, Zionism is a system of
5wl •* i governs—and infects—everything in the state
whose ideology it is, from state institutions to who may or
may not be a part of the Israeli basketball league, who may
or may not be a Jew, who may or may not travel from point A
to point B, who may or may not own land. Thus when we talk
about Zionism and imperialism we are talking about a family
of ideas belonging to the same dynasty, springing out of the
same seeds.
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Jewish superiority was frequently presented in conjection with Arab
inferiority:
In Meinertzhagen's own words "intelligence was a Jewish virtue
and intrigue was an Arab vice." He described the Jews as
•v£niif'«. *?' detera"lil?ed and intelligent" and the Arabs as
decadent, stupid, dishonest and producing little beyond
"^ influenced bV the romance and silence of the
Ian Smith believed that the Jewish people "has had a mission, a civilizing
mission, in the world, second, perhaps, to none."385 He stated:
The Jewish people were above all the fountain-head of Western
«iVll4.1»fatlon to"hom the West owed its very existence. And
now they were to awaken the Middle East which "had been
proves!. "^ centuries and lead ifc "along the path of
On the same subject Reinhold Neibuhr (jointly with six other American
notables), after the Second World War declared:
lil^ ^dinc.tate speedy modernization of the Middle
ast, that the Muslims present a "hopeless1 picture of
backwardness and despotism, and that "there is only one
ffif^2ffi^?^ffii^^iMtiOT i th Middl
This western outlook was extended to color the current Arab-Israeli
conflict. Edward Said wrote:
;v,:e;Jff was [presented as] a democracy whose "right" to
SiSS ««r«r?!191(?if' Wt3S m°rally correct (since no one had
?k if nfc an t]16 Jews), was historically inevitable
the whole world had promised empty Palestine to these
f Je«iS\liberals from Europe*, was! above an?
pcally attractive since it seemed to embody everv
conceivable cliche about pioneers, ingenious sciintSts
intrepid humanitarians, and noble fighters; Israelwasthe
nrn!rL°f te5rorist •"acks . . ., and Israel has stood f£
Mn=?f™ faand Peace whereas its Arab enemies are medieval
Muslim fanatics, irrational murderers, contemptible
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hypocrites.388
Ahad Ha'am observed: "We think that the Arabs are all savages who live
like animals and do not understand what is happening around them."389 in
the eyes of an early Zionist leader, Sh'muel Dayan (one-time Knesset
member and father of Moshe Dayan who once became Israeli Defense
Minister):
; • • the Arabs were just another part of the wild locality,
like the mosquitoes, insects and wild animals. For this
reason they were merely temporary. Just as the wild grass and
the prickly bush were liable to be burned and the marsh to be
dried out, so the diseased and starving Bedouin tribes were
destined to disappear. u
And most currently, Prime Minister Begin, while in office, described the
Palestinian guerrillas as "two-legged animals." Army Chief of Staff
Raphael Eitan referred to the Palestinian civilians in the West Bank as
being "drugged cockroaches in a bottle." General Avigdor Ben Gal, former
Commander of the Northern Front, described the Arabs inside Israel as "a
cancer in the Israeli body politic."391 One basic belief in Zionist
ideology is that the Arabs can only be dealt with by force. An Israeli
writer observed that:
^llf^VV1118 con\ext}s th« frequently expressed
that the Arabs respect and submit only to power "I
fkieftn ^ft "ll1'- *£* arf a11 COwards a"d treacherous,,A kick in the teeth is the only language they understand."**
Again religious themes have been used in current Zionist literature to
dehumanize the image of the Arabs. "Throughout history the sons of Ismael
have been renowned for their thievery," one Zionist writer stated in 1982.
He added: "The Bible itself proclaims them to be lawless men who do not
hesitate to take possession of that which does not belong to them."393
Such a Zionist outlook has been taught to the Jewish children in Israel.
Racism: The Role of
The educational system in Israel has contributed to such racist
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perceptions of Arabs. Zionist political socialization ensured that the
Israeli children, from their first days in school, were taught to see
themselves as one of the select race. A religious textbook in secondary
schools explained why non-Jews ought to be slaves of Jews. The reason,
the book stated, is that:
Jews are the elite of the human race and were specially
created to pay homage to the Creator. Because of this they
deserve to have slaves, and these must be non-Jews, because
a Jewish slave would not devote himself entirely to God Non-
n?SrVe JSWS 3fter they have been rid of' their
This passage was read at the 26th session of the United Nations General
Assembly in July 1971. The following quotation (taken from a book that
was approved by the Israeli Ministry of Education and Culture to be a
textbook for secondary school), which fell within the general conception
of "Jewish superiority," seemed to be representative.
The Israeli people is select among others for its race
develop""91"9 ^ f°r thS CUmate °f the country in wh!ch i?
?1?*.Isra?:1iJ>eople comes from the best racs since it has
Sionr 8el«*ion of all that was best from ever?
,,2fSr?? iS the beSt !an9uage since, we see, the prophets
Sfn^ It KtO e?Press their Profound sentiments and ideas
instrument 9S an instrument' ifc is th« most perfect
Israel to other nations is like the heart to other
organs of the human body. Thus, the Israelites have S
rarest tt ii th hih
e t e
oppor unity of atta ning e ig est power and
recognition that mankind can attain.**6
The Zionist writers tend frequently to distort the image of the
Arabs. Based on a recent survey of Israeli children's literature, an
Israeli writer observed that one popular theme advanced in adventure books
for Israeli children was: "The Arabs slaughter Jews for pleasure and the
pure Jewish child defeats the cowardly pigs."396 Yokheved Saks is a
popular Israeli writer of children's books. By 1984 her production
comprised 69 books, 138 plays, and 400 songs. In most of her works the
Arabs were portrayed as having "heavy hairy arms, a twisted mouth, black
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eyes shining with anger, they stink, they listen to noisy music."397 In
addition, the Arabs "have low morals, they maltreat children, they swear,
they are cowards, and worst of all—they steal from Jews."398 The
following interview with Yokheved Saks (which appeared in the Friday
Jerusalem paper, Kol Ha'ir, December 30, 1983) reflected a deep-seated
attitude of distaste toward the Arabs.
Q K?*£Si ?Ot4-Hdelaibtra^ely creating a negative stereotyped
attitude to the Arabs in your books?
A I believe the attitude I create in my books is the truth, and
therefore it is right . . . Everyone knows that they are
thieves. If our laundry falls, who steals it? The Arabs
Everyone knows this, even if I don't write about it in my
books ... I have never met a gentle Arab.
Q Have you known any other Arabs?
A S ^V^""? inu° them every day- J can even rememberfrom my childhood, when we had an Arab woman to do our
laundry. And the man who cleans the steps here, isn't he an
Arab? Sure he is! And we also buy our fruit from them
have Sen'Ptl°nS °f ArabS in y°Ur b°°ks fit a11 the Arabs you
A Sure.
Q Do you believe that there is any reason to try and live with
tnem somehow?
A I think we should treat them with "respect and suspicion "
Ai^a" ' 5 example, make sure to pay on time the Arab who
cleans my stairs. In any case, he is quite an honest Arab
. . But to say that therefore he is gentle? I never spoke to
him, but I am convinced that he could never speak delicately
Q Do you watch television? Have you heard about the
confrontation between Jews and Arabs in Upper Nazareth?
» ' -1.Personally would never harm an Arab who did not harm
me. But I would not agree to have him living next to me
. Can you be sure that the Arabs from Tarshileha did not take
part in murdering the children? I would never take the risk
Especially with Arab mentality being what it is, that they can
k\ ?°* V?uy •nice .\° you' and y°u never know what is hiding
behind their smile. One must know that this is their
c^^ili^^ be
JLi?^ Tfmatter °1 8"sPici°n» it's a matter of recognizing
reality, if you want to teach a child to confront danger in
life, you must rob him of his childhood innocence . . .399
In his study on the stereotypical depiction of the Arab,
specifically the Palestinian Arab, in Hebrew children's literature, Fouzi
El-Asmar, a Palestinian writer, observed that Zionist ideology has served
as a guide to Israeli children's writers.400 He noted that the Israeli
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authors of the children's story books "constantly present the Arabs in
the most negative light" in order to justify "the dispossession of the
Arabs and the occupation of additional territory."401 The following
passage, taken from a book written for elementary government religious
schools by the Department of the Israeli Ministry of Education, provides
another example of how Zionist education influences the mind of Jewish
children, it stated:
hSLS? *.nrab .sittinjf underr one tree as a symbol of peace
between them is a Utopia of Zionism's creation. The Arabs
have no roots in the Land of Israel. They did not plant any
trees here, and therefore they will not "eat of the f£St Sf
J£°™* K6?8' ^If4.uhey are sittin9 u^er trees, these trees
do not belong to them. The connection of Arabs to the land
is SSJS £\?^elati°n °f ^ J* t th ld
Al-Asmar further pointed out:
It is also clear that the image of the Arab is presented in
XwJ an^VJL un*B?mi™ any Positive relationship between
£™,?fv ■. Palestine. The young reader is educated
£™S *?¥ llteratuure to avoid the Arabs. He or she is
warned not to approach the Arabs because they are physically
t1^ an2 dtseased' ^cause they steal, because they cannot
are lo?r!pt.^CaUSe y SW6ar constantly, a"d because they
Sammy Smooha, an Israeli scholar (Chairman of the University of Haifa's
Department of Sociology and Anthropology) touched upon this point:
is defined to be the perception of one ethnic or
rfoh^ ^gr°UP<-KS inferulor' and subsequently having lesser
rights than others, there are unquestionably disturbing
sSHS?v * °- JtWlSh ■raci?" a9ainSt Arabs in ^srael toda?9Blatantly racist, Kahanism is but the extreme form of the
predominant Israeli attitude towards Arabs. The unfavorable^
^gr of/rabs fo^d in the Hebrew literature and the mass
^ widesPread throughout the Israeli!
Zionist political socialization has constantly tended to de
nationalize Israeli non-Jews, such as the Palestinian and the Druze, by
exposing them to a great deal of Zionist history and literature. Adel
Mana'a, an Israeli Arab who lectured at the Hebrew University at
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Jerusalem, related: "it was my fate to grow up in a village in Galilee,
and to be taught in its school to love Zionism, which was said to have
*redeemed our empty country.1"405 Sabri Jiryis, an Israeli Arab scholar,
noted that 384 hours were devoted to Jewish history during the whole of
the four years of Arab secondary schools in Israel, while only 32 hours
were devoted to Arab history during the same period.406 Rafik Halabi, an
Israeli Druze writer who described himself as "an Israeli patriot, "
related:
And I must admit that whatever else I may have lacked as a
child, the state of Israel saw to it that I got good Jewish
education. Of the history of the Druze and their heroes I was
never taught a thing in school though we did manage to pick
rLS^hin?1^ouVslaair!/"d Christianity, but I can clearly
remember drilling for difficult exams on the history of the
Maccabean revolt. I did not know the names of any Druze
writers nor did I ever read any of their works, but I spent
many hours studying the Zionist's philosophy of Ahad Ha'am,
learned to love modern Hebrew poetry and dabbled in Abraham
Mapu s stories of longing for Zion.407
A Palestinian education officer who taught in Israel, summarized the
Zionist educational policies toward the Palestinian Arab inside Israel:
In short, Israeli education and cultural policies for Arabs
aimed at nothing less than the de-Palestinization and de
nationalization of those Arabs under its control since 1948
. . . Education of Arabs in Israel has been perceived and used
as an instrument of ideology through which the Zionist entity
can, so it had hoped, achieve the goal of annihilation of
Palestinian cultural and national identity ... The modern
history of Palestine is distorted and reduced to the "history
of the lands of fathers," of the desert which was transformed
into paradise by Zionist settlers and "newcomers."4*
Such anti-Arab teaching has shaped Jews' attitude toward the
Palestinians. According to Ian Lustick, an opinion poll conducted in 1968
revealed:
iJ wa£ 91 Percent of all Israeli Jews believed that "it
would be better if there were fewer Arabs." Eighty percent
believed that "every Arab hates Jews." Seventy-six SJcInt
maintained that Arabs would "not reach the level of p?IgrSs
°fSs: El?htrslx Percent said they would refuse to rent
an AFab an<* 67 t idid
: rs
nnf ' percen n icated that they would
not agree to have an Arab as a neighbor." According to a
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similar survey in 1976, "71 percent of the respondents [Jews]
declared that Arabs will not reach the level of progress of
Jews, 97 percent thought that it would be better if there were
fewer Arabs in Israel, 83 percent believed that it is
impossible to trust Arabs, 87 percent agreed that surveillance
of Arabs should be expanded, and 76 percent rejected the
possibility of having an Arab superior at work." Ordinary
language in Israel includes the use of "Arab" as an adjective
to denote faulty work, undependable performance, etc.
Epithets such as "Araboosh" and "dirty Arab" are widely used
it is also common to hear Arabs referred to as "doos "
especially among working-class Jews.*35 '
According to a survey conducted in the middle of the 1960's, it was found
that 80 percent of the Jews believed that "Arabs will not reach the level
of progress of the Jews," and 90 percent preferred to see fewer Arabs
remain in Israel.410 Another poll carried out in the early 1970's showed
that 84 percent of the Jews sampled would be bothered if a friend or
relative married an Arab; 74 percent if their children make friendships
with the Arabs, and 49 percent if Arabs moved next door.411 it was also
reported that two-thirds of the Israeli Jews thought Arab Israelis "to be
lazier, crueler, crookeder than themselves."412 According to Benjamin
Joseph, "polls consistently find widespread prejudice" in "Israeli Jewish
attitude towards Arabs."413 He added:
The findings of one poll, conducted by the Van Leer Institute
in Jerusalem were reported on the front page of Meariv 36%
?f. sraSla- Jews re9arded Arabs as "dirty", 42% as "primitive"
33% as "not valuing human life" and 41% as "violent" 36% of
the respondents opposed equal rights for Arabs and jews, two
^n<- ■> y ^ree ?PPPSed the sale of lands to Arabs in the
central region of the country and one in three believed that
L7yJ??U?d be nactively sou9ht to induce Arabs to em!graX.
The pollster Dr. Mina Zemach, described the sample as
scientific and representative of Israeli Jews.41* ****"■* as
Another poll conducted in 1984 by Dr. Mina Zemach revealed that 15 percent
of the Israeli public favored deportation of Palestinians in the occupied
territories. About as many felt it was O.K. to grant them full civil
rights in Israel. 43.5 Percent of the Israeli public would allow these
Palestinians to live in Israel but with no civil or electoral rights.415
in the words of the Israeli newspaper which published the finding,
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"deportation or apartheid" were the two choices of the majority of the
Israeli public.416 Shlomo Ariel, an Israeli educator, explained the level
to which anti-Arab feeling reached among Israeli youths. He stated:
As part of my job, I organized some seminars about
current issues for youngsters about to be conscripted. I met
with ten such groups of 50 boys each, who can be described as
a representative random sample of Israel's Jewish population.
The boys came from all sections of society and from all groups
of ethnic origin existing within that age group ... In every
discussion group there were several boys who argued that the
Arabs of Israel should be physically eliminated including the
old, women and children. When I drew comparisons between
Sabra and Chatila and the Nazi extermination campaign, they
voiced their approval and declared in all honesty that they
were willing to do the exterminating with their own hands,
without guilt feelings or hang-ups. Not a single boy voiced
his horror or even reservations about these remarks, but some
did say that there was no need for physical extermination.
It was enough to expel the Arabs across the border.
Many argued for South Africa style apartheid. The idea
that the Arabs of Israel regarded this country as their
homeland was received with amazement and contempt. Any moral
arguments presented were rejected with sneers. In any one
group there were never more than two or three boys with
humanitarian and anti-racist opinions, and I felt that they
feared to express these publicly. Those few who dared to
present unpopular views were indeed immediately silenced by
a chorus of shouts.
A clear representative of modern Zionist racism is Rabbi Kahane.
As a member of the Knesset, he presented the following draft law:
A citizen can only be who belongs to the Jewish people . . .
a non-Jew who wants to live in Israel must observe the seven
commandments of the Jewish religious law ... a foreign
resident must accept the burden of taxes and slavery ... if
he does not accept slavery, he shall be deported ... a
foreigner shall not reside in the area of Jerusalem . . .
shall not vote to the Knesset.
Another draft law by the same author called for an establishment of
separate beaches for Jews and non-Jews, and prohibiting mixed marriage or
sexual contact between Jews and non-Jews.419 Henry Cattan noted that "such
laws are not dissimilar to Nazi legislation against the Jews and South
African apartheid regulations against blacks."420 It was reported,
according to The Jewish Press (October 16, 1981), that the walls of the
Hebrew University were plastered by Kahane's Party (Kach) with posters
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that called the attention of Jewish women to "beware of Arabs who seek
only to shame you and take advantage of you." They also read in part:
"You are a daughter of a great nation. Chosen and Holy, the Jewish
nation. Do not defile yourself."421 The popularity of Meir Kahane, who
called for the expulsion of the 700,000 Palestinian citizens of Israel as
well as the 1.5 million who lived in the occupied territories, has been
rife in Israeli society. "Just under 30 percent of the [Israeli] public
accept some or all of" Kahane's ideas regarding the treatment of the
Palestinians.422 However, racism can be seen as a "natural" outcome to the
Zionist philosophy of exclusiveness and separation.
Zionist Exclusiveness
The background of the Zionist discrimination against non-Jews can
be traced back to the basic principles of Zionist ideology which called
for exclusive employment of Jewish labor in the process of building a
Jewish state in Palestine. "The Zionist movement aspired to create an
autarkic society, set apart from the non-Jewish society around it."423 The
land, it was held, must be physically worked only by Jews. Separation,
Jabotinsky argued, was important to national creativity. In 1905 he
considered "national spiritual creativity" as "the end purpose of the
existence of any nation." Thus, "... the creative nation requires
separation and seculation just like the creative individual
personality."424 A.D. Gordon, an early Zionist thinker, called for "every
single tree or plant in the Jewish Fatherland . . . [to] be planted only
by [Jewish] pioneers."425 In a similar line of thinking, Dr. Ruppin, at
the Eleventh Zionist Congress (1913), expressed his desire to establish
"a closed Jewish economy" where "producers, consumers, and even middlemen
shall be Jewish."426
Thus, the Zionist settlers sought to create in Palestine a Jewish
entity which would be nationally and culturally separated from its
surroundings. Hence the Zionist slogans: "Jewish work," "Jewish
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production," and "Jewish defence." Igor Yaroslavtsev explained the
implication of such "racist slogans":
The slogan "Jewish land" for example, meant buying land
through the Jewish National Fund, which had been specially set
up for the purpose, and encouraging Zionist colonizers to
settle there. The slogan "Jewish work" concealed the racist
objective of having only Jews entitled to work on "Jewish
land." "Jewish products" implied an organized boycott of Arab
goods to improve the sales of Jewish commodities. Practical
attention was given to the slogan "Jewish defence" which
ultimately came to mean Zionist terrorism. 27
The Histadrut (Israel's general federation of labor) representative on the
Zionist Executive Council in 1935 pressed for a motion (which was
unanimously adopted) making it a duty for Zionists "to employ only Jewish
labor." Violation "of this resolution would entail expulsion from the
Zionist Organization."428 The Jewish National Fund (established in 1901)
made it a rule "that all land which it acquired was to remain inalienable
Jewish property that could not be sold or leased to others."429 In 1908
a forest was founded in the memory of Herzl. When it was learned that the
saplings were planted by Arabs, the purists came and replanted them.430
Separation was also justified on religious grounds. Rabbi Kahane said:
God wants us to live in a country of our own, isolated, so
that we live separately and have the least possible contact
with what is foreign, and so that we create as far as possible
a pure Jewish culture based on the Torah. This is why I am
a nationalist, why I want a state: this is what God wants,,
And not so as to have a flag like the one you see outside.
He further emphasized:
The biggest racist is the Jew who doesn't see that to be a Jew
is something special. When I say that I am a Jew, it means
that I accept that there is a wall separating Jews and non-
Jews. It's a terrible thing to create a wall between people-
-between Jews and non-Jews in this case. But this is
conceivable when there are reasons to be Jewish and to want
to live one's Jewishness. 3Z
Lenni Brenner pointed out:
If one believes in the validity of racial exclusiveness, it
160
is difficult to object to anyone else's racism. If one
believes further that it is impossible for any people to be
healthy except in their own homeland, then one cannot object
to anyone else excluding 'aliens' from their territory.433
Besides ideological considerations, separation was sought for its
practical economic benefits to the settlers. The Israeli writer Ben-
Porath explained:
Zionism's social objectives were concerned with Jewish
society. Given the great gap in living standards and levels
of education and health, it was in the Jewish interest to
separate the provision of public services and diminish the
spillover of resources, through taxation, from the Jewish
sector into the Arab sector. ^
Jabotinsky demanded total separation between Jews and Arabs on the ground
that "rapprochment could help the Arabs gain strength in the economic,
technological, and social spheres."435 Ben-Porath held that the creation
of separate Jewish institutions (such as the Jewish Agency, the Haganah,
the Histadrut, the Jewish National Fund):
. . . were vital to the development of the Jewish economy and
society. It often actively sought to prevent or impede the
process of market integration, which feeds on economic
realities. Many elements in the organized Jewish sector
helped create barriers to labor integration: the separate
organization of Jewish labor in the Histadrut; cooperative and
collective organizations (particularly in agriculture); and
national ownership of much of the Jewish-owned land (where
the employment of Arabs was prohibited).436
In practical terms, the Zionist policy of exclusion meant that the native
Arabs, both Christian and Muslim, were to be excluded from participating
in the socio-political life of the Jewish settlement. Michael Adams
suggested that Zionist exclusion "established a form of apartheid."437 He
further stated:
The policies adopted by the Israelis toward the Palestinian
Arabs after the establishment of the Jewish state followed
logically—and indeed, inevitably—from the attitudes of the
Zionist "Pioneers" in the pre-state period. Zionism as it
developed in the 1930's and 40's was an essentially
undemocratic movement, because it favored one section of the
community in Palestine at the expense of another.438
161
The legacy of Zionist exclusion has influenced Zionist policies
after the establishment of the state of Israel. The state apparatus
became a tool to implement Zionist philosophy. Ben-Porath wrote:
In the early years, the state maintained market segregation
between the sectors. For some time there was segregation of
the trade in agricultural produce, but the longer and more
serious struggle evolved over the free movement of labor. The
Arab sector was governed (until 1966) by military
administration, which meant restrictions on the Arabs' freedom
of movement. These restrictions were enforced throughout the
1-950 *s to regulate the entry of Arab labor and to protect the
employment opportunities of Jewish immigrants. These
restrictions were liberalized in 1959, but institutional
separation remained in place. Throughout the 1950's, the
labor exchanges in the Jewish sector were run by the
Histadrut, which actively tried to protect the interests of
Jewish labor. The military government was instrumental in
continuing this institutional separation. State organs did
not include the Arab population under their normal
jurisdiction. The power of the state was also used for the
acquisition of land through confiscation. (This was largely
the Arab refugees' land, but in many cases the owners or their
families were living in Israel. )4Jir
However two developments took place: First, the Histadrut (founded
in 1920) began in 1960 to admit Arab workers to its membership. Secondly,
in 1966 the military government, over the Arab sector, was abolished.
Elmessiri held that such "moderation" could be seen as a natural outcome
since "the full rigor in the implementation of repressive acts is
necessary only in the first stage of settler colonialism."440 He further
pointed out: "Once the settler-colonialist power structure has fulfilled
its objectives, such as a demographic majority and expropriation of the
land, it can somewhat relax the stringent regulations."441 Jabotinsky was
of the opinion that full and equal rights to the Arabs could be granted
only after achieving a Jewish majority.442 In this connection Elmessiri
argued that a moderation tendency after consolidating the power structure
was a common phenomenon among settler colonial regimes. He explained the
move of the Prime Minister Voster (when he declared in 1977 his intention
to eliminate discrimination in South Africa), within this context.443 The
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same analysis can be applied to the so-called South African "reforms" and
to the question of Israel's "democracy."
Israel's "Democracy"
In comparison with South Africa, the Zionists have frequently
referred to the fact that the natives who remained in Israel can and do
vote. However, one should realize that the natives in Israel are a
minority (17 percent of the population); and thus participating in the
political process would not pose a real threat to the structure of Zionist
domination, while the ruling whites in South Africa (who comprise only 16
percent of the population) were in a totally different situation that
necessitated a more concrete and open stand against the African native.
Israel has been very sensitive about its democratic image. "Israeli
officials have been more reluctant than South African authorities to ban
outright Arab organizations that engage in political activities."444
However, through the devices of security regulations, the Israelis "have
succeeded in stifling and crushing attempts by Palestinians to establish
political organizations that challenge the Zionist nature of the state."445
Auishai Ehrlich suggested that "Israel must maintain the formal facade of
a democracy" for two reasons: First, since its deep economic dependence
on the U.S., an Israeli democratic system would ensure the flow of
American aids. Secondly, Israel has to maintain a good relationship with
world Jewry. "Under conditions of open dictatorship, immigration could
well come to a halt and most Jewish support could cease."445 A third
reason could be added which is concerned with the special background of
the Israeli state. Israel was the only state that was created by the
United Nations (through the 1947 General Assembly Resolution recommending
the partition of Palestine). Because of this fact, Uri Davis argued, it
would be:
. . . Politically impossible for the newly established state
of Israel immediately to contravene the terms of the UN
Charter by passing open and explicit apartheid legislation.
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For the newly established government of Israel it was both
morally and materially imperative to present Israel to the
West as an advanced form of democracy and social progress.
Israel's democracy, in the words of Israel Shahak, "is strictly for
Jews only."448 On July 31, 1985, an amendment to the election law was
passed, "prohibiting in Knesset elections of any list "rejecting the
existence of the state of Israel as a state of the Jewish people.1"449
Sammy Smooha, an Israeli professor, maintained that with such amendment,
"the Knesset ruled that Israel is not only a Jewish but also a Zionist
state: the state for the Jewish people, the majority of whom are living
outside Israel."450 Thus, he concluded: "Full participation by Israeli
Arabs in the Israeli democracy is, therefore, conditional upon their
acceptance of the Jewish-Zionist character of the state."451 Further, the
Supreme Court of Israel decided that "there is no Israeli nation apart
from the Jewish people and the Jewish people consists not only of the
people residing in Israel but also of the Jews in the Diaspora."452 On
this Noam Chomsky commented:
[Israel] is a Jewish State governing a society that is in part
non-Jewish. This fact . . . has always been the Achilles heel
of Political Zionism. If a state is a Jewish state in certain
respects, then in these respects it is not democratic . . .
and a non-Jewish citizen suffers various forms of
discrimination. He is not permitted to lease or work on state
lands. He is not able to reside in all Jewish cities, such
as Karmil, built on land confiscated from Israeli Arabs. "
Being a democratic and a Jewish state is a conflicting matter.
Rabbi Kahane was more honest on this point than other Zionist leaders.
He explained his argument in the New York Times (July 18, 1983):
Israel's Declaration of Independence is a schizophrenic
document, for it speaks of the establishment of "a Jewish
state in the Land of Israel' while, in the same breath
offering "equal social and political rights to all citizens,
regardless of religion.' That is clearly an absurdity—a
contradiction in terms. A Jewish state, by definition, is one
with a majority of Jews who can, thus, establish their own
sovereignty and become captains of their own fate. A
democracy, on the other hand, allows non-Jews to become a
majority and, thus, to turn Israel into a non-Jewish state.
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The very idea of a *democratic Jewish State' is nonsense. A
state can be permanently defined as Jewish or as democratic,
but never both.
Instead of being a democratic state, Kahan held, Israel has to be an all-
Jewish theocracy which is ruled by the law of the Torah. He explained:
I'm taking on people steeped in Western concepts who tell
themselves that Judaism is really Thomas Jefferson or Burke
or Rousseau when it's really nothing of the sort . . . Judaism
was always an exclusive group and it doesn't integrate with
other people. I'm a Jew, not a democratic.
On another occasion, Kahane emphasized that "Judaism does not accept
democracy unless it is within a structure that adheres to the law of the
Torah. I challenge any rabbi to contradict me on this."456 Kahane made
many in Israel extremely uncomfortable when he raised simple but vital
questions: If the Arab citizens of Israel became a majority, will Israel
remain a Jewish state? Is Israel ready to abandon its Jewish character?
"Obviously, nobody in Israel can accept this because to accept this would
amount to being anti-Zionist!,"457 Kahane said. He insisted: "You can't
have Zionism and democracy at the same time" because they "cannot go
together."458 In an exchange with critics, Kahane clarified his position:
You claim to be democratic and secular, but one of the laws
which you accept is neither democratic nor secular. It is,
furthermore, the law on which your state is built: the Law
of Return, which applies solely to Jews. You are blind to the
future; when changing population patterns mean that Arabs
become a majority in this country, and they abolish the Law
of Return, will you still be so democratic and secular? And
when this state has an Arab majority, the Arab laws—because
the Arabs won't have your complexes—will you still be so
democratic and secular? And when that Arab majority decides
to throw out the Jews, will you still be so democratic and
secular? You are also blind when you tolerate mixed
marriages. For centuries, the Torah has barred Jews from
marrying non-Jews.
To conclude our discussion about Zionist exclusivism and Israel's
"democracy," let us quote from Benjamin Joseph, who argued that:
. . . In a land populated with growing numbers of non-Jews,
policies of "separate development" in some form or another are
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inevitable if Zionist ideology is to be implemented . . .
Israel's commitment to Zionist principles and the operating
procedures of its major institutions assure that the country
does not belong to all its citizens. National goals such as
"ingathering of exiles", being "the sovereign state of all
Jewish people" and maintaining a Jewish majority cannot easily
be reconciled with secular citizenship rights and political
pluralism. Hence it is misleading to describe Israel as
Jewish" in the same sense that France is French. The latter
does not officially strive to be the country of one ethnic
group or race. Arabs living in the French state are French,
but Arabs living in the Jewish state are not Jewish.
Similarly, Uri Davis concluded that "the state of Israel is not a legally
independent state with a "democratic constitution," rather it "is a
legally Jewish state, and it has no constitution."461
The Jewish State
Israel is a Jewish state. As Ben-Gurion plainly put it: "Israel
is the country of the Jews and only the Jews. "462 Racism seemed to be a
natural outcome in a state established exclusively for the members of one
religious group. The basic argument here is very simple: Israel is not
merely another independent state, or a state of its citizens, but it is
a "Jewish State." Zionism defined Israel to be "a state that embodies
Jewish nationalism and serves the national interest of the Jewish
people."463 The Declaration of Independence stated:
ACCORDINGLY WE, MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLE'S COUNCIL,
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY OF ERETZ-ISRAEL AND OF
THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT, ARE HERE ASSEMBLED ON THE DAY OF THE
TERMINATION OF THE BRITISH MANDATE OVER ERETZ-ISRAEL, AND, BY
VIRTUE OF OUR NATURAL AND HISTORIC RIGHT AND ON THE STRENGTH
OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
HEREBY DECLARE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JEWISH STATE IN ERETZ-
ISRAEL, TO BE KNOWN AS THE STATE OF ISRAEL.464
The Declaration also stated that the Jewish State "will be open to Jewish
immigration and the Ingathering of Exiles."465 As one can realize, the
Declaration did not mention Israel as an independent or sovereign state,
rather, it declared Israel as a Jewish state. Uri Davis said that "what
may seem to an uninformed outside observer a minor technical quibble was"
actually a subject "of explicit discussion and controversy" among the
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Zionist leaders at the time.466 Akiva Orr, a Jewish-Israeli writer, argued
that the difference between "independent state" and "Jewish state" was not
insignificant. He explained:
[The Declaration] does express the spirit of political Zionism
(and of its creation—the state of Israel), the raison d'etre
of all its institutions as well as its self-image. A "Jewish
state" expresses a concept of identity different from that of
an "independent state." It is a state whose main quality is
its Jewishness rather than its independence.
Ian Lustick maintained that "the Jewish character of Israel has been
manifested in all the trappings of its official existence, from its
national anthem to its seals, emblems, calendar, and postage stamps."468
In his testimony before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on
Palestine in 1947, Ben-Gurion said: "When we say *Jewish independence1
or a "Jewish State' we mean Jewish country, Jewish soil, we mean Jewish
labor, we mean Jewish economy, Jewish agriculture . . ,"469 Similarly,
Golda Meir, the Israeli Prime Minister, said: "I want a Jewish state with
a decisive Jewish majority which cannot change overnight ... I always
believe this was plain Zionism."470 in a straightforward statement, Moshe
Dayan expressed the wish of the Zionist leaders to see the Arabs out of
Israel. He said:
There are about one million Arabs whom we don't want as
citizens in Israel ... It is not in accord with our aims for
the future; it would turn Israel into either a bi-national or
an Arab state instead of a Jewish state, and we want a Jewish
state.471
The Declaration also stated that Israel "will ensure complete
equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants
irrespective of religion, race, or sex."472 Orr pointed to the
"significant omission" of "ethnic or national origin," arguing that this
omission was done deliberately on the grounds that the founders of the
state of Israel did not really intend to grant "full political equality
for all citizens, including the indigenous Palestinian Arabs."473 He
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continued to say:
It was, after all, a Jewish state, not just another
independent state, and in that state Jews, and Jews only, were
entitled to special political privileges, hence the careful
omission of any reference to ethnic and national origin. Full
social and political equality for the Arab citizen of Israel
is something to which most Israelis, and Jews everywhere,
would object even today ...
Orr further pointed out:
Yet it would be wrong to conclude that the founders of the
Jewish state intended to discriminate against non-Jews. They
intended to discriminate, and did discriminate, in favor of
Jews, but most of them refused to accept that discrimination
in favor of Jews implies—by default—discrimination against
non-Jews . . . "Full political equality" was transformed into
the vague phrase "full and equal citizenship," i.e. minority
rights. In practice the Palestinian Arabs in Israel were not
even allowed to form their own political parties^or elections
to the Israeli parliament (the Knesset) ...
Similarly, Michael Adams contended that the Jewish state "could only be
achieved by violating the rights of the Palestinian Arabs. "476 Edward Said
believed that as a Jewish state, Israel was:
. . . created by and for the Jewish people, then it must be
the case that non-Jews are posited as radically other,
fundamentally and contitutively different. . . . To be a non-
Jew in Palestine (Israel) is first of all to be marked
negatively • .77• • tand then] by inferiority and
secondariness.
Yet beside being a Jewish State, Israel saw itself as a "Zionist
state." The then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin said: "Israel is
a Jewish-Zionist state in which a minority of Arabs live with religious
and cultural distinctions."478 Ian Lustick explained the interrelation
between Israel and the Zionist apparatus:
These overarching ideological commitments and the
overall "project" character of Israel are embodied in a set
of institutions that have been fighting, for over fifty years,
for Jewish independence in Palestine (Eretz-Yisrael), for mass
Jewish immigration, for the expansion of Jewish land
ownership, and for other Zionist objectives. Together these
institutions represent the organizational apparatus of the
Zionist movement . . . Before 1948 the institutions of the
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movement—including the Jewish Agency, the Histadrut, the
Haganah (underground army), the JNF, the Basic Fund (Keren
Hayesod), and the various political parties and their
associated school systems and kibbutz (agricultural
collective) movements—constituted, administratively and
substantively, a kind of protostate.
After 1948 these institutions continued to function, and
their commitment to the basic tenets of Zionist ideology
remained intact, but with the emergence of Israel as a
sovereign state the division of labor among them was somewhat
rearranged.
Abdeen Jabara noted that:
The World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency were
charged in the Status Law of 1952 with being the "authorized
agency" which would continue to operate in Israel for: (1)
"the development and settlement of the country," (2) "the
absorption of immigrants from the Diaspora," and (3) "the
coordination of the activities in Israel of Jewish
institutions and organizations active in those fields.
Section 5 of the law states that "the ingathering of the
exiles" is the "central task of the State of Israel and the
Zionist Movement in our days." 8
As we shall see, these Zionist institutions have played important roles
in maintaining and perpetuating discrimination against non-Jews.
From Discrimination to Apartheid
So what are the practical implications for those inhabitants who are
officially classified as non-Jew? No one better than Israel Shahak (a
survivor of the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp, and the President of the
Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights) can answer this question. He
stated:
The state of Israel builds huge building projects in
Jerusalem. But for whom? Not just for "Israeli citizens";
only for Jews. An inhabitant of Jerusalem can never be
eligible for a flat in those building projects if he for
example happens to believe in Jesus Christ or in the Prophet
Mohammed and acts on this belief, i.e. is a member of any
Christian or Muslim religion. If he is an atheist, his right
for obtaining a flat in most of the newly built housing
projects in Jerusalem belonging to the State of Israel,
depends strictly on his race. If he can bring proof that his
mother, grandmother, great grandmother and the grandmother of
the grandmother were all Jewesses, he is regarded as a Jew and
can obtain a place to live in. If one of the links is weak
he can not.
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He further continued to say:
This situation is the same in most areas of Israel. More than
90% of the inhabited areas of the State of Israel are under
the rule of the Jewish National Fund regulations, under which
non-Jews cannot rent or buy a house or flat, open a business,
in short cannot live. This land is called in Hebrew "the
saved" land. The land which belongs to non-Jews is called
unsaved or not national (the term "national" in Israel does
not mean "Israeli" but "Jewish") and by buying or confiscating
it from a non-Jew by a Jew, the land is supposed to be
"saved."482
And more:
This is of course only the beginning. A Jew by the mere fact
that he is a Jew, will obtain a host of other privileges, over
the non-Jew, some of them worth a lot of money, some honorary.
A Jew obtains not only the right to live on most of Israeli
land, he also obtains a loan and a mortgage to help him. When
a new Jewish settlement is being established (on the land that
was saved—confiscated from non-Jews and made Jewish) all the
Jewish inhabitants enter into prepared houses, with water and
electricity. Many of the old non-Jewish villages have still
no water or electricity now and there are some cases in which
the electricity line newly built to serve the new Jewish
settlement passes the old Arab (in official parlance non-
Jewish) village which is still forbidden to use it and sits
in the evening in darkness watching the shining Jewish
settlement. A building project for the newly-married applies
only for the Jewish newly-married and so on. To be a Jew in
a Jewish state is to be both a privileged being, and to be
ableAA^° receive a lot of "easy" money a non-Jew can not ever
get.4UJ
Thus the question of "who is a Jew" has not been a matter of intellectual
debate or a matter of religious interpretation. Rather it has socio
political implications. Shahak explained:
This is the reason for the furor raised on the question of
who is a Jew." It is not theology they are so concerned
about it is money and status. Imagine that a non-Jew would
be able to pass" merely by obtaining a certificate from
somebody in USA that he is a Jew! HOrrible things would then
happen: Non-Jews will be able to live in Ramat-Eshkol.
Palestinians from the Old Nazareth will be able to obtain
flats in Upper Nazareth, which so far is a completely
Apartheid city closed completely to non-Jews. And so on and
so on. But no danger of that: The gate is strongly watched
and onlv real" Jews will be subsidized flats in the Jewish
state. w
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In Israel there are certain areas which are completely and
officially reserved for Jews only and where non-Jews are prohibited from
building houses, renting apartments or engaging in trade or business.
Israel Shahak wrote:
Most of the land in Israel belongs to or is administered by
the Jewish National Fund (JNF), which . . . forbids non-Jews
to dwell or to open a business, and sometimes even to work on
its lands only because they are not Jews! Such policy not
only enjoys here perfect legality (in contrast to a similar
discrimination against the Jews which is illegal in most
countries of the world), but is supported by all the
instruments of the Israeli rule. In such a manner many whole
towns were created in Israel, which are as the phrase goes
"clean of Arabs" and this legally, or rather as we should say
"clean of Gentiles (goyim)." In other towns, like Upper
Nazareth, only one special quarter is "devoted" to the
dwelling of Arabs. Any attempt of an Arab to buy or to rent
a flat from a Jew is opposed openly and legally by all the
branches of the government (the Ministry of Housing,
Municipality, etc.) and also by the illegal opposition of the
Jewish inhabitants, which is nevertheless supported by the
Israeli police. I can only remind you that nobody opposes an
operation of the sale or the rental of a flat in Nazareth, if
the buyer or the lessee is a Jew, which means, according to
the racist definition of this word employed legally in Israel,
a human being who can prove that his mother, his grandmother,
his great-grandmother and the grandmother of his grandmother
were Jewish. If he can prove this, such an operation becomes
all right all of a sudden and nobody opposes it, neither the
government nor the inhabitants. There is opposition only if
the mother of the buyer is not a Jewess.
Shahak referred to Muhammad Ma'aruf, an Israeli citizen who attempted to
open a factory in Carmiel. Ma'aruf's demand was rejected because Carmiel
was "sout of bounds'" to non-Jews. "486 Shahak held that this
discrimination was not related to "security" matters. He said: "I can
dwell or open a business in any place of my choice . . . but only because
my mother was a Jewess. An Israeli citizen whose mother was not a Jewess
cannot enjoy this right."487 Mr. Ma'aruf was a Druze and accordingly he
had to serve a compulsory service in the Israeli army. However he could
not "dwell in Carmiel only because he happened to be born to the
"incorrect1 mother."488 But "a Jewish thief or robber or murderer, who has
completed his sentence, has the right to dwell in Carmiel. Similarly,
Israeli Arabs had no right to live in the new town of Ymit, which was
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built exclusively for Jews.489 Comparing this with South Africa apartheid,
Shahak wrote:
Zionism is worse than the Apartheid regime of South Africa.
That regime has "divided" the country and has forbidden the
whites to buy land in a "black" area (the Bantustans) and the
blacks to buy land in a "white" area. Zionism wants to "save"
as much land as it can without any limit at all, in all areas
of the "Land of Israel," and it turns the land that it "saves"
into one big Apartheid area, in which human beings who were
born from non-Jewish mothers have no right to live. I see no
difference whether the Apartheid-area was created by
confiscation or by purchase. The most important fact is that
it exists.490
Everything within the Zionist framework is divided along this line:
Jew and non-Jew. Israel Shahak observed:
No one is astonished in Israel that almost all the Israeli
statistical data about human beings are racist in essence:
There are no Israelis inside Israel. Officially there are
only "Jews" and "non-Jews." No babies. No dead men, no ill
men, again only Jews, who incidentally can be babies, can die,
or be ill; and "non-Jews," who also, incidentally to their
"chief" quality—which is the absence in them of "Jewishness"-
-have the impudence to behave like "the chosen people" and to
be born, be ill and die, likewise.
The system of the public school in Israel is divided into two systems:
one for Arabs and another for Jewish Israelis.492 "Jewish Israelis are
completely prohibited from attending Arab schools while an Arab Israeli
may attend a Jewish school only by special state authorization."493
Further, all Israeli ministries or departments are organized along racial
lines. "For instance, the Israeli Ministry of Health has a general health
office for Jews only while a sub'department exists for minorities."494
Israel Shahak said "Human health is not recognized as such in Israel and
this is because of racist Zionist reasons. Only a separate health of a
body of a Jew, and another sort of health of a body of a non-Jew are
allowed to exist."495 A similar division existed within the Israeli
Ministry of Housing. The "department for the housing of minorities" deals
exclusively with non-Jews. Shahak pointed out:
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The racist state of Israel has no human housing policy, as it
exists in varying manners in the U.S.S.R., in the U.S.A., and
in Britain. The State of Israel does not pretend to care
about housing for a human being because he is a human being,
for a poor family, or one that has many children, because
decent housing is a human need. No! The State of Israel
because of its Zionist aims, such as the "Judaization of the
Galilee," is carrying out two contradictory sets of policies
at the same time: One of maximum care for Jews and the other
of discrimination against and oppression of the "non-Jews."
The structure of the Zionist state has inevitably led to
discrimination. Consider the role of the two Zionist, non-governmental
institutions: the Jewish National Fund (JNF) and the Jewish Agency (JA).
According to Israeli sources, world Jewry (between 1948 and 1978) had
supplied $5,000,000,000 to Israel, of which 65 percent came from American
Jews.497 From 1948 through mid-1977 the total income of the Jewish Agency
was $5,092,500,000.498 Because of their non-governmental status, these
agencies "do not serve a constituency of "Israeli citizens.1 Rather they
are communal Jewish-Zionist organizations which serve a transitional
constituency—the Jewish people,"499 Ian Lustick stated. He elaborated
more:
That is, although the government of Israel is bound according
to its own democratic norms to address itself, in the laws it
promulgates, in the programs it sponsors, and in the services
it provides, to Jewish and Arab citizens alike, the Jewish
Agency and the JNF are mandated to operate only in regard to
Israel's Jewish population. There therefore constitute
efficient conduits for channeling resources to the Jewish
population only, resources which are converted into capital-
intensive economic development projects, educational
vocational training, social services, land acquisition, etc.
In the implementation of such programs officials of these
institutions see themselves ideologically as well as legally
justified in ignoring the needs of Arab Israelis and the
impact of their activities on the Arab sector.500
The intention of benefiting the Israeli Jews alone was clearly manifested
in the following statements, issued by JNF and Jewish Agency officials.
The economic impact of our land purchases and our
activities on Arabs is not considered . . . The government
would have to look after all citizens if they owned the land;
since JNF owns the land, let's be frank, we can serve just the
Jewish people.
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Arab villages are of course ineligible Lfpr our economic
assistance] because this is a Jewish Agency.
Consider also the following statement written in 1967 by the Zionist
leader, Joseph Weitz of the Jewish Agency Colonization Department:
Between ourselves it must be clear that there is no room for
both peoples together in this country ... We shall not
achieve our goal of being an independent people with the Arabs
in this small country. The only solution is Palestine without
Arabs . . . And there is no other way but to transfer the
Arabs from here to neighboring countries, to transfer all of
them; not one village, not one tribe should be left.
In terms of their objectives and structures, the Zionist agencies
intended to promote exclusively the interests of the Jewish citizens.
Article 3 of the constitution of the JNF said: "Land is to be held as the
inalienable property of the Jewish people."503 And the JA, according to
its constitution, "shall promote agricultural colonization based on Jewish
labor" and that "in all works or undertakings carried out by the Jewish
Agency it shall be a matter of principle that Jewish labor shall be
employed."504 The efforts of these agencies were closely coordinated with
the Israeli government. In the years between 1948 and 1970, the Israeli
government transferred 1,330,000 dunams of land to the JNF.505 Lustick
stated:
Most of the land transferred to the JNF was that of Arab
refugees; much, however, was land expropriated from Arabs who
remained to become citizens of Israel ... By transferring
these lands to the control of the JNF, which of course works
closely with the Land Settlement Department of the Jewish
Agency, the government was able to insure that decisions about
the use of the land would be made strictly on the basis of
Jewish-Zionist considerations. As indicated earlier, all
"state" lands were placed at the disposal of the JNF by the
creation of the Israel Land Administration and the Land
Development Authority. As noted, these two bodies develop,
lease, and administer 92 percent of Israel's land area . . .
Since the JNF, as an institution, does not and cannot address
itself to the Arab sector, Arab access to JNF-controlled lands
for the purpose of long-term leasing or development is
effectively denied.506
In accordance with the JNF principles, the Israeli government passed the
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Agricultural Settlement Law, whose purpose was "to stop the infiltration
of the Arabs into the Jewish agriculture sector, [and to] prohibit even
the subleasing of Jewish National Fund land to Arabs."507 According to
this law, any individual or settlement that leased or hired Arabs "would
be subject to the expropriation of the land involved."508 The law ensured
that "the land would then revert to the JNF or the Israel Land
Administration, whereupon these bodies would make arrangement for the use
of the land in a more suitable fashion."509 Article 23 of the JNF's
constitution made it clear that an "employment of non-Jewish labor renders
the lessee liable to the payment of compensation of a certain sum of money
for each default."510 The Israeli newspaper, Ma'ariv (October 26, 1971)
reported "that the Jewish Agency planned to confiscate the land of a
settler in moshov . . . for renting land to Arabs."511 Several cases were
also reported in the same newspaper (November 5, 1971) "where the Zionist
settlers committed the 'criminal' act of renting 'land to Arabs who used
to dwell on it before1 1948."512 On this, Israel Shahak commented:
Pay attention, please: Because I am a Jew, I am allowed to
lease orchards for picking or marketing, but an Arab, only
because he is an Arab, is forbidden this! The Ministry of
Agriculture of the State of Israel together with the
settlement authorities will persecute and prosecute the Jewish
settlements, for doing actions which are completely legal when
done between Jews and Jews and become a grave offence when
done between Jews and Arabs! And truly enough the settlements
were punished. But since this country "the settlements" are
a holy cow, because they are racist, a special privilege was
granted to those offenders who "broke the law." They were not
brought to court, on the accusation of this most horrible
"crime" of not being racists, but made "a deal" and bought
themselves off by giving "donations" to a mysterious fund!
It is important to recognize fully the contribution of these
Zionists institutions to the discriminatory practice in Israel. Ian
Lustick maintained that the task of these organizations was to pursue
Zionist objectives which the state could not do because of its formal
obligations to all its citizens (Jew and non-Jews). Consider the question
of the birth rate. The Israeli government sought to increase the birth
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rate of the Jewish family (as opposed to the Israeli family). Ben-Gurion
explained:
Since the problem of the birthrate does not affect all
the inhabitants but only the Jewish community, it cannot be
solved by the Government. Israel provides equal rights for
all its citizens without distinction of race and nationality
. . . Consequently if the Government plans to increase the
birthrate by providing special assistance to large families,
the main beneficiaries will be the Arab families, which are
generally larger than Jewish families.
Since it is only the Jews who need such incentives, the
Government is unable to deal with the problem, and the matter
should be transferred to the Jewish Agency or some special
Jewish organization. If the Jewish birthrate is not
increased, it is doubtful that the Jewish State will
survive.
Lustick elaborated more on the link between these Zionist institutions and
the state of Israel:
The role of the JNF, the Jewish Agency, and other
institutional components of the world Zionist movement in the
distribution of resources in Israel and the concentrated
development of the Jewish sector is augmented by common
statutory provisions which assure these institutions
representation on various public regulatory agencies,
marketing boards, and planning authorities. In addition,
during the early and mid-1960's, when financial contributions
from world Jewry were at a low ebb, the Israeli government
effected unilateral transfers of public monies into the
treasuries of the national institutions. Between 1959 and
1967, for example, the IsraelJL government donated over $100
million to the Jewish Agency.
Then he concluded:
What should be emphasized is that the existence of separate,
Jewish institutions such as the JNF and the Jewish Agency,
controlling as they do vast resources and not including Arabs
in the purview of their activities, enables the government to
use the legal system to transfer resources from the public
domain to the Jewish sector. It does this without
discriminating in the law between Jews and Arabs, but by
assigning responsibility for the disposition of those
resources (especially land and funds from abroad) to
institutions which are historical creations of the Zionist
movement with personnel imbued with the desire to consolidate
and strengthen the Jewish community in Eretz Yisrael."°
However, awareness of Israeli practice of discrimination and
apartheid has been growing in today's Israel. The Israeli press described
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the phenomenon of "racial purity" as "Jewish Nazism." The activities of
MENA (an organized group whose aim was to prevent Arabs from living in the
same apartment block or neighborhood as Jews), was the subject of an
article entitled "Ku Klux Klan in Upper Nazareth" written in the Hebrew
language daily Ha'aretz (December 12, 1983) by Heda Boshes. The writer
criticized the practice of racial discrimination against the Arabs.517
The "Institute to Search Social Problems in the Light of the
Halakha" issued a decision concerning the question whether Jews and non-
Jews should live together in the same neighborhood. The decision, which
was published in the Hebrew language daily Yediot Aharonot (December 25,
1983), stated that: "Jews and non-Jews should not live in the same
building."518 Journalist Aharon Bkhar described in the same newspaper the
Halakha's decision as a "racism of the ugliest sort." He wrote:
If such a decision were made by a Christian priest in
New York against Jews, we would witness a scandal there. And
here as well, all the hypocrites would crawl out and scream,
and they would be justified in doing so.
But when it is said here, and by a Rabbi, there is no
one to protest. No one has misused Jewish morality as was
done yesterday by a Rabbi. This Rabbi also condemned the
friendship that developed between Tel Aviv school children and
children in an Israeli Arab Village, claiming that this might
end with mixed marriages. What would we have said if a
Christian priest in New York, or the Moscow party secretary,
had said something similar about Jews? If this is the
Halakha, count me out!b1B
In an article published in Al Hamishmar (December 27, 1983) Yehoshua Sobol
made an analogy between the Halakah's decision and a similar practice of
Nazi Germany. He wrote:
After the rise of the Nazis to power, Alfred Rosenberg
established a sort of "Institute for Research on Judaism" .
. . in order to research the dangers to the Aryan society and
its culture from Judaism.
. . . One of the tasks of this institution was to give
the ideological legitimation for the uprooting of the Jews
from German society, to justify their removal into the ghettos
so that German society would remain clean of any contact with
the Jewish element.
And so the institute was able to state that German
property must not be sold to Jews; that all the property Jews
had ever purchased from Germans should be confiscated. And
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since there was to be no contact between Jews and Aryans,
Rosenbergs' Institute issued orders that Jews and non-Jews
were not to live in one neighborhood, that the Jews should
live separately. Obviously Rosenbergs' Institute could have
issued a decision forbidding Jews and non-Jews from living in
one and the same building.
Such a decision could have come out of Rosenbergs'
Institute since it fits with the Nazi doctrine concerning the
idea of racial separation. But this specific decision was not
issued by Rosenbergs' Institute, but by an institute operating
in Israel in the 80s—"The institute to research social
problems in the light of the Halakha."520
Sobol concluded:
Judaism as it is daily practiced by the Halakha priests has
long ago turned into a tool for the theological and
ideological justification of any racist crime performed in
this state, either by the authorities or by citizens with a
racist ideology.
Similarly, Shulamit Aloni (member of the Knesset) criticized the practice
of "separation" which took place in Jerusalem. He wrote in Yediot
Aharonot (December 11, 1983):
In order to renew and rebuild the Jewish Quarter in
Jerusalem, all its Arab inhabitants were ordered to leave.
No requests, no demonstrations, no press conferences could
stop this from happening. Even Burkan, who lived there in
rented flat and who wanted to buy a flat there for the full
sum of money which was required, failed in this attempt.
The Supreme Court decided that Burkan did not have the
right to purchase a flat in the Jewish Quarter—in spite of
the fact that he owned property in the same quarter—and that
this decision did not imply any discrimination since
separation of people according to religion in housing is
acceptable, and in Old Jerusalem people live in quarters
divided according to religion.
The directors of the Jewish Quarter and the Minister of
Justice Nissim were thinking of this court decision when they
refused to give permission to a Scandinavian Christian couple,
who came here for a year of study, to rent a flat in the
Jewish Quarter. In the Knesset on January 24, 1981, Nissim
emphasized that this decision was justified and it was in
accordance with the criteria of a democratic society to try
and keep the Jewish Quarter clean of Arabs and Christians, in
general.^
However, the attitude of MENA and other racist organizations that
called for separation should not be surprising when one listened to the
Israeli Minister of Agriculture (a member of the so-called "Socialist
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International") describing his own fellow citizens, the Palestinian Arabs,
as being cancer within Israeli society.523 Or consider the following
proposal by a prominent Israeli official (The Northern District
Commissioner of the Ministry of Interior), Israel Koenig, which
recommended to restrict job opportunities, housing, education, and family
payments for Israeli Arabs, and to stimulate their departure.524 After
pointing to the "danger" of the increasing rate of Arab population, Koenig
recommended:
... to redress the drastic situation by giving Arabs no more
than 20 percent of the available jobs; by changing the
selection system to reduce the number of Arab students in the
universities and encouraging the channeling of these students
into technical professions, physical and natural sciences and
thus to leave them with less time for dabbling in nationalism-
-also to make trips for students easier while making the
return and employment more difficult, which is to encourage
their emigration. [Payment of] big family grants to Arabs
should be transferred from the national insurance system to
the Jewish Agency or the Zionist Organization.525
On this Alfred Lilienthal commented: "Never has Israel's Zionist system
of classifying its citizens into Jews and non-Jews been more nakedly
exposed."525 It is obvious that Koenig's position reflected the entire
Zionist philosophy in dealing with the Palestinian Arabs. In the words
of the Israeli professor Sammy Smooha, "... the Arab minority is
considered hostile, and a potential fifth column which must be
contained."527 Their disloyality is assumed and thus "they are kept under
ongoing, covert official surveillance."528 Michael Hudson wrote:
There is not doubt that Zionism today remains an exclusivist,
particularist ideology, a throwback to the folk nationalism
of the mid-nineteenth century. Nor is there any doubt that
the behavioral manifestations of Zionism in the Israeli state
have given rise to systematic discrimination against Arabs,
both Muslim, and Christian, and also against Jews from Arab
societies.
Rehavam Ze'evi, a high ranking Zionist official (a retired general and
one-time head of the Central command) advocated the idea of "transferring"
the Palestinians. He said:
179
Two peoples can't live in one land. When they live in
one land, there is blood and fire . . . wherever in the world
two peoples live, sooner or later war begins between them.
Look at Lebanon, Ireland, Sri Lanka . . . It's possible to
live as neighbors, but in the same house—impossible. When
they live in the same house, the sorrows begin. When there's
a big national minority in a country, it begins to demand
rights, begins to demand autonomy, builds an underground which
starts planting bombs. Their children and ours begin killing
one another. Among us it's worse ... a minority that will
soon be the majority in this country. Look around here, as
we've done. Every [Arab] settlement is becoming a village,
every village a small town, every small town a city.
In a dozen years, according to the statisticians, the
numbers will be equal. In a democratic state where everyone
has the right to vote, they'll be the majority. In 13 years,
the prime minister, minister of defense and chief-of-staff
here will be Arabs . . . "°
Ze'evi admitted that expelling the Arabs from the Land of Israel has been
central to Zionism.. He stated:
. . . everything carried out by Zionism over the past 100
years has been precisely that—"transfer.1 Every place we
built here was on the ruins of an Arab village or city. I was
an officer in the Palmach in 1948 when we conquered Lod and
Ramleh. The inhabitants raised white flags. We asked our
commanders what to do. The second officer in charge of the
battalion, Yitzhak Rabin, answered: "expel them.' We said:
"What do you mean? How?1 He said: "that's an order from
B.fen] G.[urion].' And that's how it was—in Acre, Haifa,
Tiberius, and right .here in Salamea where there was also an
Arab village . . . "53T
Apartheid in Practice
Israeli practice of apartheid, according to Israel Shahak, has been
clearly manifested with regard to the land question. There has been a
"continued system of discrimination amounting to apartheid with regard to
the use of the land which has been confiscated,"532 Shahak said.
Examining the Israeli policies in the occupied territories, Shahak stated:
The land which has been confiscated, by whatever legal
subterfuges, is openly and officially devoted for the use of
Jews only, for the sole reason that they are Jews. Again,
accuracy in the use of terms and descriptions is important:
the confiscated land is not being officially devoted for the
use of Israeli citizens, for about 15 percent of Israeli
citizens are Palestinians. It is devoted for the use of Jews
whether they are citizens of Israel or the USA or of any other
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state . . . The racist policy practiced by the Israeli
government with the regard to the use of land, land unjustly
confiscated, is another form of racism, parallel to and as
wicked as the worst form of anti-Semitism.533
The situation inside Israel (as opposed to the Occupied Territories) was
not dissimilar. Shahak explained:
More than 90 percent of the land of Israel belongs to, or is
administered by, the Israel Land Authority. This land is not
administered for the benefit of all Israeli citizens. It is
administered exclusively for the benefit of Jews—whether
Israeli or American or from any other country—to the total
exclusion of all Palestinians and all non-Jews. It is
administered in conjunction with the so called Jewish National
Fund, a branch of World Zionist Organization, which invented
this racist rule with regard to the use of land. ^
The Israeli government established an official "committee for the
evaluation of land policies" with the task "to examine the aims of Israeli
land policy, of allocating land for housing and recommending laws
governing the work of the Israel Land Authority."535 Meir Shamir,
Director of the Israeli Land Authority, declared: "We have a definition
and the aim is that any Jew in the world is an Israeli citizen."536 As to
the Arab citizens of Israel, Shamir said: "our assumption is that, at
least at present, the mixed town in which Jews and Arabs live, is not the
way to live."537 The reason, as explained by Gur Arieh, then the advisor
on Arab Affairs to the Prime Minister, was that "if you let Arabs into
the Jewish towns which have difficulties . . . you prevent the Jews in
those towns from dominating the employment possibilities."538 Meir Shalmir
said: "we have been operating according to a government consensus on this
issue. I am not authorized to tell you whether there is any such
government decision written down anywhere." He added: "But I can tell
you from present knowledge that, in any case, these are the guidelines we
have received—not to encourage mixed areas of housing."539
Thus, Shahak found that the similarity with South African apartheid
seemed to be compelling:
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The infamous system of South African apartheid amounts to a
declaration by the government, which has all the power, that
certain areas of land will be open only to a particular kind
of human being, for their exclusive benefit, and closed to
others (the emigration policy will be carried out
accordingly). We should mention in the connection that more
than half of the land of West Bank and about 40 percent of the
land of Gaza Strip has already been confiscated and converted
into a closed domain ruled by racist regulations. These
regulations put the Palestinians in exactly the same situation
as the Blacks under the South African regime: they are
excluded by law—a racist, unjust law—from living on a huge
portion of their land.540
In another essay, Shahak suggested that the conditions of the
occupied territories "are actually, theoretically and officially worse
than in South Africa."541 He presented facts and figures:
In the West Bank the proportion of the land which had already
been confiscated by the beginning of 1987 was, according to
Israeli figures, 52 percent and according to Meron
Benvenisti's figures, 59 percent—in either case, more than
half. Jewish settlers number 60,000; the Palestinians
officially number 850,000—according to Benvenisti's more
realistic figures, one million. Take out your pocket
calculators; you will see the proportions. As for the Gaza
Strip, it has a higher human density than Hong Kong. 39.5
Percent of land there has been confiscated for exclusive
Jewish use. And 28 percent—not of the 39 percent but of the
whole area—has already been given to the settlers. Jewish
settlers in the Gaza strip number 2,500 and the Hebrew press
suspect that of these a few hundred are temporary residents-
-students, religious Jewish academics of Yeshivot. Let us
compare this with South Africa (and, of course, again you will
understand I am not praising the devil), if you take the 13
percent allocated for the blacks and the 80 percent for the
whites and compare it according to population, you will see
that Gaza strip is infinitely worse in terms of apartheid than
South Africa/5*2
Similarly, within Israel, the Palestinian residential areas have the same
problem of over-population. Louise Cainkar wrote:
The land around them has been confiscated and Palestinians are
not allowed to live in most Jewish areas. Homes are
overcrowded as building permits are regularly denied to "non-
Jews." Pursuing a policy of liquidating the historic Arab
quarters in mixed cities—cities such as Haifa, Jaffa, and
Acre. Palestinian Arabs are denied permits to renovate their
homes, many of which are on the verge of collapse. The
Palestinians are thus forced out. Municipal budget
allocations from the Israeli goverrunent keeps Palestinian Arab
cities and towns underdeveloped.
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Shahak cited what he considered another "clear case of apartheid," which
was the question of water distribution in the occupied territories. He
stated:
One of the first acts of the Israeli government after the
conquest of 1967 was to check on all the water consumption of
Palestinians, whether from wells or from springs, to install
meters on all the sources, and to prohibit Palestinians, and
Palestinians only, from drawing more water than they did
before that date except by a special license (very rarely
given). At the same time, settlers receive almost unlimited
permission to draw water, dig and drill new wells . . . And
control is very strict: buying new pumps is prohibited—even
spare parts—registering power pumps needs a special permit
and so on. By autumn 1987, according to official Israeli
data, the 60,000 settlers in the West Bank were using more
water than the 850,000 or million Palestinians.544
Shahak supplied many examples of "oppression and discrimination
inflicted on Palestinians"545 of the Occupied Territories. He maintained
that the Israeli rule "has been more totalitarian in all aspects of daily
life than previous regimes."546 He considered the Ottoman Turkish rule of
1905 as "more liberal than the Israeli occupation regime of 1985.ll547
Shahak explained:
All crosswords in the newspapers have to be submitted for
censorship, lest a word such as "homeland" should appear in
them. All obituaries in the press are likewise censored:
Quite recently an Arabic paper of East Jerusalem, Al-Sha'ab,
was closed for three days (together with the printing shop
whose sole offense was that it prints the paper) for the sole
"crime" of publishing the obituary of two Palestinians.
Censorship of the news and of expressions of opinion has
simply no limits as to what can be prohibited. It is
sufficient to state, by way of example, that translations of
news items from the Hebrew press about brutalities committed
by the occupation forces are frequently prohibited in the Arab
press. It is likewise prohibited to indicate that a
censorship took place by leaving white spaces in the middle
of an article which was mutilated by the censors.545
The Israeli Knesset passed the "law for prevention of terror" defining "as
a criminal offence any expression of a pro-Palestinian opinion "whether
in form of sounding an anthem or a slogan or in any other act. "l549 Shahak
further informs us that:
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A whole system of prohibitions applies to everything that the
censor can label as a "national symbol." It applies not only
to works of art, such as pictures, but even to combinations
of colors. I should mention here that not only is the
Palestinian flag strictly prohibited, both in the Occupied
Territories and in Israel, but in the Territories any
combination of the four colors of the flag, namely red, green,
black, and white, is also prohibited. For example (and this
is an actual example! ) a painting of a girl lying on the
ground surrounded by flowers was prohibited since the sharp
eye of the censor discovered that some of the flowers were
red, with green leaves too, and some were made black in
surrealistic style, and there were white spaces too; a clear
case of terror in the opinion of the Occupation regime! There
was also the case of a textile shop in East Jerusalem which
was observed, to the horror of the guardians of law and order,
to display shirts of the four colors in close proximity, and
was ordered not to do so anymore.
The following story of the "confiscated cake" seemed to be interesting.
Shahak related:
Out of literally thousands of examples, I will save time and
present another one only. When a new house was finished in
the town of El Bireh, a big cake was ordered for the
celebration party. The military governor had heard that this
cake was coated with icing in the four prohibited colors. He
sent an officer to the party, and the cake was solemnly
confiscated. Sl
Needless to say, that this ill treatment did not extend to the Jewish
settlers who live in the Occupied Territories. And for Shahak, this was
simply a plain apartheid whereby "the behavior of the state towards
different groups of human beings should be as different as possible."552
Shahak insisted "that the apartheid regime in the Occupied Territories is
actually worse than the apartheid in South Africa both in intentions and
in actuality."553 Shahak also suggested that the system of "courts and
police" gave more evidence of Israel's apartheid. He stated:
The civil courts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip do not have
any legal powers with regard to any Jews, especially the
settlers of course, but also all Jews, American ones too, even
in cases of traffic offenses (in spite of the fact that all
the judges are nominated by the Israeli Military Government).
Jews living or passing through the Occupied Territories can
not even be stopped by the local Israeli-commanded police.
If a settler forcibly steals a piece of land belonging to a
Palestinian and the local court issues an injunction, this
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injunction has no legal power and the robbery can continue.
In a similar way, enormous areas of the Occupied Territories
have been put under the municipal rule of the so called Jewish
"local councils" which have the power to give or deny permits
for the building of houses. In more general ways, by 1970,
the municipal rights of all Palestinian municipalities and
councils, rights established by the Ottoman Empire and kept,
more or less, by the British and the Jordanian regimes, were
abolished. From that date, no village or town in the Occupied
Territories has been allowed to issue permits for building new
houses; and recently, for the addition of a room to an
existing house.
Louise Cainkar cited another example which indicated different treatment
between Jews and Palestinians. She wrote:
Palestinians guilty of stone-throwing have been punished by
10 years imprisonment plus the destruction of the family home;
Jewish settlers were recently given three-year sentences for
planting bombs in Palestinian mayors' cars, which resulted in
severe bodily injury to two mayors ... In Israeli courts,
one Jewish soldier's testimony is often all that is necessary
to convict Palestinians arrested on "security" charges.
A report prepared by Meron Benvesti, a leading Israeli demographer, and
published in The New York Times, indicated that Israel was "sliding slowly
toward apartheid." Jewish settlers of the West Bank, have the same civil
rights of Israelis, including the right to vote; Arabs do not. Benvesti
observed that discrimination has already become institutionalized. For
example, the Knesset extended "social security" to include West Bank
residents, who are Israeli Jewish citizens or who are entitled to enter
Israel according to the Law of Return simply because they are Jewish.
Arab residents of the West Bank are not covered by social security.556
Benvesti concluded:
Arabs have been discriminated against ever since the state of
Israel has existed. Israeli Arabs live in the shadow of
discrimination in almost every sphere of life. The present
government only changed the style, not the context. Up till
now discrimination was justified by "objective' and
"practical' arguments, such as security . . . Now it seems
that the government doesn't need these delicate
explanations.
Writing on the same subject, Brice Harris pointed out:
Just as South Africa denies Africans in the Bantustans the
right to participate in Assembly elections, so Israel excludes
from Knesset elections the Arabs living in West Bank and Gaza
territories. The reasons are the same: that African or
Palestinian voters might threaten the dominant European
(Afrikaner Nationalist) or Jewish (Zionist) character of the
two states.
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The practice of apartheid has also manifested itself in the Israeli
policies that restrict the movements of the Palestinians.
Restriction of the Movements of the Palestinians
Palestinians from the Occupied Territories must carry with them all
the time an Israeli-issued identity card. Anyone caught without such a
card would be subject to punishment. The process is not dissimilar to
South African "Pass" laws. Shahak explained:
fha r? iSa?eli•faw.it is a crime for anv Palestinian from
the occupied territories—but not for a settler in the
occupied territories-to be inside the state of Israel at
!£ Jetween 1 a.m. and 5 a.m. Even if during those five
f1S- in bed'1he c°»*its a crime for which the usual
psent is several months in prison and a stiff fine But
the Israeli economy has become so dependent on Palestinian
labor from the territories, that if all were made to obey the
law, it would interfere with the Israeli economy. So there
is a system, unofficial but nonetheless carried out by the
Israeli police, that if those Palestinians workers who stay
in Israel illegally have been locked in from the outside
between 1 a.m. and 5 a.m., the police will not molest them
SL- P01.1^ have to know exactly where they are, so a
system of nightly control has grown up, carried out both by
P;hmcaenf2y voiunteer bodies called civilian guards, manned
m many cases by teenagers under military age. This is
Pf^\cuf y horrible because there is a ver/strong cruel
, k aii that age, and m any case people, if they are not
x**l'- W1tn -?ot volunteer for such work. This system, in
addition to its apartheid nature, provokes an enormous amount
of cruelty—of beatings up, of harassment etc.
One of the forms of control invoked is that Palestinians
always have to have their identification on them. toyoni
caught without an identity card is not only arrested and
heavily punished, but is also beaten on the spot To be
without an identity card is like being under fascist or na|i
occupation without papers—or like being in South Africa.8®
Palestinian cars are distinguishable from that of Israeli Jews: The plate
number of Palestinian cars are blue or white ones while Jewish settlers
have yellow plates.560 In the "new united Jerusalem" (where Arabs and Jews
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are supposed to be equal, as the Israelis claimed), a similar situation
existed: "Car plates for Arabs were distinguished by the first three
digits; Arab taxis had to be painted in a distinctive manner."561 it was
reported that "American visitors to Jerusalem who rode in Arab cars and
taxis have found themselves harassed at checkpoints."562 The following
story cited by Israel Shahak reflected the ill treatment of the
Palestinians.
One guard, stationed outside the French embassy, would, when
he saw Palestinians from the territories, stop them—and don't
ask me how he used to spot them; our Israeli answer would be
that ^ust as anti-Semites used to spot Jews, and quite often
they were not wrong, so these Jewish racists can spot
Palestinians. This guard, because he was stationary within
Sk- fSf? -^W gttes' di^l<: beat P^Ple, but he would
take their identification cards, and say: vRun to this mark
on the seashore, and if you run quick enough you will have
your identity card back, if not you will run again.' Only
when we finally got the French ambassador to intervene was the
S^wTS!* £°m ^hiS duty to an°th«. But hi wfsn'?
Srnn« hI~K^ °-*- Kia3 resP°nse bein9 that he had done nothing
wrong he hadn't beaten anybody, he had only asked them to
run. I mention this not only because of its apartheid nature,
but also because such cruelty became greatly intensified in
connection with the general rise in Jewish racism and
chauvinism during the summer of 1987.56"
This situation put into question the finding of Esther Cohen who, in her
book' Human—Rights in the Israeli-Occupied Territories, 1967-19R2.
suggested that "Israel's policy of balancing security measures with
economic, cultural, social, and civil liberties can be taken as a paradigm
for future occupations."564 Israel Shahak explained the restriction
measures of the Israeli authorities in the occupied territories and their
economic implications with regard to the Palestinians:
Everything in the occupied territories needs a permit. When
I say everything, first of all I mean agriculture Literally"
to plant one orange tree, any fruit tree, or one tomato plant
™,™^S °Wn* Pr°Pertv. (^is only applies to Palestinians, of
course) needs a special permit from the military governor
Jh1™« J^V1 .comP°sed of settlers is supposed to check these
things What is more, this order is being specially used to
St™^ m°re ^"k1 forms of Palestinian agriculture?
™s treesK need to be replaced every twenty to twenty-five
£?»n?inS,° hS °bvious wav to ruin the Palestinian orange
plantations in Gaza is not to give permits for replacements
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In addition, all imports from Israel are allowed into the
occupied territories, not only without customs barriers but
without any license, without any limitation. Imports from the
occupied territories to Israel, however, are strictly
prohibited, except by special order, which is only given if
there is a scarcity of a particular item in Israel.565
The occupied territories do not, contrary to the prevailing opinion
up to the current Palestinian uprising, constitute an economic burden for
Israel. Instead, they have been a source of revenue to Israel. Raja
Shehadeh, a Palestinian lawyer, stated:
The occupied territories represent to Israel not only a pool
of cheap labor and an unrestricted export market or dumping
ground" for its own goods, but also a source of revenue
through direct and indirect taxation that goes directly into
the Israeli treasury and is used for Israeli public
consumption.bbb
Shehadeh presented facts and figures to support his argument:
In 1986, Israel exported $730.3 million worth of goods to the
West Bank and Gaza, making the territories Israel's second
largest export market after the U.S. Israeli goods, meanwhile,
represented 89.4 percent of the occupied territories' imports
both in 1985 and 1986. Indeed, the territories are virtually
obliged to import from Israel because they have been cut off
from their traditional sources in the Arab world. Fees levied
on imports from Jordan are so high as to make them
uncompetitive. Direct imports from other countries are either
entirely banned or heavily taxed, with import duties reaching
200 and 300 percent.357
He further elaborated:
But while Israeli exports to the occupied territories are
unrestricted and competition from goods from other sources
virtually eliminated through duties and other controls,
Palestinian access to Israeli markets is sharply limited.
Palestinians cannot sell their agricultural produce in Israel
without permits, the issuance of which is severely restricted
in order to prevent competition with Israeli farmers.
Nonetheless, 73.2 percent of the territories' exports in 1986
were to Israel, most of which were re-exported. Indeed,
Israel totally controls the export of goods from the
territories by requiring that they be channeled exclusively
through Israel's own export marketing board, Agrexco, which
sells the produce at orofits accruing to Israel and under an
Israeli brand name. °
This situation led Meron Benvenisti, a former mayor of Jerusalem, to
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describe the economy of the occupied territories as "undeveloped, non-
viable, stagnant and dependent."569 Shannee Marks saw this dependency as
"a model for colonial society."570 She added: "Israel is no different
from the French in Algeria, the Belgians in the Congo, or the British in
Palestine."571 This put into question the findings of Esther Cohen, who
argued that Israeli economic policies "promoted the economy of the
occupied territories."572
The Israeli government declared (spring 1987) that "%local revenues'
would entirely cover expenditures in the occupied territories."573 it was
reported further that over the past twenty years of occupation "some $1
billion has been deducted from the wages of Palestinians working in Israel
for employee benefits for which they are not eligible, since they are not
residents of Israel."574 According to Meron Benvenisti "at least $250,000
of this *deduction fund1 has been used directly for Israeli public
consumption" while the rest was "used to subsidize the civilian
administration in the occupied territories."575 m addition to this,
Israel has benefited from the so-called "occupation taxes" (indirect taxes
paid by the Palestinians). It was reported that during the past twenty
years of occupation Israel gained $800 million, much of which has been
used for Israeli public expenditure.576 This situation led Alfred Moleah
to suggest that there has been a "colonial relationship" between Israel
and the occupied territories, whereby the latter "serves as a source of
cheap labor"577 and provides "Israel with a market for its goods."578 This
situation represents more evidence of Zionist racism.
The Palestinian Workers
The other question which connected with racism is the situation of
the Palestinian workers. It was reported that "in the West Bank 54
percent of the wage labor force is employed in Israel; in Gaza, 67
percent."579 Those Palestinian workers get paid half wage as compared to
that of Israeli workers.580 Azmy Bishara maintained:
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Palestinian workers in Israel save about $500 million for
Israeli employers in lower labor costs, not to mention the
amount they save the Israeli treasury in social security
benefits that they do not receive despite deductions from
their paychecks.58'
Similarly, Danny Rubenstein wrote in Davar (May 18, 1976):
... an Arab worker is extremely moveable, one can fire him
at one moment and transfer him from one place to another; he
does not strike and he has no 'claims' as the Israeli worker
has. In short, in many economic respects, the workers of the
territories are a treasure for the Israeli economy.582
Sheila Ryan stated that the occupied territories provided:
. . . thousands of workers for the most menial, miserable and
poorly paid jobs in Israel. Each morning these workers leave
their homes in Gaza and the West Bank to face a day of hard
work and racial discrimination; their labor goes not to build
a national economy of their own, but to augment the economy
of the colonial power which oppresses them . . . 83
The psychological cost for the Palestinian workers has been high. They
have felt a sense of humiliation knowing that their labor has been helpful
in advancing the Zionist cause.
In the occupied territories there has been a surplus of unemployed
Palestinians—a situation from which the Israeli government gained two
advantages: to satisfy its need for unskilled workers and at the same
time to distract Palestinians from their miserable conditions under
occupation.584 According to the Israel Economist (October 1971):
The Israeli government is channeling Palestinian workers into
the lowest ranks of the Israeli proletariat by denying work
permits to persons from the occupied territories for any job
deemed appropriate for unemployed Israelis and by referring
workers from occupied territories only to unskilled or semi
skilled jobs.585
Israel Shahak identified two categories of Palestinian workers. The first
one consisted of those who obtained work inside Israel through official
channel (Labor Exchange). It:
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. . . means that they register with their military governor,
who then, through his labor bureau, sends them to an Israeli
employer. The employer doesn't pay them directly, but through
the military governor, who deducts a third of their salary.
Thus, the Israeli employer pays the same salary as to
Israelis, so there will be no undue competition; but the
military governor takes a third of the money, puts in the Bank
of Israel, where it sits—I don't know what happens to it.
Through the military governor the worker obtains the rest of
the salary. °
The second group was the so-called "unorganized work," which was comprised
of workers who were vulnerable to the most severe exploitation. Those
workers used to:
. . . go to Israeli towns and hire themselves direct, in
places which are called, not only by the Hebrew press but by
everybody in conversation, "slave markets.' If you ask
anybody in Jerusalem, "where is the slave market?'--you don't
even have to specify "slave market for Palestinians'—they
will say, In Musrara. Go over there . . . 5ffr
It should be noted that workers in both categories have no protection
through a union because the Histadrut (General Federation of Workers of
the Land of Israel) does not accept workers from the occupied territories
as members. This resulted "in such phenomena as work obtained through
labor contractors, inferior social benefits, longer hours, and
vulnerability to discharge on arbitrary or economic grounds."588 Sheila
Ryan elaborated more on the conditions of the Palestinian workers:
The laborers from the occupied areas, especially agricultural
workers from Gaza, are often forced to reside temporarily in
Israel, illegally and in inhuman conditions, because the time
and cost of transportation to their own residence is excessive
. . . The Israeli police have been instructed to take firm
measures against [them] . . . Reports in the Israeli press
describe "entire families [from Gaza] including children and
toddlers sleeping overnight in the chicken houses of Jewish
farmers. Some employers lock their employees from the West
Bank and Gaza in at night, lest they be found in the streets
by the police, and the employer fined heavily. In March 1976,
three workers were sleeping in a warehouse at night when a
fire broke out; trapped behind locked doors, they died. ^
Despite such inhuman conditions, finding a job was not an easy task.
Shannee Marks, who lived in Israel many years, related:
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The workers coming in from Gaza already stand in the palm-
tree lined square of Gaza City at three in the morning. The
square of this sluggish town is so packed at that hour it is
difficult to drive through. Trucks, small half-open lorries
in which six people can sit knees touching knees on hard
benches, long Mercedes taxis, and private cars belonging to
*independent' Israeli employers pick up their passengers.
Those who know their destination in advance are the lucky
ones. They know that their trip is not going to be for
nothing. Many come with only the hope of finding work. Many
are dav laborers who are happy when they work one day in the
week.590
The foregoing findings should not be surprising for anyone who
realizes the norm of colonial relationships with a conquered people.
However, for some Zionist "socialists" like Itzhak Ben-Aharon (Secretary-
General of the Histadrut), such treatment of the Palestinians became a
source of embarrassment. Ben-Aharon "charged that Israel was ^building
Zionism1 on the backs of hired Arab labor from the occupied
territories."591 In this respect, Sheila Ryan argued that the "cultural
conflict" within the Zionist establishment "is not merely between racism
and humanitarianism, but between two different forms of racism": one
argued that Arabs should not be a part of the process of building Zionism,
while the other held that "Arabs are in fact precisely fitted to do the
hard and dirty work of Zionist society."592 To support her argument, Ryan
cited two examples. The first was a letter from a Zionist to the then
Prime Minister Golda Meir. It stated:
If Mrs. Meir wants to see Hebrew workers sweating away
on hot summer days, if it gives her pleasure, this is her own
business. But it cannot become the national criterion on
which to convince the public that we should not integrate the
economy of the West Bank . . .
Every Jewish mother wants her son to finish high school
and university and to become a chemist, technician, engineer,
or at least a trained plumber. Who is training the young
people of today for the simple tasks, carrying buckets of
cement or asphalt for road making? In the course of time we
shall in any case need Arab workers for building agriculture
and even industry. Immigrants are more and more people whose
professions are far from these simple tasks.
The second was a letter written by a Jewish Israeli woman to Moshe Dayan.
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It read:
Both I and my husband were born in a moshav in the
center of the country. Up until the Six Day War we lived
comfortably, worked hard and made an honorable living. Since
that war, however, things have changed dramatically, for my
husband, a capable man, has become a farm-work contractor.
His work involves no problems: labor is cheap and there
is a ready market. Today we have five Arab workers and we
have reached the point where no one on the moshav lifts a
finger. Nowadays my oldest son refuses even to mow the lawn.
"Let Mohammed do it," he says. And to ask him to shift the
irrigation pipes or do any manual labor is simply out of the
question. My children and the other children of the moshav
are, before my eyes, becoming rich men's sons of a base and
disreputable kind, whose work is done by servants. They do
not know how to drive the tractor standing in our yard and
they behave as if farm work is beneath their dignity.
Richard Stevens found that the relationship between the Zionists and the
Palestinian was basically similar to that between the whites and the
native Africans. He pointed out:
... in Israel as in South Africa, the alienation of the
indigenous peoples from the land has occurred as part of the
pattern of establishing and maintaining a settler state.
Unlike South Africa, however, Israel does not assign to the
"native" a primary role as laborer although this role, through
force of circumstance, is steadily growing. Israel like South
Africa, will increasingly need the cheap labor whose physical
presence it equally fears. 5
Louise Cainkar reached a similar conclusion concerning Israel's parallel
to South Africa. She maintained:
In both Israel and South Africa, industrial development is in
the hands of the ruling group and is confined to their areas.
The brunt of the hard labor, however, is performed by the non-
whites in South Africa and the Arabs in Israeli-controlled
territory. The result is the same in both places: workers
must either commute daily to work or spend the night in
cramped shelters, returning home on weekends for Palestinians,
one month a year for South African non-whites. Again, only
the difference in, the sizes of these two countries creates
this difference.395
She further stated:
In South Africa, non-whites were forced off the land from
which they drew their livelihood. The white minority
government then created Bantustans in areas that were
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economically unviable, forcing non-whites to seek jobs as low
level workers in the white economy. Israel has taken most of
the Palestinian people's lands and has crushed their economy,
thereby forcing Palestinian dependency upon the Israeli
economy. Palestinians who do not sell their labor to Israeli
industries, developments or farms suffer tremendously, and
their economic position resembles that of South Africa non-
whites who work inside the Bantustans. Palestinians from the
Occupied Territories who work in Israeli industries are about
on par economically with South African non-whites who sell
their labor to white industries. Both groups form a reserve
labor army, brought in and cast out according to the whims of
capital development. Just as the South African economy could
not survive without exploiting non-white labor, so the Israeli
economy is dependent for profits on the exploitation of Arab
labor. Neither groun of workers has any labor rights, "legal"
unions or benefits.
It is obvious that the Israeli policies in the occupied territories
are aimed to convince the Palestinians to leave the territories. This was
reflected in the position of Hagai Lev, one of the Herut leaders who
pointed to Israel's "particular problem" in the territories which "could
hardly be Jewish with a population of nearly 1 million Arabs and only some
200,000 Jews."598 Lev argued "that the Arabs would eventually get fed up
with their life under Israeli rule and leave "voluntarily."'599 He noted
that this has been the case since "the number of Arabs in the West Bank
has remained constant since 1967, even though the area has the highest
birth rate in the world."600
That was the situation of the Palestinian workers who lived in the
occupied territories. The conditions of the Palestinian workers who are
Israeli citizens are basically the same. Facts and figures indicated the
existence of disparities between them and that of Jewish workers. It was
reported that:
Only 14.5 percent of the Arab labor force is engaged in white-
collar jobs, as compared with 41 percent among the Jews (i.e.
government posts, administration, planning, management, free
professions, etc.), while 16 percent of Arabs and 5 percent
Jews are employed in cheap labor. 38 Percent of Arab workers
are employed in the construction industry and agriculture,
compared with 12 percent of Jewish workers. "To keep the
Arabs as water carriers and wood choppers' was the slogan
coined by an Israeli official (Lubrani) who was in charge of
Arab affairs in the late fifties.m
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Most Arab villages find work in the Jewish metropolitan areas as unskilled
or semi-skilled workers, especially in the construction industry and as
porters in hotels, restaurants, garages, etc. They leave their villages
between 5 and 6 a.m. and return home in the evening.602 Lustick noted that
"more often than not their status is not permanent and job insecurity is
high, especially during the periods of economic strain."603 When
questioned on this issue, a Labor Party leader in Haifa who handled the
Arabs' affairs answered: "... when you tell them [higher government
officials] about the boys' condition, you always get the same answer; they
weren't better off under the Mandate; boys in Arab countries are just as
neglected."604 Note that the white rulers in South Africa have advanced
the same argument: the black workers in South Africa are better off than
the black workers in other African countries.
The Israeli army represented another area of Zionist discrimination.
Lenni Brenner pointed to the "discriminatory" structure of the Israeli
army. He explained:
The Israeli army is officially discriminatory: Jewish males
are drafted as are the Druse males (they are Arabs, but their
religion is extremely accommodating to any powers that be),
but Christians are not drafted, though they may volunteer.
Town-dwelling Muslims (the majority of the Arab population)
are neither drafted nor permitted to volunteer (Bedouins are
allowed to volunteer—traditionally they have been
antagonistic to the town dwellers and indifferent to
nationalism, the very small Cirassian minority, who are
Muslims but not Arabs, are drafted.605
Serving in the army provides special economic benefits. Ian Lustick
wrote:
The possession of veteran status is a prerequisite to a wide
variety of jobs and public assistance programs. The personal
associations, as well as the rank and service records, a
soldier establishes in the course of regular service and
reserve duty are among the most important elements in the
determination of a future career in Israeli society . . . 60B
Since most Israeli Arabs were barred from the armed service, this meant
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that they were deprived of certain state subsidies and transfers
(university fee, housing, child allowance, etc.) which were associated
with military service. Although compulsory military service opened many
job opportunities which were closed to other non-Jewish citizens, it did
not save the Druze community from other Zionist discrimination such as
confiscating Druze landholdings and neglecting to develop Druze villages.
According to the Financial Times (November 10, 1982), an Israeli Druze
officer said: "The government is quite happy for me to fight and die for
the country. But after the army service I am treated as a second class
citizen, just like the rest of the Arabs here."607 It was reported that
this officer who has been wounded twice was at the time unemployed and
wanted to emigrate. Expressing resentment with Israeli unequal treatment,
the officer stated:
There is a lot of agitation in the West to force Russia to
release that fellow Shcharansky. But what will happen if he
is let out? He will come here and take over our land. My
family has lived here for more than ten generations. I have
fought in the army to defend Israel, but when he arrives,
Shcharansky will have more rights here than I do.608
Another Druze who was a law student at Tel Aviv University expressed
similar feelings:
The government doesn't give me the feeling that I am an
Israeli. Israel took away the land of the Druze for Jewish
settlements, and discriminates against Druze villages in the
financial assistance which it gives their local councils.
He pointed to the fact that Beit Jann (a Druze village) "receives only one
tenth of the annual government financial allocation given to the nearby
Jewish village of Ma'alot which has the same size population."610
Kibbutzim (a collective agricultural, military, and industrial
enterprise) is another area where Zionist racism has taken place. As a
part of the Zionist "cooperative" movement, the kibbutz, like the
Histadrut, has been a vehicle for the realization of the Zionist
philosophy of separation. The kibbutz is a very important organization
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which provides technical, financial, and social service assistance to
member settlements. Israel Shahak considered kibbutz's members (who often
claim to be "socialists") as "the worst racist in Israel."611 He referred
to the fact that a non-Jewish Israeli citizen "cannot be accepted as a
member in any Kibbutz, even in cases where a daughter of a Kibbutz fell
in love with one of its hired non-Jewish workers."612 Despite its
popularity in the U.S.A., the kibbutz, Shahak argued, "practices the
greatest degree of racist exclusion."613 He explained:
Since all non-Jews cannot become members of a kibbutz, because
of its official exclusive character, and because the kibbutzim
employ many temporary workers, under the misleading nickname
of "volunteers, romantic love has naturally bloomed between
young men and women under these conditions, in spite of all
official discouragement. Therefore, the Christian partners
had to be forced into conversion to Judaism, since without
such conversion they could not become members of a kibbutz.
A special school for such conversions was set up in Kibbutz
Sa'ad. The Hebrew press reported some years ago that the
Christian candidates for kibbutz membership, through
conversion, had to promise that in the future they would spit
when passing before a church or a cross. I regard it as
natural, although regrettable, that the American media did not
mention this interesting story. We can imagine what the
American media, not to mention the present American
Administration, would say had spitting before churches or
crosses been recommended in certain other countries.
Discrimination extended even against fellow Jews of non-European origin.
It was reported that those Jews who came from Arab countries "were often
referred to contemptuously as "hashechorim1 the dark ones."615 Their
behavior was seen as "primitive."616 It was also reported that "some
students, for example, refused to eat at the same table with those
Oriental Jew who work in the Kibbutz."617
Within the Zionist movement, Shahak observed, racism has no
connection with "left" or "right" learning. He criticized those Jews who
joined "socialist" or "communist" parties in order to promote Jewish
interests alone and at the same time kept silent about racist practices
in Israel.618 Their silence about the racist structures of the Kibbutz,
Shahak saw, was a case in point. Similarly, General Eytan (a leading
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right-wing Zionist), in exchange with critics, stated:
They [the Israeli left] call me a racist because I say what
I believe. But you will never see an Arab in a left-wing
Kibbutz or in one of their schools. Once they expelled a girl
from the Kibbutz for having married an Arab. The Left claims
that they want a democratic Jewish state. But what does that
mean, a democratic Jewish state? It means a state without
Arabs.519
Even the Peace Now movement in Israel (very popular in the West for its
"moderate" position concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict) was seen as a
racist movement because of its refusal to accept Israeli Arabs as members
in its organization.620
"Kiryat Arab," a Kibbutz settlement, proposed that all Palestinian
workers employed by it should be dismissed. Professor Asa Kasher of Tel
Aviv University criticized such "Nazi-like character and proposed that the
name of the settlement should be changed to "town of Nuremberg.1" He was
answered in the well-known Hebrew weekly Koteret Rashit "that all
Kibbutzim are as racist as Kiryat Arab."521 The following poem reflected
a growing awareness of Zionist racism among certain Israeli intellectuals.
Don't go to town of Nuremberg, Asa Kasher, Come with me to
Kibbutz "the Fields of Fuhrer,' and there with Jewish
members we will check if there is even one Arab member. It
will be simple and not difficult. Let us ask one of the
waiting Arab workers whom they despise to go out, and check
in their office. No one, not one Arab member Asa Kasher.
Not one would be found. For the kibbutzim which could be
called "Fields of Fuhrer1 or "Furrow of Stirmer1 are as
they could have said in German "Araber Rein'--"Clean of Arabs'
all of them have not one Arab member . . . 622
Shahak concluded:
It is my considered opinion that the State of Israel is a
racist state in the full meaning of this term: In this state
people are discriminated against, in the most permanent and
legal way and in the most important areas of life, only
because of their origin. This racist discrimination began in
Zionism and is carried out today mainly in cooperation with
the institutions of the Zionistic movement. "
As in South Africa, case laws are needed to "legitimize" the practice of
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apartheid and discrimination in Israel.
The Legal Framework of Racism
Unlike South African apartheid, Zionist systematic discrimination
was not explicitly recognized in the legal framework of the state of
Israel. Most Israeli laws are free of formal provisions for separate
development. However, laws were passed to sanction Zionist exclusivism
and to ensure the subordination of the non-Jews to the Jewish character
of the state. The law of Return which entitles every Jew (and only a Jew)
anywhere in the world to immigrate to Israel and obtain automatic
citizenship, is a case in point.
The Law of Return
Mick Ashley maintained that although Israeli discrimination against
the Arabs was embodied in the "application of laws concerned with land
acquisition, security, and citizenship, . . . Israel's racism is perhaps
seen most clearly in her July 1950 Law of Return."624 In his speech before
the Knesset (1950), David Ben-Gurion stated:
The Law of Return is one of the fundamental laws of the state
of Israel. It embodies a central purpose of our state, the
purpose of the ingathering of exiles. This law states that
it is not this state which grants Jews from abroad the right
to settle in it, but that this right is inherent by virtue of
being a Jew, if one wishes to settle in the country . . . This
right precedes the state of Israel, and it is this right which
built the state of Israel.625
The Law of Return is basically a law of immigration because it deals
with the immigration of Jews to Israel. However, it is called the Law of
Return because Jews, according to Zionist ideology, "do not "immigrate1
to Israel, but "return to it.1"626 Akiva Orr wrote:
The insistence on the latter term is an essential part of
Zionism. The Zionist movement did not aspire merely to create
a Jewish state, but insisted that this state be established
in biblical Zion. It considers the Jews who come to Palestine
as exiles returning to the homeland. The entire Zionist claim
to Palestine is based on this conviction. This is not mere
political expediency, it is a genuine conviction, and a
powerful emotional drive.627
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The Law of Return stated:
1. Every Jew has the right to immigrate to the country.
immigration
(b)
2. (a) Immigration shall be on the basis of
visas.
Immigrant visas shall be issued to any Jew expressing
a desire to settle in Israel except if the Minister
of Immigration is satisfied that the applicant*
(1) Acts against the Jewish nation; or
(2) May threaten the public health or state security or
(3) Has a criminal past liable to endanger public peace.
3. (a)
(b)
A Jew who comes to Israel and after his arrival
expresses a desire to settle there may, while in
Israel, obtain an immigrant certificate
The exceptions listed in article 2 (b) shall apply
also with respect to the issue of an immigrant
certificate, but a person shall not be regarded as a
threat to public health as a result of an illness that
he contracts after his arrival in Israel.
4. Every Jew who migrated to the country before this law goes
into effect, and every Jew who was born in the country
either before or after this law is effective, enjoys the
same status as any person who migrates on the basis of
this law.
5. The Minister of Immigration is delegated to enforce this
law and he may enact regulations in connection with its
implementation and for the issue of immigrant visas and
immigrant certificates.628
The Law of Return embodied the fundamental principles of Zionist ideology
which saw Israel as "the sovereign state of the Jewish people." Roselle
Tekiner explained:
Its sovereignty is not limited to the Jewish citizens of the
existing State of Israel. It claims as Jewish nationals all
hvrfh2S4fSerreK fci?Ky live in the world' who are recognizedby the state to be the descendants of the inhabitants of the
Israelite nation that existed over two thousand years ago.
In other words, there is no Israeli nationality status defined
by the geographic boundaries of the state. There is an
extraterritorial Jewish nationality which is accorded to all
who are said to be descendants of Abraham, to whom, according
to Biblical accounts, God promised the land of Canaan. Arabs
are Israeli citizens, but they are not citizens by return
This means they do not possess nationality in Israel, for the
inn^H /t°Pit natipnality is the only nationality status
accorded by the state. It means that they are not served by
fh»fS?h(Zl°niSt) institutions. The practical consequeJSe is
that they occupy a permanently disadvantaged position ®*
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Palestinian Arabs, who became refugees from areas that became part
of Israel in 1948, were denied entry into Israel. Ashley suggested that
"this blatant discrimination against the Palestinians surpasses anything
practiced in South Africa."630 Although they are second or third class
citizens, Ashley continued to say, black Africans, unlike the
Palestinians, are "allowed to live within the border of [their]
homeland."631 Following the emergence of the Palestinian refugees problem,
Israel ■ rejected all United Nations resolutions which called on it to
recognize the right of these refugees to return to their homes. At the
same time, Israel has continued to demand more Jewish immigration. Ahmed
Khalil, a Palestinian lawyer, now in exile, touched upon this point when
he said:
I was born in Haifa, and so was my father and my grandfather
Now I am a refugee. Golda Meir was born in Russia, educated
in America, and now she is Prime Minister of my country I
studied law with Abba Eban in Cambridge. He was born in South
Africa and educated in England. Now he lives in my country
and I can t.
Mick Ashley commented:
It is immoral for Jews to quote the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights as giving Russian Jews the right to leave or to
return to their country, while as Zionists they continue to
support the denial of this right to the Palestinians. It is
also morally wrong for non-Israeli Jews to support the
dispossession of the indigenous Arabs by Jewish settlers on
the grounds that it is a Jewish homeland, while they continue
to ignore Israel's Law of Return. Hypocritically most non-
Israeli Jews welcomed the Law of Return as the fulfillment of
the ingathering of the exiles, but 80 percent of them voted
w?ains633lt Wlth their feet by remaining in the land of their
birth.
The Law of Citizenship (The Nationality Law)
The Law of Return has direct connection with the Law of Citizenship
of 1952 (better known as the Nationality Law) "which states that any Jew
who comes to Israel by virtue of the Law of Return becomes—automatically-
-a citizen of Israel."634 Article 2 (a) of the Nationality Law stated that
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"every Oleh [an immigrant Jew] under the Law of Return shall become an
Israeli National."635 Article 2 (b) of the same law stated: "Israeli
Nationality by return is acquired by a person having come to Israel as an
Oleh after the establishment of the state with effect from the day of his
Aliyah [immigration]."636 it is interesting to note that the citizenship
in this case would be granted automatically without applying for it on the
part of the Jewish immigrant. Orr wrote:
There is no need for an immigrating Jew to go through any
legal procedure in order to become a citizen. Quite the
opposite. Such an immigrant must go through a legal procedure
in order to ensure—if he so wishes—that he does not become
a citizen of Israel. Many Jews who came to Israel from
countries which do not permit dual citizenship, and were
unaware of the extraordinary nature of the Israeli Law of
Citizenship, discovered—often to their dismay—that they lost
their former citizenship when they failed to declare on
arrival that they did not wish to have Israeli citizenship
imposed upon them."' *
The granting of "Jewish nationality," Roselle Tekiner argued,
provided "special privileges" which have not been clearly recognized by
foreign observers. She maintained that, unlike the United States, there
is, in the Israeli case, "a major difference between ^citizenship' and
*nationality.'" The vagueness stemmed from the "'Jewish people'
nationality status, which is unique in the world because it applies to all
persons of one religion, wherever they live, but does not apply to
citizens of the state itself that are not of the specified religion."638
She further explained:
"Nationality" is not merely a social identification with some
political connotations that is applied to the various
religious and/or ethnic groups within a state, as in many
Eastern European and Middle Eastern countries. In Israel,
Jewish people1 nationality is regarded as a concept of
international law. This opinion was stated in the Eichmann
Trial Judgment of 1961. Israel's highest court held, "The
Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate, given by the
League of Nations to Great Britain, constitutes an
international recognition of the Jewish people.""^
Indeed, Tekiner argued, "there is no Israeli nationality in Israel
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Jews must indicate their nationality as 'Jew.' Others are identified as
'Arab1 or 'Druze,' etc. . . . ii 640 To clarify this, Tekiner cited the case
of George Tamarin.641 Tamarin, a Jewish Israeli human rights activist,
demanded "that his nationality identification be changed from 'Jewish' to
'Israeli.111 His request was rejected by the Interior Ministry and later
by the Supreme Court. The Court decision "stated that the desire to
create an Israeli nation separate from the Jewish nation is not a
legitimate aspiration." it further emphasized "that a division of the
population into Israeli and Jewish nations would create a schism among the
Jewish people and" thus "negate the foundation on which the State of
Israel was established." The Court decision also stressed: "There is no
Israeli nation separate from the Jewish people. The Jewish people is
composed not only of those residing in Israel but also off Diaspora
Jewry."
Contrary to the seeming clarity of the Law of Return, many problems
arose from different interpretations. The case of Oswald Rufeisen642
represented another confusion regarding the definition of "Nationality"
and "Religion." Rufeisen is a Polish Jew who converted to Catholicism
during the Second World War. in 1958, he immigrated to Israel demanding
Israeli citizenship in accordance with the Law of Return. He considered
himself as a Jew by nationality and a Catholic by religion. His request
to consider him as a Jew for the purpose of "return" was rejected by the
Israeli government and by the Supreme Court later. Instead, he "was
granted residence in Israel under the Entry into Israel Law (1952), and
subsequently, citizenship (by 'residence,' not by 'return1)." Eventually
Rufeise was "registered under the Population Registration Law (1965) as
Israeli by citizenship, indefinite (blank) by nationality and Catholic by
religion."
The other case was that of Major Benjamin Shalit643 (an atheist of
Jewish descent) who together with his wife Ann Shalit (an atheist of
Christian descent) "demanded that their children be registered as Israeli
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by citizenship, Jewish by nationality and indefinite (blank) by religion."
The Israeli government refused their request but the Supreme Court ruled
in favor of the Shalits. However, two months later, the Israeli Knesset
passed an amendment to the Law of Return (1950) and to the Population
Registry Law (1965) aimed "to prevent the ruling from becoming a legal
precedent."644 Another amendment to the Law of Return was made by which
the Minister of Interior was empowered to grant Israeli citizenship even
prior to immigration to Israel.645 it was reported that the purpose of
this amendment was to make it easier to the Soviet Jews to immigrate to
Israel.646 The Minister of Interior was also empowered "to withdraw the
Israeli nationality of any person who has performed an action involving
disloyalty to the State of Israel."647 Needless to say, the main target
here is the Israeli Arabs. On the other hand, the Minister of Interior,
according to another amendment, was empowered "to grant Israeli
nationality to the inhabitants of the occupied territories."648 This was
directed to those Arabs who collaborated with the Israeli authorities.
To ensure their safety, a special arrangement was made whereby the granted
Israeli nationality might not be stated in the identity card.649
Christopher Mansour and Richard Stevens suggested that the religious
authorities (with the full support of the Israeli government) have
contributed to what they considered a similar South African racism.650 By
allowing the Rabbinical courts to rule on matters of who is a Jew and the
issues of marriage and divorce, the religious authorities have influenced
»i651
The
"the applicant's ability to claim Israeli citizenship as a Jew.
Akwitz family's652 problem is a case in point. The father (a Russian Jew)
and the mother (a Russian Christian) emigrated to Israel with their two
children. when the oldest son applied for the Army, he was rejected
because "he was classified as a Russian and a Christian." a Jew in Israel
"means a person who was born of a Jewish mother or who has become
converted to Judaism and who is not a member of another religion."653 Such
a device, Mansour and Stevens contended, enabled "the Israeli government
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[to] neatly sidestep any charge of legislated discrimination by leaving
the classification of the inhabitants to the rabbinical courts."654
The problem of Mrs. Rita Eitani655 added another case to the Zionist
record of racism. Mrs. Eitani, a German immigrant, was able to enter
Palestine clandestinely after the beginning of the Second World War. She
became an active member in the Mapi (the right wing of the ruling Labor
party at the time), and subsequently served in the Israeli army where she
established a distinguished career. Because of some tension between her
party and the Social-Religious party, rumors went around that Mrs. Eitani
was not a real Jew on the grounds that she was born of a non-Jewish
mother, and that she had never converted to Judaism. The matter was
exploited by the other rival party. Thus a request for information from
the German registration bureau concerning the origin of Mrs. Eitani's
mother was made. It was found that her mother was not a Jew. Thus, Mrs.
Eitani was asked "to give back her passport on the grounds that she had
obtained her Israeli nationality by fraud." Further, "her marriage with
a Jew was found invalid as civil marriage is not recognized in Israel."
Her chance to be converted to Judaism was not there because the rabbis
would realize that the case would not be inspired by real faith.
Eventually Mrs. Eitani was fired from her work. On this, George Jabbour
commented:
This case illustrates clearly the discriminatory practices of
Israel with regard to its citizens. Israel and other settler
states abound with such examples. The purity of blood which
was the catch-word of the Nazi German regime, is also the
catch-word of the settler regimes in South Africa, Southern
Rhodesia and Israel.
Similarly, Haim Cohen, one-time judge of the Israeli Supreme Court,
declared:
The bitter irony of fate has decreed that the same biological
and racist arguments extended by the Nazis, and which inspired
the inflammatory laws of Nuremberg, serve as the basis for the




The process of "Registration of Birth" represented another area of
Zionist discrimination. Birth certificates for Jews list the following
categories: Religion, Nationality, Citizenship of the Infant at the Date
of Birth. Birth certificates for non-Jews list the following categories:
Religion and Confession, Nationality, Citizenship of the Infant at the
Date of Birth.658 Uri Davis held that there was a significant difference
between the two cases:
In the case of the Jewish infants, the registration of
religion alone is stipulated. The registration of confession
(orthodox, conservative or reform) is not required, presumably
in order not to undermine the effective state-supported
monopoly of the orthodox Jewish confession in Israel. [It
should be] noted [that] conservative and reform Jewish Rabbis,
who may legally lead their congregations in all parts of the
world outside the territory of the state of Israel, cannot
legally officiate in the Jewish state.
In the case of non-Jewish Palestinian Arab infants,
however, the registration of confession (for example, Sunni
Muslim, Shia Muslim) is mandatory, in line with the supreme
policy of all Israeli governments to consolidate confessional
divisions within the non-Jewish population.659
Davis pointed to what he called another "shocking practice." While "the
citizenship of the Jewish infant is registered as Israeli at the time of
his or her birthday, the citizenship of the non-Jewish Arab infant is left
indefinite at the time of his or her birth."660 Davis stated:
Both babies were born in the state of Israel. Both birth
certificates were issued by the State of Israel, Ministry of
the Interior, Population Registry Division. For the clerk at
the Population Registry Division at the Ministry of the
Interior a Jewish infant in the state of Israel has Israeli
citizenship at birth, but an Arab infant in the state of
Israel is devoid of citizenship and is, therefore, stateless
at birth.
The World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency (Status) Law
Another Israeli law which "legally" discriminates against the non-
Jews is the World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency (Status) law, which
was passed by the Knesset in 1952. This law coordinated the efforts of
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the Israeli government and the Zionist institutions in order to achieve
"the central task" which is the "ingathering of the exiles."651 In this
respect, Alfred Lilienthal commented that "... the other side of the
coin was that more Palestinians had to be removed, let alone not permitted
to return home, to make room for incoming Jews."652 The Status Law charged
the Zionist organization (JNF, WZO, JA) with the matters concerning
settlement of immigrants and the development of the country. However,
these organizations:
. . . have no desire or inclination to aid or even acknowledge
the presence of the non-Jewish Arab inhabitants of the State
of Israel. And yet these organizations have been granted a
quasi-governmental status to the extent that they are "a state
within a state, and have control over many public functions
which are normally reserved for the government. They control
immigration policies and thus grant special economic and
financial benefits to new Jewish immigrants. They provide
tlnh^nH?t^ents cities and villages with financial and
technical aid that is denied Arab villages.5"
Roselle Tekiner argued that "the Status law is the most significant of the
vfundamental laws' for recognizing Israel's legal clandestine racism."664
She further pointed out:
A nation which codifies in a fundamental law that its "central
task is to serve one particular group of citizens, identified
by ancestry (born of a Jewish mother) or by reliqion
irtnSf^K S ^daism) is racist, according to the definition
adopted by the General Assembly in 1965. This definition is,
as stated earlier, "any distinction, exclusion, restrictioA
or preference based on race, color, descent or national or
ethnic origin. if Zionism's discriminatory principles were
incorporated in a constitution, as in South Africa, its racist
nature would be open to view and condemned by the world
Instead, it is given lowered visibility by specifying the
discrimination in the inconspicuous Status Law/6"
And then concluded:
In short, the Status Law legitimates an arrangement between
ASencv^thf^V"? ^e £Orid .zioni=t Organization/Jewish
*?,f^yl ?u& effe,Ct ■ °u whlch is Permanent discrimination
against the non-Jewish sector of Israeli citizenry. The
Status Law makes the government a full and equal partner in
activities which provide advantages to citizens by return
which are legally denied to other citizens **
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In the same line of thinking, Alan Taylor pointed to the racist nature of
Zionism and its discriminatory practices.
The net result of these executive policies, legislative
actions, and judicial decisions has been to maintain Israel
as an exclusivist State. The assignment of an ethnic-
SX210^ aS £he Riding principle of national character
IJePlrateS ,ISVrael from other Polities. Whereas,
^tlZen°f France' for example, becomes "French"
blctmt "iIZLf* Sr%°ial Sense' a citizen °f Israel does not
become Jewish. if he is a Jew he is registered as such and
gains immediate rights of full citizenship and participation
in the national ideal upon entry as an immigrant, if he is
ff h2"«W' .?tatus is automatically subordinate, whether
it be as an undisplaced Palestinian or an immigrant subject
to the residence requirement for naturalization. The
discrimination, both implicit and explicit, against non-
The discussion in this chapter clearly indicated the settler
colonial character of the Zionist movement. The course of the Zionist
enterprise was similar in essence to that of European colonialism in
Africa and Asia. The Zionist project was set up to establish an exclusive
colonial settlement with the support of the colonial powers. The link
with the British colonial power indicated the reactionary nature of the
Zionist movement. This has also been manifested in current imperialist
support to Israeli policies. in addition to its colonial character,
Zionism is a racist ideology. This was manifested in the argument that
the Jews make up a "chosen/pure race" which should not be assimilated with
other "inferior races." As is the case with every colonial movement,
Zionism has constantly tended to dehumanize the image of the local
population. This has been manifested in the widespread prejudice and
discriminatory policies against the non-Jews. The practice of apartheid
is not dissimilar in essence to that of South Africa. In practical terms,
Zionist exclusiveness meant that the native Arabs, both Christian and
Muslims, were to be excluded from participating in the social and
political life of the state. In the Jewish state, the Jews alone are
entitled to special political and economic privileges. Unlike South
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African apartheid, Zionism's systematic discrimination was not explicitly
recognized in Israeli laws. However, the Law of Return, the Law of
Citizenship, and the Status Law were passed to sanction Zionist
exclusivism and to ensure the subordination of the non-Jews in Israel.
Thus, far from being a progressive movement, Zionism is a colonial racist
enterprise.
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Chapter IV
Conclusion
I went to Israel recently, and enjoyed every moment there.
I told the Prime Minister when I got back that as long as
Israel exists we have a hope. If Israel should, God forbid,
be destroyed, then South Africa would be in danger of
extinction. "
This statement was made by General Hendirk Van den Bergh, head of
South Africa's Bureau of State Security (BOSS), as quoted in Zednek
Cervenka and Barbara Robers, The Nuclear Axis (New York: Times Books,
1978), p. 311.
During the Israeli invasion of Lebanon (1982), an Israeli family was
sailing in the Green islands where they were shocked by the feelings of
hostility of everyone they met, even traditionally friendly Western
Europeans. However, a couple from South Africa were exceptional. They
welcomed the Israeli family by saying: "You're just like us. We're
outcasts too."1
The story serves to explain a growing phenomenon—that Israel, like
South Africa, is a pariah state outside the international community, in
his article "The Club of Pariahs," Kenneth Adelman suggested that Israel,
like South Africa, is an international pariah.2
The relative isolation is due to the uniqueness of the two
countries. South Africa is a unique state where apartheid is official and
de jure. The white minority (16 percent of the total population) exerts
virtually total political, economic, and military power. Israel is also
unique, for it was established as a refuge for the Jews who were victims
of prejudice and persecution. However, the reality (which has often been
ignored or rationalized) that another people had to be robbed of their
land and the Palestinians had to be discriminated against or expelled
suggested increasing similarities between the two situations. The Zionist
treatment of the Arabs under Israeli control was equated with Pretoria's
barbaric handling of Africans. In 1975, the U.N. passed a resolution
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equating Zionism with racism and comparing it to apartheid. In 1978,
Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky asked: "When are people going to
investigate the apartheid system in Israel?"3 Returning from a trip to
the Middle East (September 1985), congressman George Crockett suggested
that "a system of apartheid exists on the West Bank and Gaza under the
Israeli military occupation."4 For Israel, the analogy with South Africa
is very upsetting, it is seen by Israeli officials as "a disgusting and
unfair comparison," which has "more than a little anti-Semitism behind
it." In a lecture given to the School of Law, Tel Aviv University,
Raphael Eitan, a member of the Israeli Knesset (Chief of Staff of the
Israeli army during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon), stated:
I don't understand this comparison between us and South
Africa. What is similar here and there is that both they and
we must prevent others from taking us over. Anyone who says
that Blacks are oppressed in South Africa—is a liar. The
Blacks there want to gain control of the White minority just
like the Arabs here want to gain control over us. And we,
too, like the White minority in South Africa, must act to
prevent them from taking us over. I was in a gold mine there
and I saw what excellent conditions the Black workers there
have. So there are separate elevators for Whites and Blacks,
so what? That's the way they like it.f
However, many observers (including Israelis) believe that the
analogy with South Africa became inescapable. In January 1988, Shlomo
Avineri, a prominent Hebrew University political scientist close to
Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, suggested that "by the year 2000 we will
look into the mirror and we will see South Africa."7 Nevertheless,
Avineri's vision of the future has already materialized in the occupied
territories. The Chairman of the Israeli League for Human and Civil
Rights, Dr. Israel Shahak, maintained that the Palestinians' "conditions
are actually, theoretically and officially worse than South Africa."8
Examining the situation in the occupied territories, the Israeli newspaper
Haaretz stated that while "South Africa abolished the 'pass laws' for the
non-white residents," the Jewish state "is liable to find itself now on
the road that South Africa abandoned."9 The Israeli handling of the
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current Palestinian intifada (uprising) reflected typical South African-
style confrontations between stone-toting youths and heavily armed army
units. However, the parallel with South Africa is not only a matter of
similar repressive techniques used to quell restless natives. Rather, the
analogy runs deeper to the philosophies of exclusiveness and separateness,
which are the basic principles of the ideologies of apartheid and Zionism.
An ideology is a set of beliefs and values which rationalizes a
society's structure of power and privilege. It can be used by the ruling
groups or by those who oppose the system. An ideology that explains and
justifies the status quo is called the dominant ideology. "The
beneficiaries of a dominant ideology rationalize their role by false
claims which they want the dominated to believe, because this facilitates
dominations."10 However, according to Heribert Adam, an effective ideology
must address both subordinate and superordinate groups. In other words,
"a ruling group too must feel morally comfortable with its ideology."11
The divine right of kings was an effective ideology during Europe's Middle
Ages. European colonialism of the nineteenth century justified its
domination over the natives on the basis of biological and moral
superiority—a rationale also used by whites of North America in their
handling of both black and native Americans. Hence the idea of the "white
man's burden" which was used to rationalize all European expansions. The
inferiority of the natives was a basic theme used in Palestine and South
Africa by the European settlers who leaned heavily on the West's racism
and its deep prejudices about the Orient.
Zionism and apartheid are both products of the European nationalism
which emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century.12 Alfred
Moleah maintained that the origin of Israeli Zionism and South African
apartheid "are an idea—an idea that has become a material force."13 Ali
Mazrui believed that "both Zionism and Afrikaner nationalism have borrowed
from the anti-pluralistic and exclusivist tendencies of German
nationalistic thought as a special case of European nationalism."14 a
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common feature of the two ideologies, according to Steve Goldfield and
Hilton Obenzinger, "is a mixing of national and racial identities and
aspirations, often symbolized as bult, or blood, i.e., genetic purity."15
Heribert Adam considered Israel and South Africa as ethnically divided
societies whereby "the ruling group ideology is enshrined in law or custom
at the expense of secular citizenship rights," and where there "are second
class citizens, almost outside the polity, who are perceived as
untrustworthy by birth."16
However, the two types of colonialism are different. Fred
Halliday,17 Eqbal Ahmed,18 and Edward Said19 maintained that Zionist
colonialism seeks to "expel," "exclude," and "eliminate" the indigenous
population while Afrikaner colonialism involves occupying and exploiting
the native population. Israel and South Africa represent the world's only
remaining example of a settler-colonial regime.20
Settler colonialism is the movement of permanent settlement of
people from one country to the other. The indigenous people are seen as
a cheap labor source and, at the same time, as a part of the hostile
environment that needs to be overcome.21 Settler colonialism has a
tendency "to move toward exclusivism, exploitation, oppression, and
racism."22 it is different from traditional colonialism in that the ill
treatment of the natives in the former situation "is more systematic,
intense and brutal" than that in the latter situation.23 As Alfred Moleah
put it, "all colonialism has a racist predicate but settler colonialism
has virulent racist predicate."24 The interests of the settler-
colonialists are in contradiction to those of the natives and on some
occasions to the parent country. The settlers tend to secede from the
sponsoring power and establish their own supremacist system, which is
characterized by a ruthless oppression of the natives.
A common feature of settler regimes is the question of security.
These regimes, according to Eqbal Ahmed, are insecure unless three
conditions are fulfilled:25
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1. A solution to the "native problem" is found.
2. A decisive hegemony over neighboring countries is established
or at least a normal relationship with them is accomplished.
3. A certain autonomy from its sponsoring power is obtained.
Settler regimes succeeded in the U.S. and Canada, but failed in Kenya,
Algeria, Angola, and Zimbabwe. South Africa has tried (not very
successfully) to fulfill the third condition. The increasing resistance
of the Africans has made apartheid unworkable. The establishment in
Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe of independent government has intensified
the white's sense of insecurity. Furthermore, the South African whites
have a demographic problem that cannot be overcome. Israel, for its part,
"is trying to fulfill all three conditions simultaneously."26 Like South
Africa, Israel has succeeded in establishing a great deal of independence
from the core.27 However, in terms of independence that is based on
economic strength, Heribert Adam,28 Uri Davis,29 and Brice Harris30 believed
that South Africa, because of its abundant resources of gold, coal, and
strategic minerals, is in a better position than Israel. On the other
hand, having made themselves a majority in the land of Palestine, the
Israelis feel more secure than the whites of South Africa. Unlike South
Africa, Israel enjoys unconditional Western support, which helped
continual Israeli colonization of Palestine.
All movements of colonial settlement need land. From the beginning
of the colonial era until the age of imperialism, non-European lands were
seen as being "free" or "vacant" land available for permanent European
settlement. That was manifested in the European description of America,
in the Afrikaner description of South Africa, and in the Zionist
description of Palestine. The main concern of the newcomers was the
question of acquiring land. That was the case in Palestine and South
Africa.
Both Israel and South Africa started as immigrant societies of
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technologically superior settlers who managed to seize land and overcome
the resistance of the local population. The settlers, in both cases,
succeeded in occupying the coastal areas and pushed the natives into the
interior, in the course of time, the settlers had sought more favorable
locations further inland. In both societies, European immigrants were
able to create a political structure in which they and their descendants
control the political process and thus enjoyed superior socio-political
status. They have used their superior technology and close connection
with the West to ensure their domination. The resistance of the
indigenous population (seen by the settlers as terrorism) has continued
in both societies. The Zionists and the South African whites have tried
to convince the world that the conflict in the Middle East and Southern
Africa was entirely the fault of the Arabs and Africans because of their
refusal to accept the Jewish state and the white regime, in the Zionist
case, the process of colonial expansion (called frontier) is still taking
place as the Israeli government supports new Jewish settlement in the
occupied territories. Leonard Thompson and Howard Lamar contended that
today's Israel represents a present case of "a frontier situation" which
is basically characterized by:
Settlement by people with a technology superior to that of the
"indigenous" inhabitants and with access to the skills?
products, and capital of the industrialized West; their
creation of a bridgehead behind the shelter of colonialism;
SStiS^Si °f 3! f08^011^1 State; and their victories iAfrontier wars, followed by the incorporation and settlement
of conquered territory, the expulsion of many of the
indigenous people, and the subjugation and segregation of
those remaining. The Israeli frontier is still "open " with
h^Sar^lc cou?t.e+rraid^ takin9 Place across its contested
tK^EX '«j"1-?** rema*ns £° ** seen whether, when it closes,
the state of Israel will be secure or whether it will have
Se?^emera thS White settle»ents in tropiSl
In the Zionist case, Palestine was simply declared empty. The most
appealing Zionist slogan has always been "the land without people for a
people without land." Such a slogan, according to Eqbal Ahmed, "was not
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an expression of sheer ignorance," instead "it was an ideological
statement, the declaration of a political program totally congruent with
the contemporary ethos of imperialism."32 The claim of uninhabited
Palestine was part of the Zionist strategy set forth by Herzl, who (after
a meeting with the British Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain) stated:
". . . if I could show him [Chamberlain] a spot in the English possession
where there were no white people as yet, we could talk about that."33 To
the founding father of the movement, Zionism was a colonial enterprise
requiring imperialist sponsorship.
However, the problem was that Palestine already had a people, (in
1918 there were 56,000 Jews out of a total population of 700,000; and in
1946 there were 608,000 out of a total population of 1,900,000.M) By
1948, Palestinian Arabs comprised 67 percent of the population and owned
over 90 percent of the land.35 This is, of course, after decades of Jewish
immigration.) Eventually the Israelis became a majority after the
forceful transformation of the Palestinian inhabitants in 1948 and in
1967. in today's Israel the Arabs comprise 17 percent of Israel's four
million people in addition to 1.2 million Arabs in the occupied territory.
The premise of Herzl was to "spirit away the population." Arthur
Ruppin, the chief architect of early Zionist colonization, declared in the
1920's that "Herzl's concept of a Jewish state was only possible because
he ignored the presence of the Arabs."36 in 1940 (eight years before the
creation of the state of Israel), Joseph Weitz, then Director of the
Jewish National Fund, wrote in his diaries: "there is no room for both
people in this country . . . There is no room for compromise on this point
... We must not leave a single village, not a single tribe."37 According
to Israeli government data, 45 percent of all Palestinian settlements
disappeared after the establishment of the state of Israel.38
in the early stage of the Zionist settlement, the only method for
the acquisition of land was by means of economic exchange. When the
Zionists became militarily powerful, conquering land replaced buying it.39
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In honoring its Balfour Declaration, the British Mandate helped facilitate
Zionist land acquisition. Arthur Ruppin stated: "on every site where we
purchase land and where we settle people, the present cultivators will
inevitably be dispossessed."40 This set in motion a pattern of colonial
dispossession which led to the Palestinian rebellion of 1936-1939. By
1947, when the British turned the Palestinian question to the U.N., Jewish
landholdings in Palestine was about 8 percent of the whole territory.41
In 1947 the U.N., under pressure of Western powers, awarded 54 percent of
Palestine's land to a Jewish state. The new settler state of Israel
managed to expand its territory from the 54 percent allocated by the U.N.
to 78 percent in 1948.42 Israeli expansion continued further in 1967. The
rest of Palestine's territory and of two neighboring states was conquered
by Israel as a result of the Six-Day War (1967). The 1967 war also
resulted in the evacuation of about three hundred thousand Palestinians
from the West Bank.43 The massive dispossession and population transfer
has been central in Zionist policies. A straightforward statement by the
Israeli journalist, Y. Ben Porat, is representative:
JLV5f! obl^tion of the leadership to openly and bravely
remind the public of truths which have been whitewashed and
blurred in the course of time. One of them is that there is
no Zionism and no settlement and no Jewish state without the
evacuation of the Arabs and the expropriation of lands . .
If the public so desires it will accept Zionism as it is, with
all its implications and "deviations"; if not, it will negate
Zionism from its beginnings until today.44
Many collective settlements were established in the "occupied
territories"—a term that was changed into "the administered territories"
and then "the territories" and eventually "Judaea and Samaria." This is
a typical Zionist posture. Israel Galili, a veteran architect of early
Zionist colonization, openly admitted that the state of Israel was the
product of conquest: "Our right in Gaza is exactly like our right on Tel-
Aviv. We are colonizing Gaza exactly in the same manner in which we
colonized Jaffa." He added: "Those who doubt our right on Gaza should
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doubt our right on Tel-Aviv as well."45 Zionist colonization and
displacement continue unabated. The Jewish National Fund and the state
of Israel own 92 percent of today's Israeli land. Non-Jews have no right
to lease or to farm this land. The remaining 8 percent of the land is
privately owned by Jews and non-Jews.46
Once a settler state is established, then the process of land
acquisition is legalized through state laws. In the words of Heribert
Adam, "legality . . . becomes a substitute for legitimacy."47 In this
context "the separation of legality from legitimacy make it possible to
rule illegitimately with the aid of law."48 This applies to both Israel
and South Africa.
The Absentee Property Law of 1950 in Israel is a case in point.
This law, with the Emergency Regulations, led to the transfer of
Palestinian property into Zionist hands. The Absentee Law considered
every locally born Palestinian who fled the war of 1947-46 as a foreigner
subject to expropriation. The term "Absent-Present" was introduced,
making any person who left his residence between November 29, 1947 and
September 1, 1948 for any place outside Palestine or inside Palestine but
outside Jewish control an absentee and thus denied citizenship.49 In his
book Israel; An Apartheid State. Uri Davis, the Israeli Jewish scholar,
held that the Absentee Law is in contradiction to the U.N. Partition Plan
of 1947. The two million Palestinians defined under this law as absentees
"are constitutionally entitled without qualification to Israeli
citizenship."50 He believed that the denial of Palestinian's citizenship
"is an act of mass denationalization, and a blatant violation of the U.N.
Charter and international law."51 Comparing this with South Africa, Davis
pointed out that the process of denationalization of the Palestinians "is
far more radical and far-reaching than its South African equivalent."52
He explained:
It still remains the case, however, that South African
apartheid recognizes the legal personality of its black
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inhabitants in a way that Zionist apartheid with regard to the
Palestinian Arabs does not. While aiming to exclude its black
inhabitants from citizenship in the Republic of South Africa,
South African apartheid still recognizes them as legal persons
(albeit inferior), and thus predicates the legal mechanism of
their exclusion on the replacement of their citizenship in the
Republic of South Africa with an alternative citizenship,
namely, citizenship in one of the ten bogus ethnic "new
independent states." Through this mechanism the majority of
the inhabitants of the Republic of South Africa, its black
people, are rendered aliens in their own homeland, but they
are not defined out of legal existence.
He added:
In the case of Israel, Zionist apartheid is applied
under the categories of "Jew" versus "non-Jew." Of the almost
three million non-Jewish Palestinian Arabs who are today
entitled, under the constitutional stipulations of the 1947
UN Partition Plan, to Israeli citizenship, less than 25
percent (approximately 700,000 persons) are Israeli citizens.
Under the Absentee Property Law (1950), the state of Israel
has similarly denationalized 75 percent of its non-Jewish
Palestinian Arab inhabitants (over two million persons
classified as "absentees"). However, having classified them
as "absentees" in the eyes of the law, it has thereby not only
defined them as aliens in their own homeland, but has cast
them outside legal existence altogether.
Israel is a state of Jews. According to its Supreme Court, Israel is a
"sovereign state of the Jewish people."55 Similarly, South Africa is a
state for whites. Its conditions are not dissimilar in essence to that
of Israel.
In South Africa the ideology of apartheid was based on similar myth:
The land of South Africa was simply declared vacant; the native did not
exist. The Dutch settlers became Afrikaners as Palestine became Israel.
The natives in both societies were defined in negative terms: non-whites
in South Africa, and non-Jews in Israel. However, unlike Israel, which
seeks to annex the occupied territories, South Africa is giving up land
to fix its demographic problem.
The whites claim 86 percent of South Africa's territory for
themselves. The Group Areas Act, The Native Land Act (1913), and the
Native Trust and Land Act (1936), restricted the areas that are open to
ownership by non-whites to about 14 percent of South Africa's territory.56
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The rest, the poorest land, is divided up into ten "homelands" or
"bantustans." Africans are citizens of their "homeland" and thus not of
South Africa. It is a device for ridding white South Africa of its
unwanted black majority. Africans living in the "common area" are
considered as migrant workers. The Bantustan policy was manifested in the
granting of "independence" of Transkei in 1976, Bophuthat-swana in 1977,
Venda in 1979, and Ciskei in 1981. In these homelands, Africans have the
right to form political parties, carry on election campaigns, and vote for
self government. Accordingly, the Afrikaners claim that apartheid does
not deny African political rights; it only separates Europeans and
Africans by granting each a political home. Africans are forbidden from
living in or owning land in the "white areas." There is also a great deal
of restriction (lifted recently) concerning their freedom of movement.
Such restriction was regulated through several laws such as the Group Area
Act, and the Bantu Law Amendment Act of 1964. Africans in white areas
can travel and reside there only by obtaining official travel documents.
However, the pass laws (repealed in 1986) which controlled black movement
around the country are matched by Israeli restrictions against Palestinian
movement. It is illegal for Palestinian workers who work in Israeli
factories to spend the night inside Israel.57 Indeed, the roots of
Afrikaner discriminatory legislation can be traced back to the South
African Act of 1909, which stated that to be a member of the South African
Parliament, one must be "a British subject of European descent."58 The
1984 constitution of the Republic of South Africa recognizes the "white,"
"coloured," and "Indian," inhabitants (all comprise 25 percent of the
total population) as citizens of the Republic. They are, however,
segregated politically in three separate Houses of Parliament. The rest
of the population, the blacks (comprising 75 percent of the total
population), are denied South African citizenship. Apartheid's version
of the Nuremberg race laws are the Immorality Act and the Prohibition of
Mixed Marriages Act (abolished in 1985). The Population Registration Act
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of 1950, which was introduced by the Nationalist Party, became the
cornerstone of the apartheid system. According to this Act, every person
in South Africa is classified as either white, colored, or black. Thus,
all aspects of life are determined by a racial label which one acquires
at birth.
While the key question in South Africa is who is a white, the key
question in Israel is who is a Jew. However, in the Israeli case one does
not find similar legislations that make overt distinction between the
Jewish and non-Jewish citizens. A noted exception are the following: the
Law of Return (1950), the Nationality Law (1952), and the Status Law.
Israel does not have a written constitution. These three fundamental laws
substitute for a constitution.
Israel's Law of Return and Nationalist Law grant automatic
citizenship to any Jews from anywhere while denying this to Christian and
Muslim Palestinians whose rights to their land go back centuries. A Jew
in Chicago or New York who wishes to live in Israel only has to knock on
the doors of Israel and forthwith becomes a citizen. This is a racist
doctrine which treats all Jews, anywhere, as inchoate citizens of Israel.
One wonders what the reaction of American Jews would be if the United
States Congress passed immigration laws stating that "every Christian has
the right to immigrate to America." Like the concept of "Eretz Yisrael"
(Greater Israel), this Law is inherently expansionist. As long as the
Law of Return operates in Israel, the Zionist state seeks to expand in
order to provide room for the newcomers. The Economist (London) reported
that in wake of recent immigration of Soviet Jews, the Israeli prime
minister, Yitzhak Shamir, stated that "a 'big Israel' was needed to absorb
'a big immigration'"59 (emphasis added). Zionism has made no secret of its
intention to create "Greater Israel"—a land that runs from the Nile to
the Euphrates. This expansionist dream even became a subject of U.S.
criticism when, in May 1989, Secretary of State James Baker told the
annual conference of Israel's lobby, AIPAC (The American Israeli Public
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Affairs Committee) that the time had come for Israel "to lay aside, once
and for all, the unrealistic vision of a Greater Israel."60
Although "apartheid in Israel is overarching legal reality" which
"determines the quality of everyday life," its legal structure, Uri Davis
suggested, is different from that of South Africa.61 The Zionist key legal
distinction ("Jews" versus "non-Jews") is manifested in two levels. The
first one exists in the Constitutions and Articles of Association of all
the Institutions of the Zionist movement, such as the World Zionist
Organization (WZO), the Jewish Agency (JA), and the Jewish National Fund
(JNF) (all of which were granted quasi-governmental status by the state
of Israel in the early 1950's). The Constitutions of these organizations
state clearly their objectives to exclusively promote the Jewish
interests.62 The second level is embodied in the incorporation of those
constitutions into the body of the laws of the state of Israel. Examples
are: The Agricultural Settlement Law (1967), Covenant Between the
Government of Israel and the Jewish National Fund, and others.63 In this
situation, the government and the Jewish institutions become partners in
implementing socio-economic programs which benefit only Israeli Jews. The
policies of the JNF (which covers 92 percent of Israel's land) prohibit
the use of non-Jewish labor. A standard clause in JNF leasehold reads:
"The lessee undertakes to execute all works on the holding . . . only and
exclusively with Jewish labourers."64 As Rosella Tekiner noted, the Status
Law "facilitates legal, economic, political and social discrimination
against Arabs by delegating a wide range of national service to Zionist
institutions serving only Jews."65 Another discriminatory practice (not
easily recognized) is the question of financial aid which the government
provided to Israeli families. The Discharged Soldiers Law restricted the
subsidies to soldiers or members of their family only.66 Since most
Israeli Arabs are not allowed to serve in the army, they become "deprived
of certain national insurance benefits, government backed mortgages,
scholarships, and the discharge papers demanded by many prospective Jewish
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employers."67 Thus, through such devices, the Zionist state was able to
maintain its apartheid system without explicit mention of "Jew" as a legal
category vs. "non-Jew."
In addition to these laws, the religious authorities, who have a
great say in determining personal status, have contributed to Zionist
discrimination. Because they hold the final decision of who is and is not
a Jew, the rabbinical courts affect the applicant's ability to claim
Israeli citizenship.
It is well-known that the definition of a Jew remains one of the
most controversial subjects in Israeli politics. The issue is connected
to critical questions such as: What is the nationality status of a child
of a mixed marriage when the mother is not a Jew? If a Jew converted to
Christianity, is he or she eligible for citizenship according to the law
of return?
It is remarkable to know that the state of Israel, through the
Ministry of Religious Affairs, recognizes only one of the three
contemporary Jewish confessions, the minority orthodox rabbinate. The
other two Jewish confessions (the conservative and reform) are denied
recognition in Israel.68 Thus, both conservative and reform Jewish Rabbis
can perform religious business such as marriage, divorce, etc. everywhere
in the world with the exception of Israel's territory.69 In Israel, the
definition of a Jew is one who was born to a Jewish mother or converted
to Judaism by the orthodox rabbinate.70
It is ironic that Israel is presented to the world as a secular
democracy while in reality it is regulated as a Jewish state. Civil
marriage is not permitted, and the Israeli Law of Marriage and Divorce
prohibits Jews from marrying non-Jews. Maintaining "Jewish purity" is
seen as a vital matter. Golda Meier, a former Israeli prime minister,
expressed fear from increasing cases of mixed marriage.71 Rabbi Levin, a
Knesset member, put it clearly: "We are not religious and not national,
but we are special people, God's people . . . genuinely different from all
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people."72 I.F. Stone wrote:
For Israel is creating a kind of moral schizophrenia in world
Jewry. In the outside world the welfare of Jewry depends on
the maintenance of secular, non-racial, pluralistic societies.
In Israel, Jewry finds itself defending a society in which
mixed marriages cannot be legalized, in which non-Jews have
a lesser status than Jews, and in which the ideal is racial
and exclusionist. Jews might fight elsewhere for their very
security and existence—against principles and practices they
find themselves defending in Israel.
A government does not need to emulate Pretoria, openly proclaiming social
segregation, to be judged a racial state. In 1965, the U.N. defined
racial discrimination as "any distinction, exclusion, restriction or
preference based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin."74
This definition provided the basis for the U.N. resolution of 1975, which
stated that "Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination."
In addition to the myths of the "empty land" and "civilizing
mission," Biblical themes were used to justify and rationalize the claim
to the land and the dominant position of the governing groups in Israel
and South Africa. Both Afrikaners and Zionists see themselves as God's
"chosen people" to fulfill a divine mission—a position which explains
their superiority and the necessity to be separated from the "lesser"
people around them. They have a sense of special destiny among people of
the world and are motivated by concepts of a "promised land," a "new
Israel," and a people "destined to be a light among nations."
In South African apartheid, the Bible is central as a document in
which the Afrikaners' rights are stated. Calvinism (to which the white
settlers adhered) inspired Afrikaners to draw a parallel between
themselves and the ancient children of Israel. They see themselves as a
sort of Israel in Africa, and interpreted their history in a manner that
corresponds with and mirrors that of ancient Israel. "It was the Old
Testament and the doctrines of Calvin that moulded the Boer into the
Afrikaner of today," Sheila Patterson stated.75 Afrikaner settlements
were given biblical names such as: "Betlehem, Nasareth, Bethan,
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Oalmanutha and Benoni."76 The Afrikaners see that their victory over the
natives and their survival in Africa was divinely ordained. Using the
Calvinist concept of elect, Afrikaners classified all whites as the elect
and non-whites as the damned. The Afrikaner interpretation of the chosen
concept led to the establishment of three basic principles of apartheid:
A) Afrikaners have a divine mission to guide and civilize Africans; B) As
a chosen people, they must not interbreed with other people; and C)
Afrikaners' right of ownership over the land is unquestionable because it
is God's promised land given to them. Afrikaners contend that the color
line was created by God and thus racial differences among people must be
preserved, for these differences represent God's will.
The Zionists, too, used the Bible to justify their claim to the land
and their privileged position in Palestine. In this respect, Zionism has
a lesser problem. The Old Testament has frequent references to the Jewish
people as a "chosen," "holy," and "spiritual" people. It also emphasized
the idea of Palestine as a promised land given to them by God. David Ben-
Gurion, the first Israeli prime minister, described the Bible as the
"sacrosanct title-deed to Palestine."77 This is an important reason for
the significance attached to the Old Testament in Zionist ideology. The
land of Israel is of cardinal importance. The Zionist philosopher, Martin
Buber, wrote: "The world can be redeemed only by the redemption of Israel
and Israel can be redeemed only by the reunion with its land."78 The Chief
Rabbi in Israel, Rabbi Nissim, stated in 1968: "The Land of Israel was,
with its border, defined for us by Divine Providence ... In this
connection it is not a question of law or logic; neither is it a matter
of human treatment or that sort of thing."79 Accordingly, the Zionists
see the colonization of Palestine as nothing more than reclaiming what is
Biblically theirs and the fulfillment of Biblical prophecy. Hence, the
removal of the Palestinians (who were identified with the Amorites of the
past) from the God-given land is seen as a necessary step for the purity
and security of the Jewish people. Palestinian opposition represents
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resistance to Israel's eternal battle to overcome the forces of evil.
With God on the side of Israel, Palestinian resistance will be overcome
like the "Canaanites" or "Ishmaelites" of ancient times. Current history
and all its manifestations (the rebirth of Israel, its victory in six
wars, even its invasion of Lebanon) reflected the redemption process,
which eventually leads to the return of the Messiah. It should be stated
that this view is shared by Protestant fundamentalists. In her book
Prophecy and Politics. Grace Halsell pointedly noted that those
fundamentalists hailed the invasion of Lebanon as "God's will" and a
"sacred war."80 They also share several basic Zionist principles, such as
the necessity for the removal of Palestinians from Israel's land,81 and the
return of the Jews to Palestine as a fulfillment of prophecy and a
precondition for the second coming of Christ.82
The Zionist use of religious themes sought to rationalize current
Israeli policies such as the establishment of a Jewish settlement in the
occupied territories and the occupation of Lebanon's land. The Israeli
presence in Lebanon is seen as a sign of the fulfillment of Biblical
prophecy stated in Deuteronomy 2:24: "Every place where the sole of your
foot shall tread shall be yours: From the wilderness and Lebanon, from
the river, the river Euphrates, even unto the hinder sea shall be your
border."83 South Africa, too, explained its successful penetration in
Angola as a sign of divine intervention.84 Both Israel and South Africa
have similar policies of incursions into, and occupation of, their
neighbors.
The political dynamics of apartheid and Zionism extended to
neighboring states. Both regimes have sought to deal with their
international situation by intimidating their neighbors with repeated
attacks. Both Israel and South Africa have played the role of regional
superpower, which often requires crossing international borders (South
Africa in Angola, Lesotho, and Mozambique; Israel in Lebanon). They also
tend to create surrogate forces to protect their interests. "The
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equivalent of Hadad and the Falangists in Lebanon is Savimbi's UNITA in
Angola or the South African backed MRM in Mozambique."85 They share a
similar perception of the external world as a hostile environment that
needs to be overcome. The two systems are "alike" in their "siege or
fortress mentality."86 The Zionists and the Afrikaners emphasize the
notion that "the rest of the world is against us." They view "themselves
as embattled and persecuted peoples struggling valiantly to preserve
themselves and their civilized values in an environment of barbarians and
terrorists."87 This is, as Heribert Adam saw it, "an ideology of survival"
which requires "the manufacturing of enemies and threats" in order to
enhance the unity of the ruling groups in both societies.88 Since its
inception, settler colonialism was concerned about the settler's survival,
which often took place at the expense of the local people. Thus, "in the
name of the right of the immigrant peoples to survive in a new land" the
indigenous population "have been pushed off their ancestral lands, driven
to or relocated in smaller, poorer areas, utilized as relatively cheap and
defenseless labor, and denied effective political or civil rights."89
To summarize, it is evident that the two systems share analogous
backgrounds, political perceptions, commitments to separatist ideologies,
and restless natives in their midst. All of these factors helped to
establish a sense of kinship and solidarity between the two regimes. The
head Rabbi of the Great Synagogue of Capetown stated: "I am convinced
that the Afrikaner and the Israeli are made of the same metal. They share
an awareness of calling and a right of self-determination which neither
dare abandon."90 However, there is more to the link than ideological
affinity. There is a long history of cooperation between Zionist leaders
and that of South Africa which led to growing and ever deepening relations
in the economic, political, and military fields.
The roots of their relationship go back to the early years of this
century. Three men, Jan Smuts, Chaim Weizmarm, and Lord Balfour,
dominated the relationship between South Africa, the World Zionist
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Organization, and the British government. Those three politicians
contributed to the birth of the South African Union of 1910 and the
Balfour Declaration, of 1917. The contribution of Chaim Weizmann (the
British Zionist leader and later first president of Israel) to the wartime
effort by his discoveries of high explosive materials/ enabled him to
cultivate the friendship of Britain's highest political figures. Balfour
was instrumental in authoring legislation for the establishment of the
South African State in 1910. His argument was that: "You cannot give the
natives in South Africa equal rights with the whites without threatening
the whole fabric of white civilization."91 Seven years later, Jan Smuts,
South Africa's celebrated prime minister, played an important role in
helping draft the 1917 Balfour Declaration, promising a "Jewish homeland"
in Palestine.
Smuts and Weizmann met for the first time in London in 1917.92 At
the time, Smuts was a "special delegate" from South Africa and War
Cabinate. Weizmann was President of the English Zionist Federation. The
meeting was successful and friendly, whereby the two men recognized their
similarities and common interests. Weizmann found Smuts to be very
sympathetic to the Zionist cause because of its link with British
interests, and also because it was, in the words of Weizmann, "a simple
question of the 'desert versus civilization. "*93 On this Professor Richard
Stevens commented:
In short, the subordinate position of the African majority in
South Africa posed no difficulty for Weizmann, nor did it
detract from the respect felt by the "New Moses," as Smuts
called Weizmann, for the South African leader. Similarly,
Smuts assumed without question "the right" of Jewish settlers
to occupy Palestine without regard to the rights of the
indigenous Palestinian Arabs. In both cases, Smuts and
Weizmann projected at the highest level the capacity of
Western civilization to rationalize domination and
exploitation, conquest and control, as Christian civilizing
mission or as ethnocentric Judeo-Christian fulfillment.
In a meeting of the South African Board of Deputies and the Zionist
Federation, held in 1919, Smuts stated:
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I need not remind you that the white people of South Africa,
and especially the older Dutch population, has been brought
up almost entirely on Jewish tradition. The Old Testament,
the most wonderful literature ever thought out by the brain
of man, the Old Testament has been the very matrix of Dutch
culture here in South Africa . . .
That is the basis of our culture in South Africa, that
is the basis of our white culture, and it is the basis of your
Jewish culture; and therefore we are standing together on a
common platform, the greatest spiritual platform the world
has ever seen. On that platform I want us to build the future
South Africa.95
Three decades later (1949), Smuts reemphasized his conviction about the
"special" historical role of the Jewish people. He stated: "I do not
think that at any other stage in history has there been an event of such
far-reaching importance as the return of the Jewish people to their
ancient homeland."96 Smuts used his influence at the U.N. in favor of
Zionism during a discussion concerning the partition of Palestine.97 When
Smuts passed away in September 1950, the then acting Israeli prime
minister, Joseph Sprinzak, declared: "General Smuts is written on the map
of Israel and in the heart of our nation."98 Two years later in March
1952, Israel dedicated its "living memorial" to Jan Smuts. Alfred Moleah
suggested that although the efforts of Weizmann and Smuts played an
important role in initiating the alliance between Israel and South Africa,
such an alliance was indeed created "by the objective conditions of their
situation and goals."99 Similarly, Richard Stevens saw the personal
interaction between the two men as "a microcosm of all the cultural,
economic, political, and imperial factors converging in the triangular
relationship of Zionism, Britain, and South Africa."100
The year 1948 marked both the declaration of the state of Israel and
the accession to power of the National Party in South Africa. Dr. Malan,
the architect of apartheid, declared his government to be the first to
recognize Israel. In 1953, Malan was the first prime minister to visit
Israel. His government permitted South African Jewish Reserve officers
to serve in the Israeli army and eased the transfer of Jewish donations
257
to Israel.101 In return, the South African Jewish community (considered
the most Zionist, and wealthiest, Jewish community in the world, and also
the highest per capita contributor to the state of Israel), toned down
their criticism of apartheid policies. This position was reflected in the
following statement given by Rabbi M.C. Weiler at the eighth International
Conference of the World Union for Progressive Judaism in London in 1953:
The Jews as a community had decided to take no stand on the
native question, because they were involved with the problem
of assisting Jewry in other lands. South African Jewry was
doing more to help Israel than any other group. The community
could not ask for the government's permission to export funds
and goods and, at the same time, object to the government.™2
Hoping to gain the support of the newly independent African states, the
Israeli government began to criticize South African policies of apartheid.
In response, Dr. Handrik Verwored, a former South African prime minister,
declared that "the Jews took Israel from the Arabs after the Arabs had
lived there fore a thousand years. In that I agree with them, Israel like
South Africa is an apartheid state."103 However, that was not serious, for
the ties between the two systems were too deep to suddenly disappear.
In the wake of the Six-Day War (1967), Israel and South Africa were
drawn increasingly closer. Upon Israeli initiative, the Israeli-South
AFrican Friendship League was established, and Menachem Begin was made its
first president.104 In South Africa, Harry Oppenheimer helped to create
the Israeli-South African Man-to-Man Committee, which led to the
establishment of the Israel-South Africa Trade Association.105 Business
was promoted especially in the form of joint investment ventures.106 The
two countries helped each other in time of difficulties (the first U.N.
arms embargo against South Africa in 1963 and de Gaulle's 1967 embargo
against arms to Israel) by exchanging Mirage aircraft and parts.107 It was
reported that Israeli licenses for weapon systems such as the Uzi
Submachine gun, the Galil assault rifle, and Gabriel ship-to-ship
missiles, were granted to South Africa.108 In his book, Israel's Global
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Role: Weapons for Repression. Israel Shahak stated that South Africa
became "Israel's single largest weapons customer."109 Even the AIPAC
(American Israeli Public Affairs Committee) was forced to admit that
"Israel has become South Africa's growing bilateral trade partner."110 On
this, the Israeli Newspaper, Maariv. published "A Letter to a Dear South
African Friend" by the Israeli author Ephraim Sidon, which read:
You can oppress, discriminate, shoot Blacks
Be racist—that's no tragedy
As long as the dead Black
Was shot by an Uzi round.
And if the head was split open with a club
Which was made in Israel
We will be the last ones in the world
To make a fuss over apartheid . . .
At times, as general lip service,
We'll condemn and say "not very nice"
But better one Kfir in the hand
Than three speeches coming out of our mouth.
And the arms will flow
No, we will not stop.
This is signed
In black and white.
That's because we have a
Long-term policy:
Money has no smell
And certainly no color.
Anyway, my good friend
In Pretoria,
Over here economics
Is more desirable than history.




It is obvious that the aftermath of the 1967 war crystallized Israel and
South Africa's communality of interest. As Die Burger. an organ of the
National Party in the Cape Province, put it clearly:
Israel and South Africa have a common lot. Both are engaged
in a struggle for existence, and both are in constant clash
with the decisive majorities in the United Nations. Both are
reliable foci of strength within the region, which would,
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without them, fall into anti-Western anarchy. It is in South
Africa's interest that Israel is successful in containing her
enemies, who are among our own most vicious enemies; and
Israel would have all the world against it if the navigation
route around the Cape of Good Hope should be out of operation
because South Africa's control is undermined. The anti-
Western powers have driven Israel and South Africa into a
community, of interests which had better be utilized than
denied.rT2
In the same line of thinking, the Jewish Affairs, the official organ of
the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, stated:
The argument that Israel and South Africa have a basic
community of interest in the Middle East and further south has
more than a grain of truth in it. There is nothing secret or
sinister about it. The strong ties between the two countries,
closer than ever since the 1967 war, are inseparable from
their geographical and strategic position, from their anti-
communist outlook, and from all the realities of their
national existence ... In short, the destinies of the two
countries, so different in many ways, but so alike in the
fundamental conditions of their survival, are interwoven in
a much more meaningful sense than any enemy propagandist could
conceive, or, for that matter, would be happy to see.
Economic, political and military links between the two
countries grew rapidly in the subsequent years. 3
Indeed, Israel became a significant arms exporter, providing
military and intelligence assistance not only to South Africa but to
several dictatorships and pariah states. In his book, The Israeli
Connection: Who Israel Arms and Why (1987), Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, the
Israeli scholar, wrote: "Mention any trouble spot in the Third World over
ten years and inevitably you will find smiling Israeli officers and shiny
Israeli weapons on the news pages."114 Hallahmi argued that beside
"technology, armaments, and experience ..." the Israelis export "a
certain frame of mind, a feeling that the third world can be controlled
and dominated, that radical movement in the third world can be stopped,
that modern crusaders still have a future."115
As a result of the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, relations between the
two countries flowered and were expanded in all fields. The then South
African prime minister Vorster declared "that if Israel lost the war, its
defeat would have important consequences for South Africa."116 Vorster's
260
visit to Israel in 1976 concluded several agreements of cooperation
between the two states.117 Despite the 1977 U.N. embargo against South
Africa, the Israelis continued supplying South Africa with technology and
advanced weapons in exchange for South African money and raw material.116
The potential interdependence between the two countries was clearly
indicated by Itzhak Unna, Israel's ambassador to South Africa, when he
said: "With South Africa's abundance of raw materials and Israel's know-
how, we can really go places if we join forces."119 He also argued for the
importance "for Israel and South Africa to stick together in order to
confront the alliance of Africa and the Arab World."120
Equally important is the cooperation in the field of nuclear
technology. Between 1977 and 1979, the CIA noticed "a steady stream of
visits to South Africa by Israeli nuclear scientists, technicians, and
defense officials."121 In 1979, a "flash in the Southern skies" was
believed to be a secret nuclear test conducted by Israel and South
Africa.122 Evidence of such collaboration surfaced when, in October 1986,
the Sunday Times (London) published the revelation of Mordechi Vanunu (a
defected Israeli nuclear technician who was kidnapped later by the Mossad
and brought back to Israel), in which he pointed to the presence of South
African technicians at the Dimond Plant.123 In June 1989 the Gurdian
reported that South Africa was prepared to test a medium-range nuclear
missile developed in cooperation with Israel.124 In a review article, the
editors of the Sunday Times of London (1984) described the connection
between Tel-Aviv and Pretoria as a "major new force on the world scene."125
Alfred Moleah pointedly noted that Israel-South Africa "links became
organic."126 In December 1984, the U.N. passed Resolution 39/72C on
Israel-South Africa relations, in which the U.N. "again strongly condemned
the continuing and increasing collaboration of Israel with the racist
regime of South Africa, especially in the military and nuclear fields."127
For those who advocate sanction against South Africa, Israel's
involvement represents a great obstacle. Carole Collins, former national
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coordinator of the Campaign to Oppose Bank Loans to South Africa,
explained:
Israel is now the biggest hole in the growing fence of
sanctions surrounding apartheid South Africa. Israel is
forcing the anti-apartheid movement—even the UN corridors-
-to ask: will we have to boycott Israel in the future to
support the liberation of South Africa?128
The Financial Times of London (1986) described Israel as "a weak link in
the chain of international sanction."129 In 1987, the Israeli Defense
Minister Izhak Rabin gave one reason for Israel's opposition to sanctions
against South Africa: "If we were up to the UN we would be the second in
line."130
Israel's connection with South Africa has been a subject of the
U.N.'s criticism. The United Nations Centre Against Apartheid has
published several reports about the progress of the ties between the two
states.131 Archbishop Desmond Tutu condemned Israel's ties with South
Africa and described the ill treatment of the Palestinians as "totally
inconsistent with who she [Israel] is."132 In his recent visit to
Jerusalem (December 1989), Tutu "supported the Palestinian people's right
to self-determination" and "wasted no time in comparing events in the
occupied territories with those in South Africa."133 In an interview in
Jerusalem, Tutu stated that if he had the chance to meet the Israeli prime
minister "I would say to him that I cannot myself understand people who
have suffered, as Jews have suffered, inflicting suffering of the kind
that I have seen on the Palestinian."134
Equally extensive is the scope and volume of intelligence and
military cooperation. The Economist (London) reported that Israeli
engineers assisted to "develop a sensitive surveillance system using
highly sophisticated electronic detection equipment along South Africa's
border aimed at detecting guerrilla attacks."135 In his book, The
Unnatural Alliance. James Adams (formerly defense correspondent and now
features editor of the Sunday Times of London) described the Israeli-
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South African partnership as being "one of the most significant strategic
alliances of the past ten years," and suggested that "neither country is
prepared to admit how interdependent they have become and yet this will
affect forever the balance of power on the African continent, the
stability of the Middle East."136
However, by 1987 the Israeli position, because of U.S. pressure, was
not to sign further contracts with South Africa.137 In January 1987
Newsweek reported that Defense Minister Rabin made a secret trip to South
Africa and told Pretoria's government that "the alliance can continue but
much more quietly."138 It was also reported that Israeli officials urged
Israeli newspaper editors to "stay away from this [the relation with South
Africa] sensitive matter of national interest."139 Cooperation has
continued unabated. In 1988 "50 Israeli aircraft engineers and
technicians has signed contracts with South African Aircraft Industries
to work on the Cheetah."140 In 1989, "South Africa was preparing to test
a medium-range nuclear missile . . . developed in cooperation with
Israel." The New York Times reported that Israeli ties with Pretoria
involved "hundreds if not thousands of jobs in Israeli military industries
and several hundred million dollars in earnings."141
The "homelands," too, have growing ties with Israel. Israeli
companies are involved in several projects in the homelands.142 The
extensive Israeli involvement in the homelands "including trade offices
in Israel" is considered as "a kind of de facto recognition."143 Israel
is the only country which treats the homelands as independent states. In
Israel "the bantustans of Transkei and Bophuthatswana are listed among the
other nations in the international dialing section of the directory of the
government-run telephone company."144 Israelis serve as guards protecting
leaders of Ciskei. In late 1984, President Lennox Sebe of Ciskei visited
Israel and signed the agreement of the "twinning" of the West Bank
Settlement Ariel with Bisho, the capital of Ciskei.145 During the ceremony
several Israeli Knesset members hailed "Israeli-Ciskeian brotherhood and
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a common struggle against a cruel world of double standards."146 Israel,
it was reported, helped to develop a small air force for Ciskei.147 The
extensive Israeli involvement in the homelands added another dimension to
the nature of the Israeli-South African link.
To conclude, the Israeli-South African connection is not based on
economic and political pragmatism; rather, it is based on philosophies of
separation and exclusion which are the essence of Zionism and apartheid.
The alliance "is a matter of true national consensus"148 which is "based
on an identity of position and goals."149 Both regimes are committed to
a practical policy of apartheid, though Israel does not formally employ
the term. In both societies, social segregation is the practice which is
enforced by members of the dominant groups. One can argue about the
relative differences between the two cases, but the essence is the same.
Both regimes follow domestic policies based on race discrimination, which
is a logical consequence of settler colonialism. As the evidence reviewed
suggested, Zionism is not a liberation or progressive movement. Rather,
it is a racist ideology whose ethnic policies lead in the same direction
of South African apartheid: expropriation of the lands of other people,
denying the natives' fundamental human and political rights, and
practicing extreme discrimination based on race superiority and purity
using the myth of fulfilling a divine mission.
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